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Abstract 
Constitutions play crucial role as they are the long-term contracts between those ruled and the 
rulers that specify the conditions on which power is to be exercised. More importantly, 
legislatures are an institution of governance that plays a significant role when they perform 
their basic roles of oversight, representation and lawmaking. However, in many developing 
countries, legislatures are weak and ineffective, hence horizontal accountability is weakened. 
The onset of democratic governance in the 1990s witnessed the birth of new constitutions and 
changes in governance structures, and parliaments begun to exert their influence forcefully. 
This thesis, a case study, examines how the new constitutional revisions in Kenya have 
affected the position of Kenya Parliament, touted as one of the most independent and most 
autonomous in Africa.  
The Kenyan Parliament has not only become complex in its operations, it has also 
become extremely independent by playing its crucial role in a continuous system of check and 
balances. This thesis gives a background analysis of the dismantling of the independent 
constitution and the emasculation of powers by the Presidency. It shows the path the Kenyan 
legislature has taken, from an appendage legislature in the 1960s to an emerging legislature in 
the 1990s and finally to a transformative legislature it has transformed to-date. 
In the new paradigm shift, the thesis measures the strength of the Kenyan Parliament 
using the Fish and Kroenig Parliamentary Survey Index based on 32 items that measure four 
different indicators of parliamentary strength. This thesis compares in the process, two 
constitutions and how they fare on the Kenya parliament. With two constitutions, one based 
on a hybrid model (former constitution) and the other one based on a pure presidential model 
(new constitution), the power shift in governance is apparent. Based on the results of the 
survey, premised on the research question, the thesis has come to the conclusion that the new 
constitution has indeed strengthened Parliament immensely. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Does Kenya have a shot at democracy after getting one of the most progressive constitutions 
in the world, or will it experience a “reverse wave” of democratization or experience a 
“stagnation of freedom” that Samuel Huntington’s historical model seemed to suggest, with 
many more countries falling back from democracy to authoritarianism than moving in the 
other direction (Diamond & Plattner, 2009: x)? The answer may depend on the strength of the 
Kenyan legislature
1
 and the full implementation of the new constitution that came in effect in 
August 2010. Partly to deal with the problems that led to the post-election violence of 2008, 
the new constitution radically devolved powers to the 47 new counties, and to other 
governance institutions including a bicameral Parliament. The choice of distributing power 
among the various institutions of governance in the true sense of "separation of powers", or 
checks and balances, hold the key to Kenya's promising democracy and political future. 
Kenyans have learned from past experience that the overload of the presidency that 
encroaches on other institutions, and its immense powers, unchecked by a legislature and a 
judiciary with no teeth to bite, lead to abuse of power. Without working systems that can 
provide what Diamond, Plattner, and Schedler (1999: 2) call "credible restraints", the quality 
of democratic regimes - in this case Kenya - will remain low and corrupt and will not be in a 
position to safeguard basic civil rights.  
This thesis examines the following research question: How have the constitutional 
revisions in Kenya affected Parliament’s position in the political system? With weakened 
institutions and an overbearing executive, the Kenyan Parliament under the former 
constitution has over the years (1966-1998) lost most of its powers of oversight and 
legislation. It has been reduced to a Parliament that rubberstamps legislation with legislators 
reduced to performing only constituency service. The new constitution, promulgated in 
August 2010, has on the other hand devolved governance and strengthened other institutions 
including the legislature. This paper contends that the transition to democracy (that stalled 
midway after the opposition won the elections in 2002) is back on track, now that Kenya has a 
transformative democratic constitution that provides a sound legal framework for 
constitutional and democratic governance. With an increasing robust and empowered 
Parliament that holds the executive and other actors accountable and a reformed judiciary that 
is becoming increasingly independent, the Executive has no choice but to respect the rule of 
law as laid down in the new constitution. As Hughes (2005: 225) puts it, the nature of the 
                                                          
1
 This thesis uses the words parliament, national assembly and legislature interchangeably for the generic word, 
legislature. 
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relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government is only laid bare 
when tested. This is true in the Kenyan context under the new constitution as evidenced in 
2011 when Parliament and the Judiciary rejected the President’s appointments of persons as 
Chief Justice, Attorney-general and Chief of Public Prosecutions, as unconstitutional.  
According to Salih (2005b: 20), when the constitutional arrangements that make up 
the democratic governance of society are broadly defined, it is obvious that Parliaments or 
legislatures are at the heart of governance and of the national integrity system that citizens 
entrust with the burdensome task of ensuring that democratic states, aided by the constitution, 
fulfil their function in the interest of the citizens. It is this interwoven relationship between 
legislatures and constitutions – that each defines the other – that motivates me to analyse the 
new constitution in Kenya and the power that it has given to Parliament.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows: the second chapter draws on the historical 
perspective on Kenya’s quest for a new constitution. It starts with the independent 
constitution and through summarized historical moments, leads us along the path the first 
independent leaders of Kenya took in dismantling and amending the constitution by 
strengthening the executive and weakening other institutions including Parliament, which was 
reduced to a rubberstamp institution. The chapter also briefly touches on the transition to 
multiparty politics and mentions a key driver to the new constitution: The National Accord 
and Reconciliation Act. The chapter then highlights on how the new constitution will be 
operationalized and implemented and the provisions that will become operational after the 
next general elections. It concludes with analysis and observation of the Kenyan Parliament 
from independence to its current form. 
Chapter three is the theory chapter where I look at the key concepts under examination 
in the thesis. This theory chapter has a three-prong approach that gives a theoretical 
framework with regards to the research question. First, it discusses constitutions in democratic 
theory. This will be followed by a discussion of accountability. It highlights both horizontal 
and vertical accountability. Finally, the chapter ends with a conceptual framework of 
legislatures. It briefly examines the question on how weakness on the part of legislature 
undermines horizontal accountability, discusses legislative-executive relations and ends with 
the generic role of legislatures.  
Chapter four introduces the methodology and the choice of method, that is, the 
qualitative study method. In this chapter, the choice of case study method and its goals will be 
discussed. The chapter will introduce the means of measurement that will be used to analyse 
the data. The means of measurement to be used are the Fish and Koenig 32 survey items that 
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measure various indicators of Parliamentary powers. A section in the chapter will discuss the 
data research sources and then introduce the survey items that will be used to do a 
comparative analysis of the former constitution and the new constitution.  
Chapter five operationalizes the data by getting data for all the 32 items under survey. 
The 32 items are also divided into four categories or indicators that measure different 
strengths of parliament. 
Chapter six analyses the results of the data collected in chapter five. It compares the 
results and analyses the weaknesses of the Kenyan Parliament under the former constitution 
and then with the new constitution. It concludes that the strength of the Parliament under the 
new constitution is double what it was under the former constitution in some indicators. The 
final results show that the strength or power of the legislature nearly doubled with the new 
constitution. Chapter seven is the final chapter and concludes the whole study.  
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2.0 Background 
This chapter briefly focuses on Parliamentary democracy in African countries during the 
decades of one-party states and then with the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. 
It discusses the independent constitution in Kenya, its dismantling leading to the agitation for 
reforms. In addition, the chapter briefly discusses the events of 2008 post-election violence 
and aftermath leading to a new constitution. It ends with looking at the three forms of 
evolution of the Kenyan Parliament. 
2.1. Parliamentary Capacities in African Countries  
Parliamentary democracy, the bedrock of good governance and accountability has witnessed 
phenomenal growth on the continent of Africa since the early 1990s (Ruszkowski, June 2011: 
7). It was the period in the 1990s with the introduction of multiparty democracy in Africa that 
democratic elected governments came to power in free and fair elections in a number of 
countries. It is the wave of democratization worldwide that began in the late 1970s through 
the early 1990s that attention was focused on the evolutions of legislatures in new 
democracies (Carey et al 2002: 352). According to Carey et al (2002: 352), the interest is both 
motivated by the windfall of empirical cases triggered by regime transitions, and by a 
normative commitment to the idea that strong legislatures are essential to the performance of 
democratic institutions. Barkan (2008, 2009) acknowledges that there are few scholars who 
have delved into the questions of when and why legislatures evolve into significant political 
institutions in nascent democracies, or why this happens in some countries and not others. He 
points out that there are no systematic cross-national explorations of the relationship between 
legislative development and “third-wave” democratization save for two notable exceptions by 
M. Stephen Fish and Michael Kroenig, “The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global 
Survey”2 and M. Stephen Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies”. Barkan argues 
that the work on Africa has been limited to a mere handful of case studies, none of which is 
comparable in scope and as a result, our theoretical understanding of legislative development 
in this context of emerging democracies, and of Africa in particular, is still at an early stage 
(Barkan, 2008: 125).  
Based on the assumption that Africa’s democratic consolidation is better served by an 
autonomous and influential parliament capable of holding the executive accountable (Wang, 
2005: 183), and the examination of this relationship between the legislatures and democratic 
consolidation of six African states (Barkan, 2008) came up with one principal finding. That if 
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 This survey is used and discussed extensively in the methodology chapter. 
5 
 
legislatures evolve into significant institutions of countervailing power – thereby contributing 
to democratization – it is for many reasons other than recurring “free and fair” elections. On 
the other hand, the analysis of post-communist legislatures by Fish (2009: 198) also 
concluded “that the presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for 
democratization”. For Fish, then, the overriding priority in constitutional design is to create a 
powerful legislature (Diamond & Plattner, 2009: xxiii). According to Salih (2005b: 3-4), 
African legislatures are caught between two competing roles as first, part of the machinery 
that confers legitimacy on governments and makes or breaks governments by exercising the 
right to a vote of confidence. And second, as pivotal oversight institutions responsible for 
scrutinizing the activities of government in order to maintain high-quality governance and 
safeguard the public interest vis-à-vis any attempt by the executive to conflate public and 
private interest. 
The focus of this thesis is on the power relationship between parliaments and the 
executive as well as the capacity for parliament to check on the executive in what is referred 
as horizontal accountability. While the focus of the thesis is primarily on the Kenyan 
Parliament, the experiences and growth of this institution is similar to the experience and 
characteristics of other African Parliaments, and probably in other parts of the developing 
world. From scholars such as (Pitkin, 1967), (Mezey, 1979), (Fish, 2006), (Johnson, 2005) to 
(Barkan, 2008) and several others, the general observation is that Parliaments plays a 
significant role in the development and performance of democracy. In theory, Doorenspleet 
(2005: 79) agrees that legislatures are believed to have important latent or symbolic functions 
for the consolidation of democratic regimes. In a consolidated democracy, the legislature is 
stabilized and functions in a democratic way, and democratic rules are accepted “as the only 
game in town” (Linz 1990 in Doorenspleet, 2005: 79). In practice, however, the contributions 
of legislatures in new democracies are more controversial as many scholars have debated 
whether new African democracies suffer from a “democratic deficit” (Doorenspleet, 2005: 
79).  
Few legislatures actually legislate; many have limited powers and most are clearly 
overruled by the executive power, and this weakness of Parliaments allow for only limited 
accountability and responsiveness producing a democratic deficit (Doorenspleet, 2005: 80). 
The concentration of this thesis then will be on the structural features of the Kenyan 
legislature, such as the legislative-executive relations or institutional influence, institutional 
capacity, specified powers, and institutional autonomy. Kenya is, indeed, an interesting case 
to study as it provides some useful insights into the consolidation of democracy in Africa in 
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general. Firstly, it has undergone some form of transition to democracy from one-party 
dictatorship to a multiparty democracy in the beginning of the 1990s, to a change of 
government through peaceful means. Secondly, it is a case study and a first in Africa, to have 
a coalition government that shares power on an equal basis. Thirdly, it has managed to change 
to a new constitution which has drastically changed the governance system in Kenya. It is this 
change, or revisions in its constitution, which has motivated me to seek to inquire how the 
new constitutional dispensation has affected the powers of Parliament. 
2.2 Why African Parliaments Are Weak 
There is a configuration of factors unique to sub-Saharan Africa and consisting of two 
principal elements that make African legislatures historically weak institutions that are a 
major disincentive for members to perform the three core and collective functions (Barkan, 
Mattes, Mozaffar, & Smiddy, 2010: 3). These elements are: (1) Africa’s demographics 
particularly the fact that most African societies are poor, agrarian, plural, and unevenly 
developed societies (Ake); and (2) The colonial legacy, especially the formal rules (e.g. 
constitutions, standing orders) that established the basis for today’s legislatures in the run-up 
to independence (Barkan et al. 2010: 3). According to Salih (2005a: 260-261), the generic 
functions are not different from those of other Parliaments. However, they differ markedly in 
terms of political cultures within which they deliver their universal parliamentary functions. 
Salih (2005a: 260) contends that African Parliaments operate as the pulse of society 
representing not only the modern forces (public, civil society, and party); they are also slaves 
of African ethnicity, regional interests and patronage. Thus, in many nascent and developing 
democracies, the Parliament may be the only institution capable of providing checks and 
balances that prevents the executive from monopolizing power (Mandelbaum, 2011: 5). 
African Parliamentarians often undertake more burdensome functions, such as managing local 
conflicts and participating in social events, from marriage ceremonies to death celebrations 
(Salih, 2005a: 260). To be able to have a clear insight into the Parliaments in Africa, it is best 
to discuss them under the two periods. These are the period under one-party system and then 
the period under multi-party system. 
 
2.3 African Parliaments in One-Party and Multi-Party Systems 
It should be noted though, that when Africa began to experiment with the norms of her first 
advisory councils/legislative assemblies and even contesting the first elections ever in the 
history of the continent, the political parties were embryonic (Salih, 2005b: 6-7); and at the 
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dawn of independence Africans’ exposure to Western-style political parties and assemblies 
was too short to ensure the internalization of the political values and practices associated with 
it. Due to the accelerated pace with which political parties were engineered, ethnic groups 
were the only widespread institutional framework within which the majority of Africans were 
organized (Salih, 2005b: 5). 
Salih (2005b: 9) notes that due to the speed with which political development 
occurred, numerous ethnically based parties emerged in opposition to other ethnic parties, and 
once established, began to assume the structures and functions of Western-styled political 
parties, poised to engage Parliamentary democracy. In many countries, Salih (2005b: 10) 
points out, civilians politicians who inherited power soon began to ban existing political 
parties, except their own, and transformed their states into one-party systems in order to 
achieve goals similar to those pronounced by military leaders, including development and 
national integration. A good example is the Kenya’s, Tanzania’s, and Uganda’s independence 
constitutions which embodied liberal democratic principles which included a prime 
ministerial and cabinet system and a dichotomy between the formal authority of the 
constitutional Head of State, and the real authority of the Head of Government, the Prime 
Minister and the leader of the majority party (Maxon, 2011; Salih, 2005b: 10). A series of 
constitutional amendments had reversed the system either under the one party system or 
dominant party systems into dual to unified executive in Tanzania and Kenya, that 
circumvented the principle of parliamentary supremacy and elevated the chief executive 
branch to a powerful dominant machinery of government (Salih, 2005b: 11). 
Salih (2005b: 11-12) summarizes five observations that could be made on the role of 
parliaments under a one-party system: These are: one, parliaments were formed and expected 
to be loyal to the single and at times constitutional political party or military rulers and ensure 
that the laws and legislations put forward by government were rubberstamped. The absence of 
separation of power made the relationship between the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary so blurred that checks and balances and accountability are non-existent. Two, one 
party parliaments were considered all-purpose institutions, which indulge not only in enacting 
laws and legislation, but also decision-making, policy implementation, and justification of 
executive decisions. Three, legislative powers of parliament were under the scrutiny of the 
ruling party. Not only were the MPs not in fact true representatives of the electorates but were 
often carefully vetted by the Central committee of the ruling party before they were allowed 
to contest elections. Four, one-party parliaments were not only bound up with the executive in 
a manner that makes a mockery of the doctrine of the separation of power, they were used to 
8 
 
bestow legitimacy on the illegitimate and non-competitive political process. In this sense, the 
government was not accountable to a parliament freely elected by and responsive to the 
electorate’s preferences and aspirations. And fifth, parliaments were the voice of the ruling 
elite and the oppressive regime they represented - not the expression of the peoples’ 
preferences and aspirations. 
With the disappearance of single-party systems, came the emergence of competitive 
politics or multiparty democracy, where African Parliaments gained some of the lost ground 
they lost during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s and have slowly begun to 
exert the new constitutional powers that have come with the transition away from 
dictatorships to multiparty politics (Ruszkowski & Draman, 2011: 9). According to (Salih, 
2005b: 13), Parliaments started assuming more seriously the six generic roles of political 
governance; that is legislation, representation, oversight, recruitment, legitimacy and conflict 
management. According to Ruszkowski and Draman (2011: 9), many legislatures face serious 
challenges and this range from lack of formal powers and established clear procedures, many 
lack institutional capacity as well as incentives to encourage MPs and Parliamentary officers 
to exercise their responsibilities. The extent to which African Parliaments have been able to 
discharge these basic functions is contingent on several factors, not least the nature of the 
political environment within which they operate, the strength of the political institutions and 
civil society organizations, and the constitutional arrangements governing the relationship 
between legislature and executive (Salih, 2005b: 13). 
2.4 Kenya’s Quest for a constitution and Its Legislative Development – A 
Historical Perspective 
Since the end of the disputed election of 2007, Kenya’s people and politicians alike have 
sought to bring into being a new constitutional order and it became one of the most important 
items agreed upon by the leaders who formed the national unity government in 2008
3
 . 
However, it took the post-election violence of 2007 and its aftermath, to make a two decade 
search for a new constitution possible
4
. There had been dissatisfaction with the way in which 
valuable sections of the Independent Constitution were changed and power concentrated in 
the Presidency (Lumumba, 2008: 1) and the many political, social and economic problems 
                                                          
3
 The unity government came about after the violence that occurred after the disputed polls and the 
subsequent negotiations led by Kofi Annan. See also page 7 on the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 
2008. A new Constitution was promulgated 2 years later on the 27
th
 August 2010, as agreed in the Accord and 
after being endorsed in a referendum on the 4
th
 July 2010.  
4
 As had been variously pointed out, constitutional changes often happen after a crisis. The French constitution 
and the American constitutions were implemented after revolutions.  
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facing the country were attributed to the deficiencies in the Constitution
5
. The calls for 
reforms in the 1990s were motivated by the need to update and improve the constitution and 
were not a call for a radically new constitution (Lumumba, 2008: 1). Touted as a democratic 
constitution at independence, the constitution was dismantled over the years (Ghai & Ghai, 
2011: 10) and the demands in the 1990s for a systematic review of the constitution were to 
review or abolish the amendments that caused concern. See figure 1. These were: one-party 
rule, detention without trial, removal of security of tenure for judges, the Attorney-General, 
the Auditor-general and the weakening of the principle separation of powers (Lumumba, 
2008: 1). This section will highlight some of the changes and amendments that the 
independent constitution underwent through the years leading to the agitation for reforms and 
eventually the birth of a new constitution.  
 
Figure 1: Constitutional Phases 
 
 
 
multi-party (1963-69)                          one party (defacto 1982-92)                                   multi-party       
one-party (dejure1969-82)                       multi-party (1992-) 
2.5 The Independent Constitution (The 1963 Constitution) 
The struggle for independence in Kenya stemmed from the desire to establish a democratic 
government after nearly half a century of authoritarian British colonial rule (Wanyande, 
Omosa, & Ludeki, 2007: 1). African majority rule or independence was expected to result in 
democratic governance and an improvement in the social and economic wellbeing of 
Africans, and the new governance regime was intended to produce two critical conditions – 
freedom and prosperity (Wanyande et al., 2007: 1). The independent Constitution was a 
negotiated constitution and distinguished itself from previous colonial constitutions which 
were external impositions (Ghai & Ghai, 2011: 7) and was a product of political, social, and 
economic context of late colonial Kenya, but it also particularly reflected the changing 
perceptions and goals associated with decolonization (Maxon, 2011: 7). African political 
leaders played a pivotal role in the process and the negotiation of the constitution was 
                                                          
5
 The constitution referred to here is the former constitution before Kenya got a new one in 2010. 
i) Independent 
constitution 1963-69 
(two chambers)  
ii) Amendments to independent 
constitution 1969 -2010 (One 
chamber) 
iii) New Constitution 
August 2010 – (two 
chambers from 2013) 
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between the leaders of the larger tribes and the smaller tribes, with significant European 
involvement, under the auspices of the British government
6
 (Ghai & Ghai, 2011: 8).  
On the contents of the 1963 constitution, there were many democratic features
7
 and the 
post-colonial regime included newly created political institutions that are generally regarded 
to be the pillars of Western liberal democracy (Wanyande et al., 2007: 1). Some of these 
were: elective legislatures divided between two houses (one to represent regions), 
independent judiciaries, autonomous and trustworthy public bureaucracies, independent 
electoral bodies, executive power vested primarily in the cabinet headed by the prime minister 
but drawn from Parliament, among others. Each of these institutions would to some extent act 
as check on the other. The independence constitution, according to Ghai and Ghai (2011: 9), 
was intended to represent a departure from the colonial, executive dominated, and highly 
centralized system of government, without any guarantees of human rights. It is under this 
constitution that Jomo Kenyatta was elected as the first prime minister of Kenya.  
2.6 Dismantling the Constitution 
The process of political representation was watered down through deliberate changes that the 
post-colonial Kenya African National Union (KANU) government introduced in the 
constitution, the electoral laws and in practice. See also section 3.7.  On the first anniversary 
of independence, and in the following years, Kenyatta changed or removed most of the 
provisions of the constitution directed at democracy, power sharing and human rights (Ghai & 
Ghai, 2011: 10). Along with the amendments that his successor, Daniel Moi, made, the 
system of government reverted in effect to the colonial system - in what Katumanga and 
Omosa (2007: 65) refer as the “colonial state becoming alive” - with vast powers of the 
governor now in the President, with decreasing accountability of the government, and in 
practice exploiting ethnic distinctions (Ghai & Ghai, 2011: 10). Kenyatta transformed the 
system of government from Parliamentary to Presidential, through the Constitution of Kenya 
Amendment Act No 28 of 1964 (Katumanga & Omosa, 2007: 64), combining the offices and 
powers of the governor-general and prime minister in the President, creating a powerful new 
post, with effect also of weakening Parliament (Ghai & Ghai, 2011: 10). The powers of the 
new office were secured by the constitutional provision for immunity of the President against 
legal action while in office (Wanyande et al., 2007: 7). The senate was also abolished, 
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 Robert M. Maxton (2011: 272) in studying the era of constitution-making found that in the evolution of the 
independence constitution, compromises among the elite owed little to it. All the constitutions of the period 
and the 1950s were in one way or another imposed by Britain. 
7
 In looking at the constitution-making process during these years, Maxton (2011: 10) argues, it became clear 
that democracy was not a priority for many of those involved. 
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reducing checks on the administration and both the civil service and the police were brought 
under executive control. The desire for personal accumulation brought about the need to 
amend the constitution so as to entrench patrimonial rule, and the Constitution of Kenya 
Amendment Act No2 of 1968 provided for the succession of the President by the vice-
President - thus reversing the 1964 Amendment Act No 28 which had given the House of 
Representatives powers to elect the President (Katumanga & Omosa, 2007: 67). 
It is instructive to note that the dismantling of the democratic and accountability 
mechanisms generally continued under Moi
8
 through constitutional amendments to maintain 
political power. The Constitutional amendment Act No 7 of 1982 introduced Section 2A that 
transformed Kenya into a de jure one-party state, followed closely by other amendments that 
removed the security of tenure of judges, the Controller and Auditor-General and the 
Attorney-General (Katumanga & Omosa, 2007: 69). Thus, with the independence of the 
courts of law undermined from extraneous influence, the judges were at the mercy of the 
President’s discretionary powers to appoint and dismiss them at will (Wanyande et al., 2007: 
7). As (Ghai & Ghai, 2011: 10) points out, many amendments under both Presidents were 
rushed through the legislature
9
; often all stages were disposed of in one day. The most notable 
of changes included a shift from multi-party to a single-party system and the transfer of 
supervision of elections from an independent body to the Provincial Administration that was 
tightly controlled and manipulated by the Kenyatta and Moi regimes during which electoral 
malpractice pervaded (Throup and Hornsby 1998 in Wanyande et al., 2007: 3).  
The effect is that election results were rigged
10
, the demarcation of electoral 
boundaries favored the interests of the KANU regime, and the appointment of the 12 
nominated MPs followed criteria other than incorporation of excluded interests (Wanyande et 
al., 2007: 3). One of the consequences of this is that the electoral system produced illegitimate 
representatives who are not the genuine preference of the electorate and who are unable to 
articulate adequately the interests of “their” constituents (Wanyande et al., 2007: 3). The net 
effect of the dismantling of the independence constitution and by practice is best summed up 
by Wanyande et al. (2007: 4): 
“The failure of the Post-colonial KANU regime to manage public affairs in the interest of the 
citizens implies a corresponding failure of the established political instruments for government 
                                                          
8
 According to Katumanga et al. (2007: 68), by the time Kenyatta passed away in August 1978, Kenya was firmly 
in the grip of the Lancaster generation leadership that was devoid of horizontal and vertical structures of 
accountability. These were the leaders that negotiated the independence constitution with the British. 
9
 It should be noted here that the legislature at this point in time was already weak and generally worked at the 
behest of the president. It was what could be described as a rubberstamp legislature. 
10
 For more detailed account, read  Throup and Hornsby (1998) 
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control and accountability, notably free and fair elections. This was enhanced by the 
formulation of an electoral regime with important non-competitive characteristics such as the 
re-election of the President without opposition, the exclusion of dissenting candidates from the 
electoral process, a conveniently controlled judiciary aimed at checking election petitions 
against government-favoured candidates, and manipulated procedures of the National 
Assembly that undermined the capacity of the institution to control executive decisions and 
actions. Ultimately, the obligation for government accountability to citizens suffered.”  
 
Some of the characteristics of the second, third and fourth decades of independence was that 
formal rules and procedures were replaced with Presidential decree, which undermined the 
institutional foundations of the economy and greatly compromised democratic values (Njeru 
& Njoka, 2007: 45). Thus, as Njeru and Njoka ague, the consolidation of autocratic rule 
elevated the institution of the presidency above all others that by the late 1990s, Kenya had 
reached the apex of authoritarian rule. However, from 1990 onwards, Moi’s personal rule 
began to receive multi-pronged assault as the campaign for reforms emerged, involving 
progressive politicians, civil society organizations, the media, foreign diplomats accredited to 
Kenya as well as multilateral financial institutions
11
 (Njeru & Njoka, 2007: 45).  
It was also the period that the winds of change started blowing across the globe in 
what is variously described by Huntington as the “Third Wave of Democracy”. According to 
(Throup & Hornsby, 1998: 54), four critical events ushered in the new era, provoking popular 
discontent and encouraging the regimes critics to speak out: these were the fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe and the ending of the Cold War; the regime’s blatant manipulation of the 
1988 national and party elections; the murder of Foreign Minister Dr Robert Ouko in 
February 1990; and the withholding of Western Aid in November 1991 by the Paris Group of 
bilateral donors, who were dissatisfied with the slow pace of economic and political 
liberalization. Nevertheless, the legislature has always had highly experienced legislators in 
its ranks in every term. In Kenya’s torturous path to successful legislative development, 
(Barkan & Matiangi, 2009: 34) point out the existence within the legislature of a group of 
reformers, which together with members who support reform because it serves their 
individual self-interests, formed a “coalition for change” that has been effective at building 
the capacity of the national assembly to the point that it can perform the core functions that 
defines legislatures worldwide. Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 34) argue that even though it is 
harder to measure with precision, this “coalition of change” is probably the largest and most 
robust of its type in the continent that has also sustained both itself and the process of 
                                                          
11
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World bank as well as other bilateral donors employ the 
governance paradigm to define economic and political prerequisites for foreign aid in Africa (Kanyinga 2007: 
82) and the new paradigm began to influence the structure and institutional context of the state, the economy 
and politics. 
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legislative development over a period of more than a decade (i.e., over two or more legislative 
terms). 
The constitutional amendments brought forward in Parliament in 1999, brought some 
changes towards strengthening the national assembly. These changes (introduced) 
strengthened the committee system, and made Parliament both financially and 
administratively independent. However, as Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 49) point out, the 
power relationship between the executive and the national assembly remained unchanged, 
particularly under the Eighth Parliament. Zambia’s situation at this time was similar to Kenya, 
and as (Momba, 2005: 102) reflects, this dispensation that countries in transition experience 
the pains of political change, is even more imperative considering that the country emerged 
from a relatively authoritarian one-party system in which the functioning of the various arms 
of the state was obscured by the extensive powers of the party and the President. However, we 
can safely say that with each election, Parliament strength has been enhanced and it has 
become more emboldened to check executive high handedness. Democratic governance is on 
cause as tremendous strides have been made now that the country has a pure presidential 
system and the legislature has been given power to perform its functions undeterred.  
 
2.7 The National Accord and Reconciliation Act No. 4 of 2008 
To be able to understand the data and analysis of this thesis - and the dynamics of the former 
and the new constitution - it is imperative to include the National Accord and reconciliation 
Act of 2008 and the parameters that were agreed upon. The Accord is an agreement between 
the two opposing sides in the 2007 presidential Elections in Kenya. These are the Party of 
national Unity (PNU) and Orange democratic Movement (ODM). The Accord came about as 
a result of the violence that erupted after the announcement of the election results that were 
disputed. Through the mediation of Kofi Annan (former secretary general of the United 
Nations), the two opposing sides, Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) agreed on two resolutions to end the political crisis occasioned after the 
disputed elections of 2007
12
. The first resolution, called the Annotated Agenda was to deal 
with the immediate three short term goals and one long term goal. Of the long term goals and 
issues were, inter alia, undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reform, among 
others. The second resolution was the Time Table. On the first resolution, the parties agreed 
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 The Independent Review Commission (IREC) report found out that there was no clear winner in the disputed 
general election held on the 27
th
 December 2007  
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that the short term goals, agenda items 1, 2 and 3 would be resolved within a period of 7 and 
15 days from the date of the commencement of the Dialogue, while the long term goal, 
agenda item 4 would be resolved within a period of one year after the commencement of the 
Dialogue (launched 28 January 2008).  
On the 20
th
 of March, 2008 through a special issue, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 20 
(Acts No. 4), Parliament enacted the National Accord and Reconciliation Act to give effect to 
the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government. This Act was 
entrenched in the Constitution (former) in Section 15A, 41A, 41B, 41C and 47A and is also 
recognized in the new constitution. The Agreement was to foster national accord and 
reconciliation, to provide for the formation of a coalition Government and the establishment 
of the offices of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Government of 
Kenya, their functions and various matters. Section 8 of this Act provided that the “Act shall 
cease to apply upon dissolution of the Tenth Parliament, if the coalition is dissolved, or a new 
constitution is enacted, whichever is earlier”.  
On the longer-term issues and solutions, parties to the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation agreed on the need for the establishment of a constitutional review process in 
consultation with stakeholders in five stages. This included: An inclusive process initiated and 
completed within 8 weeks to establish a statutory Constitutional Review including a 
timetable. It was envisaged that the review process would be completed within 12 months 
from the initiation in Parliament; Parliament would enact a special ‘constitutional referendum 
law’ which would establish the powers and enactment processes for approval by the people in 
the referendum; the statutory process would provide for the preparation of a comprehensive 
draft by stakeholders and with the assistance of expert advisers; Parliament would consider 
and approve the resulting proposals for a new constitution and; the new constitution would be 
put to the people for their consideration and enactment in a referendum.  
All these five requirements were followed. Section 12 of the Sixth Schedule of the 
New Constitution temporarily constitutionalizes the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. 
Under the National Accord, the Standing Orders of the House were also repealed and changed 
to conform to the new reality. In effect, the Accord, while fixing a political crisis, gave 
Parliament under the former constitution more powers and with the new changes, Parliament 
adopted new Standing adopted on 10
th
 December 2008. The other effect is that with a new 
constitution, Parliament’s powers were further enhanced. This will be discussed in chapter 
five and six. 
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2.8 The New Constitution  
On the 4
th
 of August 2010, Kenyan voters went to the polls to decide whether to adopt the 
new constitution and 66.91 percent voted in favor of adopting. The President officially 
promulgated the new constitution on the 27
th
 of August 2010. With the new constitution in 
place, bringing about sweeping changes in the governance of the country, the biggest 
challenge is its implementation. The new constitution introduces a new devolved structure of 
governance and a new system of public finance, expands the Bill of Rights among other 
changes. What the new constitution has done is that it has laid out guidelines around which 
these changes are to be affected and imposes to Parliament the huge task of enacting 
legislation to bring about these expected changes in the law. It also empowers the citizens to 
take the legislators to court if the said laws are not enacted within the period the constitution 
prescribes
13
. 
Time is treated to be of critical importance in the implementation timetable and 
Chapter 18 compels Parliament to enact the legislation required within the timelines set out in 
Schedule 5 (see Appendix). Parliament may extend the timeframes stipulated by passing a 
vote supported by at least two thirds of the MPs for a period not exceeding one year and this 
power to extend can only be exercised in circumstances certified to be exceptional by the 
Speaker of the National Assembly. To enforce the timeframes, the constitution creates a 
mechanism with the aim that all the necessary laws will be tabled and passed in a timely
14
 
manner. The Sixth Schedule of the new constitution creates two institutions to guide and drive 
the process of implementation. These are the Constitutional Implementation Oversight 
Committee (CIOC) and the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC). 
The CIOC is composed of MPs and is responsible for general oversight over implementation 
schedule and ensures that the laws necessary are passed on time. The CIC on the other hand is 
a nine member independent body composed of persons with experience in public 
administration, human rights and government and has the responsibility of facilitating the 
development of legislative and administrative procedures necessary to implement the new 
constitution. The Commissions’ mandate would expire five years after it has been established 
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 This law was put in place by the drafters of the constitution intentionally as a check on politicians who could 
not be trusted to implement the constitution unchecked. There are many examples of politicians stalling the 
process in the 2 decades search for a new constitution. In such a situation, the High Court may issue an order 
directing Parliament and the Attorney general to take steps to ensure that the laws are enacted within a specified 
time frame. A third step applies if parliament still fails to enact a law within the timeframe given by the court 
order. In such a scenario, the Chief Justice “shall advice the President to dissolve Parliament and the President 
shall dissolve Parliament.”  If a new parliament has been elected and assumed office, it will be required to pass 
the outstanding legislation within the timeframes laid out in the Fifth Schedule. 
14
 The legislators have been forced to extend sitting time into the night to be able to work on the laws and to be 
able to beat the deadlines. 
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or if earlier, the time which the full implementation of the new constitution shall be deemed 
by Parliament to have occurred. 
 Some provisions in the new constitution are suspended and will only come into effect 
when the country holds its first general elections under the new constitution in March 2013. 
These provisions are: Chapter 7 (on the electoral system and process), Chapter 8 (on the 
legislature) and Articles 129 to 155 of Chapter 9 (on the role and functions of the executive 
including the Office of the President, deputy Presidents and the composition of the 
Executive). The other provisions is on the devolved government which governs the transfer of 
power from the central government to the devolved government, shall take effect once the 
country holds its first elections for the county assemblies and governors. This means that there 
are some provisions of the former constitution that are still in operation and run concurrently 
with the new until the full implementation of the new constitution. Another notable thing after 
the constitution became effective, is that it demanded the removal and appointment of new 
heads of specific institutions within a time frame and the previous holders were not required 
to vie for those posts. Some of these are the positions of Chief Justice, Attorney-General and 
the Head of Police. The heads of these institutions were deemed to be of the old order and 
might use their offices to stall the implementation process. A thorough comparison of the two 
constitutions is discussed in the data and analysis chapter. 
2.9 Kenyan Parliament in Previous Research 
The present Parliament is the Tenth elected Parliament in Kenya since the attainment of 
Independence in 1963 and also the third Parliament since the return of multiparty political 
dispensation in 1991 (Ruszkowski & Draman, 2011: 82). There are different forms of 
legislatures according to leading scholars. These vary from rubberstamp legislatures, 
emerging legislatures, to transformative legislatures (see figure 1, 2 and 3). Kenya’s 
legislature had since transformed from being a rubberstamp legislature to an emerging 
legislature under the former constitution (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009). 
Has Kenya’s legislature transformed past an emerging legislature and evolving 
towards the next phase of being a transformative legislature? This thesis contends that it has 
evolved. According to Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 33), Kenya’s Parliament is arguably one 
of the two most significant national legislatures on the African continent. (Barkan & 
Matiangi, 2009: 33) point out that it is the most independent in terms of degree of formal and 
real autonomy it enjoys from the executive branch, and also the most active legislature in 
Africa with respect to the deliberation and amendment of legislation. However, the title of 
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their analysis speaks volumes about the Kenyan Parliament. It is titled “Kenya’s Torturous 
Path to Successful Legislative Development”. As can be seen from section 2.3 to 2.5 of this 
chapter, this statement is indeed true. Most of the real reforms in the legislature started in the 
final years of the 1990s, that is, under the term of the Eighth Parliament (1998-2002) – the 
second Parliament after the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1992. Before 
multipartism, backbenchers were the unofficial opposition in Parliament and the introduction 
of multipartism brought in other parties to Parliament who took the role of the opposition. 
 In its pursuit to seek answer to the research question, this thesis categorizes the 
Kenyan Parliament with regard to its level of independence, the extent to which it exercises 
power relative to the executive, its specified powers and its institutional capacity. The period 
after the first Amendments to the constitution (that changed the system of government from 
Parliamentary to Presidential in 1964), to the period after the second multiparty elections in 
1998, I refer to the Kenyan legislature as a rubber stamp legislature as shown in figure 1 
below. This is similar to Polsby’s (1975 in Norton, 1990b: 127) identity of legislative forms - 
that where the system is closed and specialized, legislatures are of the rubberstamping variety. 
The Kenyan Parliament did not have the relative autonomy that it enjoyed by the legislature 
vis-à-vis the executive that it did at the dawn of independence. According to Johnson (2005: 
4) it is possible to think of parliamentary power as moving along a continuum from little 
independence and power to very influential and active legislatures. The simplest of them, that 
he refers to as rubber stamp legislatures, simply endorse decisions made elsewhere in the 
political system, usually by parties or by the executive branch. In the Kenyan case during 
these decades, and the various amendments that were done on the constitution, Parliament 
simply endorsed everything the executive wanted. During these periods, the legislature had 
little internal structure including the employment of administrative staff and salaries which 
were handled by the executive. 
 
Figure 2: Rubber Stamp Legislatures 
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Source: Johnson (2005: 4) 
 
Consistent with the experience elsewhere in Africa, the process of legislative 
development in Kenya did not gain traction until after the country’s second multiparty 
election in 1997 (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009: 34). The period after the enactment of the 
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act of November 11, 1999, passed on November 17 and 
accented by President Moi two days later, and the enactment of the Parliamentary Service Act 
one year later, in November 28, 2000, facilitated the creation of Parliamentary Service. The 
amendments made Kenya’s National Assembly both financially and administratively 
autonomous from the executive. It is also the period Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 41) refer to 
as the period of the emergence of “coalition for change” – mostly younger members of 
opposition parties, who slowly realized that the operations of the assembly were unlikely to 
change until they seized the initiative to force needed reforms. 
This leads us to the other type of legislature called the emerging legislatures - which 
are legislatures in the process of changing from one type to another (Johnson, 2005: 5). 
According to Johnson, several legislatures in Africa are exercising greater influence over 
government policies and could be classified as emerging legislatures. Expanding their powers, 
Johnson (2005: 5) notes, usually requires major legislative changes, among them amending 
rules and procedures, building stronger committees, expanding professional staff, developed 
improved information systems, and others (Johnson, 2005: 5). He classifies Kenya’s and 
Uganda’s Parliament and Mexico’s congress in this category (see figure 2 below). It should be 
noted that this analysis by Johnson was undertaken in 2005, 7 years ago, during which 
Kenya’s Parliament has undergone several transformations, including the enactment of a new 
constitution.  
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Figure 3: Emerging Legislatures 
Source: Johnson (2005: 6) 
 
 
The new constitution promulgated in 2010 has transformed governance structure in 
Kenya and redistributed power radically to several institutions including expanding the 
existing powers of Parliament (see the chapter 5). The Kenyan Parliament is without doubt 
moving, or has moved to the least common type of legislature – transformative legislatures as 
shown on figure 3. This will be understood better as we analyze Parliament under the former 
constitution (1963-2010) and the new constitution promulgated in August 2010 in the chapter 
6. With the powers to shape budget and policies under the new constitution, and even to 
initiate policies on its own, these Parliaments, according to Johnson (2005: 5) are the most 
expensive, have highly complex internal structures (including strong committee systems, 
great information needs, and depend heavily on highly trained professional staff). The 
evolving of Kenya’s legislature under the new constitution has fundamentally changed these 
power relations and transformed Parliament into a powerful institution. Whether it will be 
more effective will remain to be seen. Fish (2006: 5-20) argue; parliamentary effectiveness 
cannot be satisfactorily treated without confronting issues of power.  
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Figure 4: Transformative Legislatures 
 
Source: Johnson (2005: 6) 
With powerful committee system, sophisticated information needs and extremely 
autonomous, the Kenyan Parliament is now at the transformative stage and this will be 
enhance so long as reforms in the other institutions as mandated by the new constitution. 
Peaceful upcoming elections will see a purely transformed legislature as envisaged in the 
constitution. 
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3.0 Theory 
This chapter discusses the three concepts interwoven together in this thesis. These are 
constitution, accountability – both horizontal and vertical - and legislatures. Every club, party, 
institution, and country is governed by a set of rules or what we variously call constitutions. 
And for all these to transact business efficiently through the rules and guidelines as outlined in 
the constitution, then all and sundry must adhere to accountability for their actions. In our 
case, the study of Kenyan Parliament especially its role vis-à-vis the executive, the component 
of accountability becomes crucial and it is one crucial component in democracy. The chapter 
starts with constitutions and their importance, this is closely followed by a discussion of 
accountability and it wraps up with a discussion of legislatures.  
3.1.0 Constitutions  
“The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who 
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; 
and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous while 
they continue to hold their public trust”       
James Madison, Federalist no. 57 
 
According to Johnson (2005: 1), modern democracies are characterized by the shared decision 
making by the legislative and executive branches and it is a country’s constitution that 
formally structures this interaction. Johnson (ibid) points out that practicality, precedent and 
habit then fill in the gaps to create the political system under which a government operates on 
a daily basis. In most countries after a new government has been elected or the old one re-
elected, it is by no accident then, that state officials, whether in the executive, judiciary, or the 
legislature, or in other independent constitutional offices are mandated to take an oath as 
prescribed in the constitution of that country. The allegiance is often to the effect that the 
incoming leaders will be faithful, bear true allegiance, obey, preserve, protect and defend the 
constitution and other laws. The following section will shed light on why constitutions are so 
special and important. 
3.1.1 Constitutionalism in the Third World and Africa in Particular 
According to Lane (1996: 75), decolonisation in Asia and Africa during the period from 1945 
to 1965 had profound consequences in that formally democratic constitutions were written 
and enacted. However, few were really implemented but rather quickly became camouflage 
constitutions for dictatorships. On the African continent there has been lots of constitution 
making, but the basic problem is that constitutions generally do not last very long. Actually 
hardly any of the constitutions introduced when the African states became independent have 
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survived. For example, the former Kenyan constitution was amended so many times it was 
hardly recognizable from the one at independence. See also section 2.5 on the dismantling of 
the Kenyan constitution. Constitutional development has been disrupted, to say the least in all 
but a few countries such as Botswana and Mauritius (Lane, 1996: 77). Lane points out that the 
first constitutions put in place when the European powers left were heavily influenced by 
colonial heritage. However, only a few years after independence these English or French 
inspired constitutions had been either remodelled or suspended. In some countries dictatorship 
constituted the real regime while the camouflage constitution had remnants of democratic 
features. In other countries, authoritarian constitutions were introduced (Lane, 1996: 77). 
Lane notes that a large number of constitutions have been enacted suspended and omitted. 
When the first constitutions of the independent African countries were drawn up, there was an 
attempt to create a constitutional legacy in relation to the constitutional practice of the country 
to which the newly independent state had been a colony. After a rather short period, however, 
such constitutions were revised to reflect other constitutional images (Lane, 1996: 78). 
3.1.2 Constitutional Perspective 
Lane (1996: 5) argues that the word ‘constitution’ is ambiguous and has two senses which are 
most often mixed up: ‘constitution’ meaning either a compact written document, comprising 
paragraphs with rules for the governance of the State, or ‘constitution’ standing for the 
regime, i.e. the real institutions in terms of which the State is actually operated. This chapter 
will dwell mainly with the formal constitution, that is, the written constitution, while the 
substantive constitution (which deals with studying the regime and how it is run) is briefly 
discussed in relation to collection of data in chapter five and the analysis of data in chapter 
six.  
DeSmith and Brazier (1989 in Shane, 2006: 191), point out that constitutions, written 
or unwritten, are set of rules, practices and customs that polities regard as their fundamental 
law. According to Lane (1996:7), a constitution as a single written document is regarded as a 
legal document because it makes up the bulk of the constitutional law in a country. Lane 
contends however, that a state’s constitutional law comprises more than the written 
constitution and that besides the written constitution, what is decisive for constitutional 
practice is an open question, the answer to which depends upon the country studied (Lane, 
1996: 7). On the other hand, Rosenfeld (1994 in Shane, 2006: 191) points out that, in modern 
form, constitutions typically aspire to constrain government power, assure adherence to the 
rule of law, and protect individual rights. Lane (1996) concurs with this description of 
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constitution but hastens to point out that whether the rules state activities are supposed to 
follow are obeyed or implemented is another question altogether (Lane 1996: 5)
15
. According 
to Shane (2006: 192), the primary human activity through which constitutions are translated 
into operational authorizations or constraints is interpretation. The role of interpretation of the 
constitution is generally left to the judiciary, which has to be active and independent in its 
duty.  
3.1.3 Constitutionalism  
To have a better understanding of the political role of constitutions, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of constitutionalism, better known as constitutional rule or culture. According 
to Hague and Harrop (2004: 209), constitutional rule is a combination of habits, practices and 
values which underpin government by law and refers to a political environment in which the 
equal rights of individuals are not just stated but also respected and that these rights can be 
defended through the courts, thus converting a dusty document into a political reality. 
Equally, Hague and Harrop (2004: 209-210) maintain that the mere possession of a written 
constitution does not guarantee constitutional rule as parchments depend on people for their 
implementation, insisting that when constitutionalism is absent, a constitution becomes a mere 
parchment. Lane (1996: 42) agrees with Hague and Harrop and adds that democratic regimes 
tend to adhere to the doctrine of constitutionalism, that is, the idea that there shall exist 
institutions that constrain the exercise of state power.  
According to Lane (1996: 42), even though a constitutional state has a constitution that 
really constrains the exercise of political power and protects citizens’ rights, such a State, 
need not be a democracy. The constitution would contain the most fundamental rules that 
structure and restrain state power (Lane, 1996: 43). Lane (1996:50) affirms that 
‘constitutionalism’ stands for an approach to the State that underlines the importance of 
institutions for limiting State power. According to Lane (1996:50), the restrictions on the 
capacity of the State to act and employ force derived from a rule of law framework lie at the 
heart of constitutionalism and it involves a requirement for the following State features: (a) 
procedural stability; (b) accountability; (c) representation; (d) division of power; (e) openness 
and disclosure. Colomer (2006: 217) distinguishes two categories of constitutional rules: one, 
those “to regulate the allocation of functions of government”, and; two, those to “define the 
relationships between these branches and the public”, which in democracy are based on 
elections (Finer 1988 in Colomer, 2006). According to Colomer (2006-221), the first set of 
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rules regulates the division of powers among different institutions, while the second set of 
rules regulates the relationships between citizens and public officers by means of election, in 
what I can refer to as a form of vertical accountability (own emphasis).  
3.1.4 Constitutions as a Basis for Governance 
Akech (2010) points out four things constitution do as a basis of governance: First, a 
constitution can facilitate the attainment of a just society – especially in ethically polarized 
polities – by establishing equality of membership and citizenship for all ethnic groups and 
individuals that make up the polity: Secondly, a constitution can aid the attainment of a just 
society by outlining the principles and mechanisms for establishing the truth in relation to past 
events, including violations of human rights and economic crimes, thereby advancing the 
interests of victims: Thirdly, a constitution can also establish a framework for the protection 
of property rights in a manner that does not entrench past inequalities, injustices, and fraud; 
Finally, a constitution can establish principles and mechanisms that enable the citizenry to 
hold government accountable daily.  
It is often stated that in the present constitutional setting, there are two basic 
alternatives when new constitutions are to be enacted or old ones reformulated. These are the 
presidential model and the parliamentary model whilst a third model is the British constitution 
model of unwritten and less visible (but more and more influential as it spreads 
Parliamentarism
16
). Shugart (2006: 344) contends that in constitution writing, these two 
regime types, that is, presidential and parliamentary systems, differ fundamentally through 
how they structure the relations of the executive to the legislative branch in either a 
hierarchical or a transactional fashion. See figure 5 on these relations. Kenya’s constitution 
at independence was hierarchical while the new constitution is transactional. In a hierarchy, 
one institution derives its authority from another institution, whereas in a transaction, two (or 
more) institutions derive their authority independently of one another. Shugart contends that 
the distinction between hierarchies and transactions is critical, because in a democracy, by 
definition, the legislative power (or at least the most important part of it) is popularly elected. 
Where parliamentary and presidential systems differ is in how executive power is constituted, 
either subordinated to the legislative assembly, which may thus terminate its authority 
(parliamentary democracy), or else itself elected and thus separated from the authority of the 
assembly (presidential democracy) (Shugart, 2006: 344). The figure below shows the 
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 For a more detailed analysis of these models and their brief histories, see: Lane (1996: 64-69). 
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relationship that exists between the electorate, the legislature and the executive in both 
parliamentary system and in a presidential system
17
. 
According to Olson (1994: 76), from these two very different constitutional designs 
flows an important difference; the two sets of offices in a dual-branch structure are occupied 
by different persons, while in a parliamentary or unitary system they are occupied by the same 
persons. This means that in a parliamentary system, one can be both in the executive (as a 
cabinet minister) and in the legislature as a member of parliament. This is the way it is for 
Kenya under the former constitution. On another front, Shugart (2006: 349) points out that 
there are numerous regimes that contain elements of both presidential and parliamentary, and 
are thus hybrids and the most common form of a hybrid is the semi-presidential government. 
According to (Fish, 2009: 197) Fish and Kroenig 2009: 2), such categories, however useful 
they may be, do not tell us necessarily where power really resides, which may matter most for 
real life politics and government. 
 
Figure 5: Basic Hierarchical and Transactional Form of Executive Legislative Relations 
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 Olson (1994:  75) has a slightly different adjustment to this model. He refers to the presidential model as the 
presidential-congressional system, whereby instead of a legislature, he has the congress. The functions are 
more or less the same.  
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3.1.5 Executive – Legislative Relations 
 
Laver (2002: 201) points out that the linkage between the executive and the legislature in 
every modern regime relies fundamentally upon institutional linkages between a legislature, 
charged with representing the will of the people in the process of making laws of the land, and 
an executive, charged with implementing these laws. A key distinction between types of 
democratic regimes concerns the sources from which these two branches of the government 
system derive their legitimacy and hence their right to be respected and obeyed by the public 
at large, even when particular decisions they make are unpopular.  
One model can be found in European-style “parliamentary government”. In this model 
both legislature and executive share the same source of legitimacy – the periodic free 
elections of public representatives to a legislature which in turn makes and breaks the 
executive, in what O'Donnell (1999) calls vertical accountability. The executive in a 
parliamentary government system has no independent source of legitimacy, being indirectly 
responsible to the electorate via a representative legislature. An alternative model can be 
found in the U.S – style “presidential government.” In this model both legislature and the 
executive, each with significant overlapping powers (horizontal accountability), have 
independent sources of legitimacy - periodic free elections both to the legislature and to the 
position of chief executive (Laver, 2002: 201)
18
. Kenya has adopted such a system in the new 
constitution.  
3.1.6 Amendments 
As discussed earlier, rubberstamp legislatures under one-party states or in dominant party 
states in African legislatures, made amendments to the constitutions primarily to strengthen 
the hand of the executive (president) and in the process weakening their powers and that of 
other institutions (Kenya is a good example). Not all African legislatures, according to Salih 
(2005b: 14) succumbed to the whim of leaders who treated the constitution with contempt or 
strived to prolong their term of office at any expense (for example Chiluba of Zambia, 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe, among others). African legislatures responded in a variety of ways, 
ranging from taking severely dividing partisan positions such as supported constitutional 
amendments in conformity with the personal ambitions of their political party leaders or 
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 I have chosen both the British and American methodology for two reasons: First, Kenyan institutions and 
laws are for the most part adapted from the British and Commonwealth traditions and this is mostly with 
regards to the Independent constitution; secondly, as regards the new Kenya constitution, American 
methodology applies because Kenya has adapted an American style presidency and a judicial system. 
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resisted in defending the constitution (Salih, 2005b: 14). Amendments to the constitution are 
necessary as constitutions are meant to be dynamic and able to change with the time. In that 
respect, Salih (2005b: 14) notes, the constitutional amendments that brought about 
competitive multi-party politics cannot be underestimated, because constitutional amendments 
made it possible for people to assume their democratic rights that were denied by the one-
party states and military or civilian dictatorships. 
According to Shane (2006), constitutions explicitly specifies processes for its 
amendment, the legitimacy of constitutional change effected through other means is open to 
question. Lane (1996: 114) concurs that written constitutions lay down a specific process for 
the change of the constitution, the more specific the rules the greater the incidence of 
constitutional inertia. If constitutional law is considered as a special kind of law, then the 
constitution will contain rules that require a special decision process for amending the 
constitution. This is the case for the new constitution in Kenya. It has some special provisions 
for altering some sections of the constitution. See item 19 in chapter 5.  According to Hague 
and Harrop (2004: 211), procedures for amendment are important components of the 
constitutional architecture and they contend that most constitutions are rigid (containing a 
special amendment procedure), thus rendering them more acceptable to the various interests 
involved in their construction. Lane (1996: 114-117) names six types of institutions 
guaranteeing constitutional inertia as: (a) no change; (b) referendum; (c) delay; (d) 
confirmation by a second decision; (e) qualified majorities and (f) confirmation by a sub-
national government
19
. A constitution could lay down certain articles that it may consider 
unalterable (Lane 1996: 114). On the same point, Lane further points out that constitutional 
rules should only be changed by means of a special procedure that is different from the one 
used to change the statute law and, more importantly, constitutions should be protected by 
means of a special court, that is, a constitutional court (Lane 1996: 171).  
3.1.7 State and Constitution 
Lane (1996: 170) points out two things to look for in the relationship between the constitution 
and the State: First, we must remember that several States lack a true constitution, that is, a 
system of rules that in reality limit the power of the State and provide for separation of powers 
either functionally – executive, legislative and judicial functions – or territorially – 
decentralisation, regionalisation or in the form of a federation. Most States have a 
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 For a further analysis of these six types and examples, see Lane (1996: 114-117). At least 3 of them are 
named in the New Kenyan constitution (a, b, and e). There is also a provision that where there is a pecuniary 
interest by the legislators in the amendment, it is to be implemented in the next parliament.  
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constitution, but some of them are either left-wing or right-wing dictatorships, in which often 
the formally written constitutional document does not correspond to the real constitutional 
practice. Secondly, that few democratic countries operate without a written constitution. This 
indicates that the existence of strong institutionalized constitutional practices is necessary for 
democratic stability and vitality (Lane 1996: 170). Prominent examples are United Kingdom 
and Israel. Lane (1996: 178-179) argues strongly that a constitution is necessary because it 
offers the rules in terms of which the State itself is institutionalised. Thus, he argues, any 
society needs institutions that only the State can uphold in the long run. A constitution is 
further necessary to regulate the State due to the principle – agent problems that arise in the 
State. Lane adds that the principal-agent model highlights basic governance problems that 
exist in any State such as how the population, the citizens in a country, to instruct the rulers of 
the State about what their interests are and how they are to be protected. Furthermore, how are 
the rulers of the State to instruct and monitor the organisations of the State so that policies 
may be implemented? The answer is the constitution, or a set of special institutions that 
regulate their principal-agent relationships (Lane 1996: 179). Lane (1996: 180) sums up the 
constitution thus:  
“The constitution is a broad long-term contract between those ruled and the rulers that specify 
the conditions on which the agents may exercise power in order to enhance the interests of the 
principal. The rules of the constitution identify what the common objectives of the principal 
and the agent are, what activities the agents may never undertake, how policies are to be 
enacted and implemented by the principal and the agent, and how conflicts about the 
interpretation of the constitution are to be resolved.”  
 
This briefly translated, mean that the primary goal of a constitution, in recognizing the 
overlapping powers of multiple authorities, is to restrain or limit the exercise of government 
power (be it the legislature, judiciary or executive) by allowing each branch to “check” and 
“balance” the initiative of the other two branches. Lane (1996:180) notes that just as 
institutions constitute restrictions on human behaviour, so constitutions put up restrictions on 
the behaviour of the rulers as they frame and implement them. Whether a constitution really 
binds or the extent to which it is truly effective depends upon the State and its commitment to 
the institutionalization of the constitution (Lane 1996: 180). The issue of commitments to the 
institutionalization is another issue that those in power, especially a powerful presidency in 
the one-party states in Africa, abuse as they do not respect institutions. It also shows the 
importance of accountability.  
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3.2 Accountability 
Kanyinga (2012), in an opinion piece in the Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation, writes 
about the period preceding 2007 elections, whereby, the law was applied in a manner that 
discriminated those outside of the centre and political power was exercised in a manner that 
was exclusive while ethnic considerations governed the making of decisions by leaders both 
in the opposition and government. In sum, Kanyinga points out, politicians behaved badly and 
leaders deepened the culture of impunity by breaking the law without retribution and in the 
end, narrow interests destabilized the country and violence threatened the existence of Kenya 
(Kanyinga, 2012).  
Kenya's political leadership, as in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, suffers 
from the same fate of accountability, whereby leaders do not respect the rule of law and the 
executive is not accountable to anyone. As mentioned earlier, a powerful parliament plays a 
significant role in holding the executive arm of government accountable in the tripartite role 
of check and balances. According to Salih (2005a: 258), parliamentary accountability is at the 
heart of political governance, emphasizing the rule of law, accountability, transparency and 
oversight. Salih (2005a: 258) notes, that it is the instrument through which the legislature’s 
role in holding government accountable to the representatives of the governed is discharged 
leading to greater efficiency in government performance and service delivery. The focus of 
this thesis is on the post-1990s Kenya Parliament that has gradually transformed from a 
rubberstamp Parliament in the mid-1960s to a transformative Parliament to date. In this 
section I seek to analyse why accountability as a concept is important. 
Pastor (1999: 123) points out that the essence of democratic government is 
accountability, and it has two dimensions: (1) people must have the unfettered right to elect 
their leaders (vertical accountability) and, (2) institutions of government must not encroach on 
the legitimate areas of responsibility of other institutions (horizontal accountability). Each 
axis poses a different democratic challenge
20
. The vertical, transition challenge is to hold 
elections that are viewed as free, fair and acceptable by the majority political parties. The 
horizontal, consolidation challenge is to construct barriers or deterrents to encroachments 
between the key institutions of governance. The impartial and credible conduct of elections is 
the point that connects the two axes.  
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 Pastor (1999: 124) adds that with greater awareness and a deliberate strategy, the international community 
could do much more to facilitate and solidify democratic transitions, prevent the destabilization of democracy, 
and restore democracy when one institution in a country intrudes on another. This would constitute a third 
dimension of accountability: enhancing vertical accountability by making sure elections are successful and 
strengthening horizontal axis by calling encroaching institutions to account for their actions. 
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 According to Schedler (1999: 14), one encyclopaedic definition tells us that 
accountability is "the ability to ensure that officials in government are answerable for their 
actions". This entails subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in 
transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts (Schedler, 1999:14). Sklar (1999: 53), on the 
other hand, sees accountability as an elusive conception which implies the right of people who 
are affected by a decision to receive an explanation of what has been done and to render 
judgment on the conduct of those who were found for doing it. These two scholars agree on 
the concept of accountability but Sklar does not include the threat of sanction as a means of 
deterrence from breaking the law. 
Schedler (1999: 14-15) contends that there are two essential connotations to the 
concept of political accountability that is, answerability and enforcement and defines 
answerability as "the obligation of public officials to inform about and explain what they are 
doing" which “involves the element of monitoring and oversight”. In principle, Schedler 
argues, accounting agencies may ask accountable actors for two things: to inform about their 
decisions by providing reliable facts and to explain their decisions by giving valid reasons 
(Schedler, 1999: 14-15). In addition to answerability in political accountability, there is the 
element of enforcement. According to Schedler, enforcement implies the idea that not only 
accounting officers "call into question" but also "eventually punish" improper behaviour and, 
accordingly, that accountable persons not only tell what they have done and why, but bear the 
consequences for it, including eventual sanctions (Schedler, 1999: 15). Citizens “punish” 
leaders through the ballot or through recall if their constitutions allow. But the elections must 
be free and fair and the results acceptable to all for the element of enforcement to have true 
meaning. Schedler (1999: 16) points out that, whereas academic writers are emphatic in 
stating that the capacity to punish forms an integral part of political accountability, political 
actors too, usually have a keen sense for the vital importance of effective enforcement 
mechanisms that will enable agencies of accountability to act forcefully. This could be the 
Standing Committees of Parliament like the Parliamentary Oversight Committees, or the 
Auditor General, the courts, and even the media. 
In addition to identifying answerability and enforcement as different connotations of 
accountability, Schedler (1999) identifies two major forms of accountability and refers to 
them as vertical and horizontal accountability. On the one hand, vertical accountability 
describes a relationship between unequals; whereby some powerful “superior” actor holds 
some less powerful “inferior” actor accountable or vice versa (Schedler, 1999:23). Sklar 
(1999: 53) simplifies vertical accountability, as “the right of persons who are affected by the 
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actions or decisions of officeholders or leaders to renew, rescind, or revise the mandates of 
those who exercise authority”. O'Donnell (1999: 29-30), points out electoral dimension of 
vertical accountability, whereby citizens can punish or reward incumbents by voting for or 
against them, or the candidates they endorse, in the next elections. O’Donnell contends that 
while elections are the main facet of vertical accountability: 
“the impact of social demands and of the media insofar as they denounce and/or demand 
restitution and punishment for alleged wrongdoings on the part of public authorities, depends 
to a large extent on the actions that properly authorized state agencies may undertake in order 
to investigate and eventually sanction the wrongdoings” (O’Donnell, 1999: 30).  
 
This means that those entrusted with power must use it wisely and should they deviate, 
then the people who put them there have the capacity to remove or punish them for 
wrongdoings. Vertical accountability can also be a normal exercise of power whereby high-
ranking public officials (“principals”) try to control their low-ranking subordinates (“agents”) 
(Schedler, 1999:23).  
On the other hand, horizontal accountability concerns a relationship between equals on 
a level playing field whereby someone holds someone else of equal power accountable, and in 
democracies this happens through the separation of power between the executive, the 
judiciary and the legislature (Schedler, 1999: 23). Sklar (1999: 53) call it the obligation of 
officeholders to answer for their actions to one another. O’Donnell’s definition is broad and 
contends that horizontal accountability: 
“is the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from the routine oversight to criminal sanctions or 
impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that 
may be qualified as unlawful” (O’Donnell, 1999: 38).  
 
These three meanings, in my view, are similar and simply translated mean that the 
three arms of government (executive, judiciary and legislature) are not necessarily equal in 
power, but at least have a slice of power which others need in order to function. Each 
institution has some veto power over the others and is able to enforce a system of checks and 
balances on one another. This means that Parliament can hold the Executive accountable for 
its actions, the Judiciary can hold Parliament accountable, and vice versa. These actors are 
essentially equal and answerable for their actions and have among others, the capability for 
enforcement through the use of veto, impeachment, overruling and dissolution.  
O’Donnell (1999: 39) recognizes that if agencies are to be effective, they rarely 
operate in isolation as they can shake public opinion with their proceedings and that their 
effectiveness depends on decisions by courts, or eventually by legislatures willing to consider 
impeachment, especially in cases that involve highly placed officials. O’Donnell (1999: 41) 
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further points out that there are two main directions in which horizontal accountability can be 
violated; one consists of the unlawful encroachment by one state agency upon the proper 
authority of the other while the second consists of unlawful advantages that public officials 
obtain for themselves and/or their associates. This relates to a situation where a powerful 
executive controls the legislature and the judiciary. For this to truly function, each of the three 
arms must be independent from the other. In the past in Kenya, the judiciary and the 
legislature were controlled by a powerful presidency. 
O’Donnell (1999: 43) comes up with several suggestions of enhancing horizontal 
accountability. First, he points out, is to give opposition parties the main role of directing 
agencies that are in charge of investigating alleged cases of corruption
21
. This can be done in 
the various house (legislature) committees, for example the parliamentary committee for 
finance, among others. Second, agencies performing an essentially pre-emptive role, such as 
accounting officers are highly professionalized and endowed with resources that are both 
sufficient and independent of the whim of the executive
22
 (O’Donnell, 1999: 44). This could 
be an independent watchdog, for example the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revenue 
Authority, among others. Third, is having a judiciary that is highly professionalized and well-
endowed with a budget that is independent of the executive and congress, and highly 
autonomous in its decisions with respect to both (O’Donnell, 1999: 44). Fourth, there is a lot 
of work to be done in societies marked not only by pervasive poverty but also by deep 
inequalities and how to ensure that agents of horizontal accountability at least decently treat 
the weak and the poor (O’Donnell, 1999: 44). Fifth, reliable and timely information is 
essential and reasonably independent media and various research and dissemination institutes 
should also play a role (O’Donnell, 1999: 44). Sixth, lively and persistent participation of the 
domestic actors (the media, civil society groups, religious leaders, NGOs and various actors 
of vertical accountability) (O’Donnell, 1999: 45); and finally, individuals, especially political 
and other institutional leaders do matter (O’Donnell, 1999: 45). 
According to Sklar (1999: 53), conceptions of horizontal and vertical accountability 
correspond to the ideas of constitutionalism and democracy, respectively. In practice, he adds, 
the processes associated with the later set of ideas are closely related as those processes are 
often conflictual and mutually reinforcing at one and the same time (Sklar, 1999: 53). He 
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 In Kenyan context, the composition and the chair of all House Committees are headed by the opposition and 
the total composition of each committee is tilted in favor of the opposition.  
22
 In the Kenyan context, independent offices are the Auditor General’s office, Revenue Authority, Office of the 
Ombudsman, while in parliament there are house committees in charge of finance, like the Public Accounts 
Committee and the Public Investment Committees. 
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argues that as an ample example, constitutional checks and balances are designed to repel 
threats to democracy by demagogic politicians (Sklar, 1999: 53). Phillip C. Schmitter (1999: 
59) contends that accountability is central to virtually all “procedural” definitions of 
democracy and points out that horizontal accountability belongs to a widely populated class of 
arguments that asserts the necessity for democracy to protect itself from its own potential for 
self-destruction (Schmitter, 1999: 59). He submits that, just as vertical accountability is not 
restricted to “throwing the bastards out” after they have disappointed the voters, the horizontal 
variety should also have the capacity to set and restrict agendas and not just react to whatever 
authorities have already done (Schmitter, 1999: 61). Plattner (1999: 63) points out that in 
liberal democracy:  
“the fundamental law to which government officials are held accountable is the constitution, 
which in turn draws its authority from the explicit consent of its people and it is this 
democratic dimension, that the notion that governments are simply agents and trustees of the 
people, that gives the concept of accountability its centrality in contemporary discussions of 
democracy”.  Plattner firmly adds that “it is precisely because the people do not rule directly 
but are the source of all political authority that accountability - ultimately meaning 
accountability to the people - can be seen as a defining feature of modern liberal democracy” 
(Plattner 1999: 66).  
3.3 Legislatures  
One key institution that occupies a central place in minimal and liberal democracies around 
the world is parliament (Hout, 2005: 25) and its cardinal role in democratic governance 
should be viewed within the context of the need for separation of powers for the full 
realization of democracy (Momba, 2005: 101). Interchangeably used, legislatures, parliaments 
or assemblies are mirrors of the nature of the state (either democratic or authoritarian), party 
systems (one-party, multiparty, or dominant party), and political culture (Salih, 2005b: 3). 
Legislatures, according to Johnson (2005: 2), vary in size in how members are elected, how 
long they hold office, in their ways of relating to political parties and to constituents, in their 
relations with executive powers, in their responsibilities in lawmaking and budgeting, in how 
they oversee executive spending and dozens other ways. Of the two types of legislatures, the 
one composed of only one chamber is called unicameral legislature and one that has two 
chambers is called bicameral legislature. Unicameralism is the dominant parliamentary 
system in Africa where 39 African Parliaments are unicameral and 16 are bicameral (Salih, 
2005b: 16-17).  
Kenya under the former constitution (1963-2010) is a unicameral legislature that 
started at independence as a bicameral legislature. Under the new constitution (August 2010- 
), the legislature reverted to bicameralism albeit with different composition. It is difficult to 
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generalize whether bicameralism offers a better foundation for stability, delegation and 
accountability than unicameralism, according to Salih (2005b: 19). Salih argues though, that 
constitutional structures that protect legislatures from executive dominance are generally 
better served by bicameralism than unicameralism. However, this section will discuss 
legislatures and describe some of the three common functions found in all legislatures among 
other attributes. Once a rubberstamp legislature to an emerging one and, owing to the new 
constitution, firmly transformed into a transformational legislature, what does this new power 
of the legislature portend for the nascent democracy that Kenya is? To answer this, let us first 
look at what weak legislatures portend for democracy. 
3.3.1. Legislatures and Patterns of Democratization 
As noted in section 2.5, weak legislatures inhibit democratization. Kenya’s legislature, as in 
many other legislatures in Africa, was very weak until the start of the 1990s. While 
legislatures strive to deliver on their constitutionally prescribed functions, the executive 
struggles tirelessly to control the legislature (Salih, 2005a: 252). According to Wang (2005: 
184), the inner workings and structure of parliament are significant for its ability to influence 
policy outcomes and also for its ability to hold the executive accountable. Fish (2006: 12) 
argues that a weak legislature undermines “horizontal accountability”. Fish notes that in 
polities where authoritarian regimes have broken down and new regimes are taking their 
place, the temptation to concentrate power in the executive is great. This was the case in 
Kenya. In December 2002, the opposition finally managed to remove the ruling party KANU 
from power. It is argued that whereas there was political change from one administration to 
another in terms of electing a new government, it was not necessarily a political transition 
from one regime to another as there was no break from past practices (Nyong'o, 2007: xv). As 
(Kanyinga, 2007: 101) points out, as an election tool the NARC alliance was motivated by the 
need to stem authoritarianism and create conditions through which presidential powers would 
be reduced and decentralized across institutions. However, Kanyinga adds, the new political 
elite radically changed course and reneged on the pre-election agreements over the 
distribution of political power (Kanyinga, 2007: 83) .  
As mentioned in chapter two, the judiciary
23
 could not counter-balance executive 
power in the early years of transition and under such circumstances, Fish (2006: 12) argues, 
the legislature is the only agency at the national level that is potentially capable of controlling 
the chief executive. Where the legislature lacks muscle, presidential abuses of power – 
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 The judiciary service commission was under a ministry, and it did not enjoy autonomy. 
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including interference in the media, societal organization, and elections - frequently ensue, 
even under presidents who take office with reputations as democrats (Fish 2006: 12-13). Fish 
argues further that legislative weakness also inhibits democratization by undermining the 
development of political parties by pointing that in weak polities with weak legislatures, 
political parties drift and stagnate rather than develop and mature (Fish 2006: 13). In Kenyan 
context, the transition from authoritarian one-party state political system to a multiparty 
system ushered in the formation of more than sixty political parties, though fewer than a 
dozen are active and most have fragmented along ethnic lines (Kanyinga, 2007: 83). 
According to Fish (2006: 13), parties
24
 are the main vehicles for structuring political 
competition and for linking the people and their elected officials and their underdevelopment 
saps political competition of its substance and vigor and checks the growth of “vertical 
accountability” – meaning the ability of the people to control their representatives.  
3.3.2. Conceptual Framework 
According to Norton (1990a: 10), the essential paradigm for legislative studies in the 
twentieth century received a significant contribution from Baron de Montesquieu’s work in 
The Spirit of the Laws (1748), who distinguished and defined legislatures by his delineation of 
a separation - or division - of powers (governmental trinity) between legislature, executive, 
and judiciary and was to provide a framework for much constitution-writing since. This 
model of separation of powers, according to Bosley (2007: 4), is tempered by a system of 
checks and balances that ensures that each branch is able to exercise restraints on the powers 
exerted by other branches
25
. Legislatures in the world are, according to Polsby (1990), 
modelled or adapted more often from either the British or the American legislative system. 
Norton (1990a: 1) and Olson (1994: 3) points out that the word ‘legislature’ constitutes a 
broad term for an institution that goes by many different names
26
. However, Norton (1990: 1) 
adds that what such bodies have in common is that they are constitutionally designated 
institutions for giving assent to binding measures of public policy; that assent being given on 
behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government elite responsible for 
formulating those measures. As Norton puts it, this is an encompassing definition which 
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 The survey by Fish (2006: 16) noted, in Bulgaria, the strength of the legislature spurred the formation of 
parties that structured political competition and injected vigor in elections and parliaments robustness also 
encouraged public participation. 
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 See Accountability on this chapter and oversight on this section. See Figure 1. 
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 They are variously called congress, parliament, national assembly, general court among other names and in 
different languages. 
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includes those institutions – like the House of Lords and the Canadian Senate – that do not 
stipulate the requirement of election, which is not a defining characteristic (Norton, 1990: 1). 
Olson (1994: 1), on the other hand, asserts that parliaments – or legislatures – not only 
the keystone of a democratic political system, but are also the most fragile component of any 
state with law making, save for constitutional law, emanating from the legislature. Carey 
(2006: 431) sees legislatures as, at least according to the formal rules set out by constitutions 
as the principle policy-making institutions in modern democracies. Mezey (1979: 3) and 
Olson (1994: xiii) contends that there have been definitional problems which has become 
more complex as our knowledge about legislatures become more sophisticated. However, 
(Mezey, 1979: 6) terms legislatures as predominantly elected body of people that acts 
collegially and has the formal, but not necessarily the exclusive power, to enact laws binding 
on all members of a specific geopolitical entity. Important policy decisions, Carey (2006: 431) 
maintains, must be approved by legislatures among other tasks and he summarises these tasks 
as: representing diversity; deliberation; cultivating information and expertise; decisiveness; 
checking majority and executive power
27
. Barkan (2008: 126) adds another function that he 
sees as the legislature’s principal task; that is, constituency service28. African legislatures 
perform other tasks. See also section 2.2. However, as Beer (1990: 62) puts it, the tasks of 
legislatures change with the times, while Packenham (1990: 86) contends, that different 
functions may be more important in different political systems. As Packenham (1990: 95-96)) 
correctly puts it:  
“The foregoing account of functions…is designed to indicate the variety, and the relative 
importance of the functions. They are not ‘functional requisites’ for any legislature, although 
they are probably found in most of them. More importantly, most of the legislatures of the 
world seem to have functions which do not fit at all closely the assumptions about functions 
adopted by most studies of legislatures.”  
 
One aim of the thesis is to assess horizontal accountability role especially the 
executive-legislative relations. I will start by highlighting this relation. 
3.3.3 Legislative – Executive Relations 
The three general ways in which a legislature may control the bureaucracy in a separation of 
powers system is through oversight, legislation, and budget-making, and for these to work, 
Remington (2004: 9) notes, some conditions must be met: There needs to be a certain degree 
of cooperation between the branches in policy making (each side must be willing to bargain 
and compromise in order to get some policy benefits); The legislature must have some 
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 This is what is variously referred to as oversight; or calling the executive to account. 
28
 He argues that in countries where legislators are elected by proportional representation (PR), constituency 
service is a lesser priority (Barkan 2008: 126). 
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capacity to monitor the executive, and; The executive needs to be willing to comply with 
legislative enactments. As Beer (1990: 71) mentions, one of the oldest conceptions of the role 
of parliament is that of controlling and restraining the executive. In nearly all democracies, 
leaders of the executive branch typically command much of the political power, control the 
financial resources, possess staff dedicated to developing policies and implementing laws, 
produce the bulk of legislation, and manage government contracts and administer government 
programs (Johnson 2005: 1).  
In the Kenyan experience, Kenya remained a country where the preponderance of 
power was concentrated in an imperial presidency at the expense of the legislature and the 
judiciary (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009: 49). According to Johnson, despite executive dominance 
in many countries, the relative balance of power between the legislative and executive 
branches in country can be changed (Johnson, 2005). Johnson argues that if new legislatures 
are going to have a central role in a nation’s governance, it is up to legislatures themselves to 
build strong legislative institutions by asserting themselves in the regular law-making or 
oversight functions, or through specific structural changes via constitutional amendment, 
legislation or rules of procedure (Johnson, 2005). In the Kenyan context, the constitutional 
amendment of 1999 established the financial and administrative independence of the National 
Assembly, but the judiciary remained firmly under presidential control (Barkan & Matiangi, 
2009: 49-50). However, Olson (1994: 74) points out, that since the legislative/parliamentary 
interaction with the executive - is the single most important relationship in the policy process 
of democracies - the key question for legislatures concerns their independence from the 
executive
29
. However, as there are many questions arising from this relationship, among them 
being the extent the legislature could act independently of the chief executive on legislation - 
amongst other questions - depends also entirely upon the democratic political system existing 
in a State.  
The constitution plays a decisive goal by defining the political system a State will 
have. See figure 5 and also section 3.3. According to Olson (1994: 93), the relative positions 
of executive and legislature are always subject to change and criticism whatever the 
constitutional design and however detailed the written constitution. Olson (1994: 93) argues 
that the relationship is one of the big questions of politics and has no clear answer that the 
main participants are willing to accept. As Beer (1990: 64-66, 73) rightly points out, 
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 Most authoritarian states, especially authoritarian states in Africa, the executive or the presidency have been 
known to emasculate the powers of the legislature and the judiciary. See: Barkan (2009), Ake (2000), and Polsby 
(1990).  
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strengthening of the executive against the legislature has been a general development in the 
modern world and as government gets deeply engaged in the management of economic and 
social affairs, it must increasingly rely less upon general laws and more upon specific 
managerial decisions. Largely because of these reasons, the practice of delegating legislative 
power to the executive has grown immensely in recent times.  
3.3.4 The members: Representatives and Legislators 
As Olson (1994: 13) puts it, the human beings who populate the legislative institution are its 
essential raw material and their skills, their expectations and the hopes and fears they bring 
with them help shape what they do as members. This human dimension, Olson argues, is 
particularly visible and acute in the newly democratized countries. In the Kenyan case, the 
emergence of a vocal and politically astute coalition for change contributed in the reforms that 
the legislature underwent in the early years of the introduction of multipartism (Barkan, 2009: 
20). According to Olson (1994: 16), different length of experience is itself a source of 
differing degrees of power and that within the legislature; the experienced members are more 
active and effective than are newer and less experienced members. However, Polsby (1990: 
131) maintains that a politicians bearing, his personality, eloquence, debating power, prestige, 
might weigh heavily, but these are personal, not organisational, attributes.  
3.3.5 Representation 
 Given the demographics and history of African countries, both citizens and MPs place a 
much higher emphasis on representation and constituency service than on legislating and 
oversight
30
 (Barkan et al., 2010: ii). “Representation”, however, according to Przeworski et al 
(1999: 8), is a relation between interests and outcomes. Barkan (2008: 125) asserts that 
legislatures are the institutional mechanism through which societies make representative 
governance real on a day to day basis; and the first function of individual legislators and the 
body to which they belong, is to represent the varied and conflicting interests in society as a 
whole. Carey (2006: 432) agrees with Barkan but is more specific by pointing out that 
legislatures are plural bodies with larger membership than executives, and so offer the 
possibility both to represent more accurately the range of diversity in the polity, and to foster 
closer connections between representatives and voters. The stumbling block in both cases, 
according to Carey (2006: 432), is to identify what sort of diversity ought to be privileged in 
                                                          
30
 According  to findings on the working paper by Barkan et al (2010: ii), this poses a dilemma for MPs in most 
African Legislatures-do they emphasize representation and constituency service with the result that the 
legislature of which they are members will not develop into a sufficiently powerful institution capable of holding 
the executive accountable to the public? Or do they devote more time to legislating and oversight at the risk of 
displeasing the electorate and suffering defeat when running for reelection. 
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legislative representation. Various dimensions of representation - including geography, 
ethnicity, religion, and gender - have been prominently on the table in each case (Carey 2006: 
434). According to Loewenberg (1971: 3), equality of status also determines that members of 
parliament work collectively, either in meetings of the entire membership or in committees of 
members and concepts of representation affects the composition of parliament and the roles 
which their members play. To Pitkin (1967: 60), true representation require that the legislature 
be so selected that its composition corresponds accurately to that of the whole nation; only 
then is it really a representative body. Leiserson (1949 in Pitkin, 1967: 116)(1949) points out 
that the substance of representing is activity and argues that this is what a political scientist 
means when he says that the test of representation is not whether the leader is elected, but 
how well he acts to further the objectives of those he represents.  
The legislator, therefore, according to Pitkin (1967: 148), has a multiple role: he has to 
represent the party that sponsored him to parliament and its programs; along with the 
constituents that voted him in, he has to be cognisant of the national interest which could be 
different from the constituency or party interest. Furthermore, Pitkin (1967: 215) adds that the 
representative who is an elected legislator does not represent his constituents on just any 
business, and by himself in isolation; he works with other representatives in an 
institutionalised context at a specific task - the governing of a nation or state. As Przeworski, 
Stokes, and Manin (1999: 3-4) rightly puts it; while individuals who offer themselves for 
public service differ in their interests, motivations, and competence, citizens use their votes 
effectively to select either candidates whose interests  are identical to those of voters or those 
who are and remain devoted to the public service while holding office. Bosley (2007: 4), on 
the other hand, sees the need to formalize consultation with the citizenry, as there are 
unforeseen circumstances or issues that parliament may not have the moral mandate to resolve 
on their own without consulting with the electorate. Preferences of citizens, according to 
Przeworski et al. (1999: 8) and Wahlke (1990: 100) are signalled to politicians through a 
variety of mechanisms such as elections, public opinion polls, or other forms of political 
expression.  
3.3.6 Law Making/ Deliberation 
Law making is one of the principal functions of legislatures, and according to Bosley (2007: 
4); its most challenging role. The general practice, Bosley argues, is that the Executive 
initiates draft legislation and parliament debates and scrutinizes the same prior to passage, 
although in theory, parliamentarians too can initiate bills. This is becoming a reality in the 
40 
 
more upcoming emerging and transformative legislatures mentioned earlier. In the Kenyan 
context under the new constitution, all bills will be initiated by parliament. According to 
Carey (2006: 432), legislatures are forums for debate and reasoned consideration of the 
diverse viewpoints they embrace and that their internal workings are supposed to be subject to 
monitoring from outside actors. Carey (2006: 432) contends that by forcing debate into an 
open setting, legislatures may limit admissible arguments on behalf of interests or policy 
positions to those that can be defended in public. Polsby (1990: 131), on the other hand, sees 
debate as the ventilation of opinion for the education of the country at large which functions 
to mobilise interest groups and to proclaim loyalties within and outside the chamber. Carey 
(2006: 434) argues further that once representatives, of whatever type, are selected; they must 
establish procedures to consider alternative policy proposals and in this instance, the 
legislative process is very much a part of the product; democratic legislatures are public 
forums of debate and deliberation. Because the constitution under which the legislation 
operates must endow it with law-making capability, Mezey (1979: 6; Beer, 1990: 73) argues 
that the legislature need not hold this power exclusively and recognises the fact that other 
institutions in the political system like the courts, bureaucracies, and presidents, can make 
laws in the form of judgement, rules, and decrees. In the Kenyan context, citizens, through a 
process, have been empowered under the new constitution to initiate bills for legislation in 
parliament. Any proposed legislation must also have public participation and input. Barkan 
(2008: 125) points out that legislatures legislate, but at two levels; at minimum they pass laws, 
in some cases merely rubber-stamping legislation handed down by the executive, while in 
other cases, legislatures shape public policy by crafting legislation-in partnership with or 
independent of the executive branch and then passing that legislation into law. 
3.3.7 Checks/ Oversight 
Checks or oversight is one of the most important roles of legislature in exercising horizontal 
accountability. Barkan (2008: 125-126) contends that this core function, is to exercise 
oversight of the executive branch, thereby ensuring that policies agreed upon and passed into 
law are in fact implemented by the state. He argues that oversight is essential in any 
democracy because it ensures both the vertical accountability of rulers to the ruled as well as 
the horizontal accountability of all other government agencies to the one branch-the 
legislature-whose primary function is to represent the citizens. Such scrutiny, he points out, 
requires a measure of transparency in governmental operations. According to Carey (2006: 
433), the capacity of checking majority action within legislatures depends on the distribution 
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of procedural rights among members; the capacity for checking external actors depends on the 
distribution of policy-making authorities across branches and across legislative chambers in 
bicameral systems. He further argues, that checks should reveal information about policies 
and about the motivations of their advocates that might not be disclosed otherwise and in 
doing so, checks should encourage deliberation and foster accountability (ibid). Demand for 
checking function, according to Carey (2006: 447), rests in part on the distrust of the 
executive and is based in part on the expectation that checks reveal information about policy 
options, and about the motivations of their champions, thus, enhancing the informational role.   
3.8 Summary 
As discussed in this chapter, there is indeed a symbiotic relationship between 
constitutionalism, accountability and the legislature. The constitution, basically a supreme 
legal document in a country, structures and limits the exercise of power and defines how a 
country is to be governed. I have discussed political accountability as a function in itself and 
why it is a key component in democracies. In separation of powers between the legislature, 
the judiciary and the executive, accountability in accordance with the constitution ensures that 
none should encroach on the territorial independence of the other. These three arms of state 
are supposed to be accountable to each other for their actions. Accountability then becomes 
crucial to the running of State: this could be between institutions, or between principal and 
agent, or between the citizenry and the state institutions. Finally, I have also looked at the 
legislature as an institution that makes and unmakes laws that govern a country.  
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4.0 Methodology  
“The content is the method” (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994) 
In this chapter I discuss the method that I use to inquire how and whether the constitutional 
revisions in Kenya will affect Parliament’s position in the system. In addition, I discuss the 
choice of method, the advantages and disadvantages of the methods chosen and the goals. 
Further in this chapter, I discuss the means of measurement, data and its sources and introduce 
the thirty two items that will be used to operationalize the data.  
4.1 The Choice of Case Study Method 
In seeking to answer questions about Kenya Parliament’s culture and its functions, I have 
found quantitative methods to be insufficient on their own in explaining the phenomenon the 
research question seeks to answer. To be able to explore my research question rigorously, 
case study method present an appropriate and unique non-experimental way as it enables a 
very close examination, scrutiny and collection of detailed material or information for the 
study that could be missed by quantitative research methods. Case study also allows for the 
use of different techniques to get the necessary information that could not have been revealed 
if the case had involved two or more countries. Hence it is a richer way of getting more 
account of what is occurring not accessible through other methods. Such an in-depth study of 
Kenya also allows directions or offer suggestions for further studies. 
4.2 Choices of Method  
As King et al. (1994: 9) point out; the content of “science” is primarily the methods and rules, 
not the subject matter, since we can use these methods to study virtually anything. For the 
effective study of the effects of the new constitution in Kenya on the Parliament, it would not 
be possible to use quantitative method and hence the choice of qualitative method which 
entails an in-depth analysis of information. Since the academic question is about Kenya, I 
have chosen to use qualitative research and in particular a within-case or case study method. 
4.2.1 Qualitative Study versus Quantitative Method 
 King et al. (1994: 3-4) argue that even though qualitative and quantitative research seems to 
be at war, their differences are mainly ones of style and specific technique. In their view, the 
same underlying logic provides the framework for each research approach and is clarified and 
formalized clearly in quantitative research methods discussions, but the same logic also 
underlies the best qualitative research. Whereas quantitative research uses numbers and 
statistical methods, King et al. (1994: 3) state that it tends to be based on numerical 
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measurements of specific aspects of phenomena, it abstracts from particular instances to seek 
general description or to test causal hypotheses. In contrast, qualitative research covers a wide 
range of approaches, which by definition could and not necessarily rely on numerical 
measurements (King et al., 1994: 4). And as is also the case with quantitative research, King 
et al. (1994: 4) point out that qualitative researchers generally unearth enormous amounts of 
information from their studies, and sometimes this kind of work in social sciences is linked 
with area or case studies where the focus is a particular event, decision, institution, location, 
issue or piece of legislation.  
As King et al. (1994: 46) argue, inference is the process of using the facts we know to 
learn about the facts we do not know. The facts we do not know are the subjects of our 
research questions, theories, and hypothesis while the facts we do know form our (qualitative 
or quantitative) data or observations. The thesis main goal is to assess the strength of the 
Kenyan Parliament in the new constitution in comparison to the former constitution. 
Accordingly, this research project hopes to satisfy the two criteria in the social sciences as 
proposed by King et al., (1994: 15) namely: posing a question that is “important” in the real 
world. The topic to be researched is consequential as it gives an understanding on the 
direction of the Kenyan Parliament in relation to the new constitution and might give an 
understanding how beneficial a stronger Kenyan Parliament would be for democratization 
and/or offer suggestions on “areas” that could be improved. It also investigates the 
performance of the new constitution in four key areas, that is: Parliament’s influence over the 
executive; Parliament’s institutional autonomy; Parliament’s specified powers and; 
Parliament’s institutional capacity.  
The second criterion this research project hopes to achieve is “to make a specific 
contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to 
construct verified scientific explanations of some aspects of the world” (King et al., 1994: 15). 
This criterion can be achieved through researching further on the Fish and Kroenig’s survey 
on Kenya from 2009 by observing changes and new observations in the Kenyan system not 
captured in the survey, either because some events occurred after the survey had long been 
published or some questions asked in the survey had been understood differently in the larger 
context (of the survey Fish and Kroenig (2009) undertook). Therefore, the research seeks to 
investigate differently the survey questions and review some “answers” given in the 32 items 
by Fish and Kroenig (2009) with regards to the former Kenyan constitution. See table 8 for 
the list of the 32 items. The research will use the 32 items to measure the former constitution 
and the new constitution and investigate which of the constitutions scores better and on which 
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indicator or category. This way, we can determine whether the new constitution has provided 
the Kenyan Parliament with more powers. To put it differently, we can determine whether the 
new constitution has strengthened the Kenyan Parliament. As Steven Fish (2006: 12) points 
out, the Parliamentary Powers Index is an excellent predictor of how countries fare in 
democratization after they adopt their constitutions. 
4.3 Case study and Its Goals 
Before conducting a case study, it is important to conceptualize it and understand case study 
is. For methodological purposes, Gerring (2007: 19) writes that case connotes a spatially 
delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time 
and comprises the kind of phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain. This is 
conversant with my study of Kenyan Parliament which is analyzed from the period from 
independence under the former constitution (amended through time) to the current period with 
a new constitution (promulgated in 2010). A case study may be understood as the intensive 
study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a 
larger class of cases (a population) (Gerring, 2007: 20). Case study research, according to 
Gerring (2007: 20), may incorporate several cases; however, at a certain point it will no 
longer be possible to investigate those cases intensively.  
To be able to examine the development of Kenya’s Parliament intensively, no other 
cases will be included in the analysis. Rather, more time periods are included. As Gerring 
(2007: 1) points out, sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful 
than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples. This way, he contends, we gain 
better understanding of the whole by focusing on a key part. A second factor militating 
towards case-based analysis, according to Gerring (2007:4), is the development of a series of 
alternatives to the standard linear/addictive model of cross-case analysis. Thus establishing a 
more variegated set of tools to capture the complexity of social behavior and as they move 
closer to a case-based understanding of causation insofar as they aim to preserve the texture 
and detail of individual cases - features that are often lost in large-N cross-case analysis 
(Gerring, 2007: 4). The other factor for case-based methods is the marriage of rational-choice 
tools with single-case analysis, sometimes referred to as an analytic narrative and this is used 
to test the theoretical predictions of a general model, to investigate causal mechanisms, and/or 
explain the features of a key case (Gerring, 2007: 5). 
At the same time, Gerring (2007: 6) argues that case study is viewed by most 
methodologists with extreme circumspection, whereby a work focusing its attention on a 
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single example (“mere” case study), is often identified with loosely framed and non-
generalizable theories, biased case selection, informal and undisciplined research designs, 
weak empirical leverage (too many variables and too few cases), subject conclusions, non-
replicability, and causal determinism. The paradox of it all, Gerring (2007: 8) points out, is 
that although much of what we know about the empirical world has been generated by case 
studies, the case study method is generally unappreciated – arguably because it is poorly 
understood. Gerring (2007: 10-11) writes that case study research may be either quantitative 
or qualitative, or some combination of both, and there is no reason that case study work 
cannot accommodate formal mathematical models, which may help to elucidate the relevant 
parameters operative within a given case. King et al. (1994: 44) state that case studies are 
essential for description, and are therefore, fundamental to social sciences.  
This thesis, though based on a single case, will use the “quantitative” items used by M. 
Steven Fish and Mathew Kroenig’s Parliamentary Power Index to analyze and study the 
Kenyan Parliament. As Gerring (2007: 11) rightly observes, if the within-case evidence drawn 
from a case study can be profitably addressed with quantitative techniques, these techniques 
must be assimilated into the case study method. King et al. (1994: 5) points that to be able to 
understand the rapid changing world; we will need to use information that cannot be easily 
quantified as well as that which can, and in addition all social sciences requires comparison 
which entails judgments of which phenomena are more or less alike in degree or in kind (that 
is, qualitative differences). At the same time, Gerring (2007: 12-13) maintains, that the 
process of case selection involves a consideration of cross-case characteristics of a group of 
potential cases and reflection upon cross-case patterns, should be a helpful tool as it helps one 
to formulate useful insights, by separating those that are limited in range from those that 
might travel to other regions. Kenya is, indeed, an interesting case to study as it provides 
some useful insights into the consolidation of democracy in Africa in general. Firstly, it has 
undergone some form of transition to democracy from one-party dictatorship to a multiparty 
democracy, from hybrid system and soon embracing pure presidential system. Secondly, it is 
a test-case and a first in Africa, to have a coalition government. Thirdly, it has successfully 
changed governance system through a new constitution. It is this changes, or revisions in its 
constitution among other factors that has motivated me to seek to inquire how the new 
constitutional dispensation affects Parliament’s role in governance. 
King et al. (1994: 10) points out that one way to understand events is by seeking 
generalizations whereby conceptualizing each case as a member of a class of events about 
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which meaningful generalizations can be made. These generalizations, as discussed in the 
previous chapter touches on concepts of constitutions, accountability and legislatures.  
4.4 Means of Measurement  
To measure or estimate the strength of Kenya Parliament, I will use the means of 
measurement created by M. Steven Fish and Mathew Kroenig (2009). Fish and Kroenig, 
hereafter to be referred to as Fish-Kroenig, attempted in their study to measure the powers of 
legislatures and encompasses a richer array of dimensions of power and its distribution, and 
checks and balances across world’s polities. Their main tool for measurement is the 
Legislative Powers Survey (LPS) which is a list of thirty-two items that gauge separate 
indicators of the legislature’s strength. This analysis will be different from the Fish- Kroenig 
survey in two respects. First, it will be comparing the strength of Kenya Parliament using two 
constitutions. It will gauge the score marks that measure the strength of Parliament under the 
former constitution (1963-2010) with the score marks under new constitution (2010- ). 
Secondly, while Fish & Kroenig used a “yes” or “no” check mark next to each statement, with 
a score of 32 indicating an all-powerful legislature and very low score indicating a weak 
legislature, I will assign check marks 0 to 1  for affirmation of each statement (see table 6). 
This Boolean algebra has two conditions, according to Ragin (1987: 86), one is “true” (or 
present) and the other is “false” (or absent). These two conditions are represented in base 2: 1 
indicates presence; 0 indicates absence (Ragin, 1987: 86). These are indeed the means of 
measurements employed by Fish and Kroenig. To avoid the pitfall of these procedures which 
entails loss of information, which Ragin (1987: 86) argues is typically not great, I have 
employed a middle condition that can capture lost information. According to Goertz (2006: 
45-46) the absence of one dimension can be compensated by the presence of other dimensions 
in what he calls fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic plays a key role in  permitting us to give 
mathematical and formal representation of the ways in which most scholars have thought 
about concepts (Goertz, 2006: 46). As Goertz (2006: 46) argue, concept builder should 
theorize the substitutability between dimensions and one can choose anything from no 
substitutability to complete substitutability. 
 In the list of 32 items under survey, losing information in at least half of the items will 
not give an accurate measurement. Should an item appear clearly in the constitution or is 
clearly practiced in the country, I will assign a check mark 1. If an item in the survey is 
neither mentioned anywhere in the constitution, nor in practice, I assign a 0 check mark. 
However, should answers to each item be ambiguous, vague, and ambivalent, or what is 
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practiced is different from what is demanded by the constitution or at the minimum appear 
somewhere, a score mark 0.5 will be assigned. I will then use the sum of the score marks 
under each of the constitutions to generate a Parliamentary Powers Index similar to the Fish-
Kroenig PPI, albeit with one country under study. The final score is continual and reflects a 
legislature’s overall aggregate strength and ranges from zero (least powerful) to one (most 
powerful). Of the 2006-2007 survey by Fish-Kroenig (2009), Kenya got 0.31 score marks (see 
results and break down on table 7).This score marks underpin the weakness of the Kenyan 
legislature at that time. 
Table 6: Categories of Measurements 
Means of measurements: Old constitution vs. new constitution (32 items) 
Unambiguous  
(“Yes” – Fish & Kroenig) 
Score marks 1 
Ambiguous/ambivalent vaguely in 
constitution or in practice (middle) 
Score marks 0.5  
Absent 
 (“No” - Fish & Kroenig) 
Score marks 0 
Table 1 shows the three categories of measurement  
To avoid systematic measurement error which, according to King et al. (1994: 155), is 
the consistent overestimate for certain types of units that sometimes can cause bias and 
inconsistency in estimating causal effects, I choose to divide the answers to each item in three 
categories for precision. Table 6 above shows the three categories of measurements. 
Obviously, as King et al (1994: 152) point out, a universally right answer does not exist: all 
measurement depends on the problem that the investigator seeks to understand.  
According to Fish-Kroenig (2009: 14), some weighting of issues is built in the survey 
itself. On the assignment of equal weight to each item, Fish-Kroenig (2009: 13) argue that it 
would involve difficult and arbitrary distinctions and as each item cannot be equally 
important, the importance of an item may vary from country to country and from time to time. 
This research will give the same equal weight to each item for both validity and reliability. To 
increase reliability however, I have used multiple sources of information which increases 
representability while at the same time eliminating observations or data that are unclear. By 
giving all the items equal weight standardizes the conditions for taking the test and 
maintaining a consistent scoring procedure – this is in line with the Fish-Kroenig Survey. The 
total number of check marks awarded for the 32 items will then be divided by 32 to give the 
final results. According to the Fish-Kroenig Survey of 2009, Kenya had 0.31 scores. This 
means that Kenya had only 10 items “yes” out of the 32 items. 
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4.5 Data (Research Sources) 
The two main sources of information for this thesis are the two constitutions of Kenya. For 
clarity, the former constitution means the constitution that was in place before the 
promulgation of the new one on the 4
th
 of August 2010. The former constitution (with 
amendments) (F. Constitution, 2010), was enacted in 1969 after a series of fundamental 
amendments to the independence constitution that came partly in force on 1
st
 of June 1963 
and partly on 12
th
 of December 1963. Instead of engaging experts on Kenya as was the case 
with the Fish and Kroenig survey, due to time and resource constraints, I use relevant excerpts 
from the new constitution (N. Constitution, 2010), the former constitution, Parliamentary 
Standing Orders
31
, Parliamentary Hansard, Bills, relevant press and journalistic accounts, 
secondary sources and other relevant scholarly work as my source of information/data. The 
use of other sources apart from the two constitutions is because not all items in the 
Parliamentary Powers Index by Fish & Kroenig are addressed in constitutions (some of these 
are items 15, 26, 28, 29, 31 and 32. See Table 8 for a list of the 32 items). It is four years since 
the book by Fish and Kroenig (2009) was published and a lot of information has been 
gathered or recorded with regards to the Parliament in Kenya and for other Parliaments in the 
world at large. There have also been more parliamentary reforms. Therefore, there is new 
information that would change the Kenya Parliament score marks for the former constitution. 
The research will not rely on the prior research and conclusions done by the Fish and Kroenig 
(2009) due to reliability and validity of their data. What we have in the Handbook of 
Legislative Studies by Fish and Kroenig are final answers to the questions that were posted to 
the various experts. However, the material they gathered is not available nor is it possible to 
replicate the questions to the experts. See the table below for the results of the Fish and 
Kroenig Survey for Kenya. Questions posted and answers are not included. 
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 Standing Orders, Hansard, Bills, Parliamentary Magazine can be found at www.parliament.go.ke  
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Table 7: Fish-Kroenig Results for Kenya 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF KENYA (BUNGE) 
Expert consultants: June Gachui, Nairobi legis, David K. Leonard, Gideon Ochanda, Bjarte Tørå 
Score: .31 
Influence over  
executive (3/9) 
1. replace 
2. serve as minister          X 
3. interpellate                   X 
4. investigate 
5. oversee police 
6. appoint ministers 
7. lack president 
9 no confidence               X 
Institutional 
autonomy (1/9) 
10. no dissolution 
11. no decree 
12. no veto 
13. no review 
14. no gatekeeping 
15. no impoundment 
16. control resources      X       
17. immunity 
18. all elected 
Specified 
powers (1/8) 
19. amendments   X 
20. war 
21. treaties 
22. amnesty 
23. pardon 
24. judiciary 
25. central bank 
26. media 
Institutional  
capacity (5/6)  
27. sessions            X 
28. secretary           X 
29. staff 
30. no term limits   X 
31. seek re-election X 
32. experience         X 
Source: Fish and Kroenig (2009: 362) 
4.6 Operationalization of the survey items (Indicators) & the questions posed 
Each item affects legislative power and Fish and Kroenig (2009) further divided each 
elements of the list into four sub categories. These are Influence over Executive, items 1-9; 
Institutional Autonomy, items 10-18; Specified Powers, items 19-26; and Institutional 
Capacity, items 27-32. Table 6 shows the score marks for Kenya by Fish and Kroenig survey 
published in 2009 and the indicators of the different items. The results show the National 
Assembly as being weak on the three indicators and its strength is only on the last indicator. 
Due to lack of space and to avoid repetition, operationalization of the thirty two - survey 
items and the questions posed (written in italics) will be presented in the next chapter 
concurrently with the operationalization of the data gathered for each item. The original Fish 
and Kroenig Legislative Powers Survey is shown on Table 7. 
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Table 8: Fish-Kroenig Legislative Power Survey 
Indicator 1-9: Influence over executive/ 10-18: institutional autonomy/ 19-26: specified 
powers/ 27-32 institutional capacity 
Item Survey questions 
1 Can the legislature control executive power by unseating, or threatening to 
unseat, the executive? 
2 May legislators staff the cabinet themselves? 
3 Can the legislature question the executive and force it to explain its policies? 
4 Can the legislature probe the executive? 
5 Can the legislature monitor the state’s coercive agencies? 
6 Does the legislature appoint the head of government? 
7 Does the legislature influence the composition of cabinet? 
8 Does the legislature select the president – or need it not contend with one? 
9 Can the legislators express their opposition to the government with a vote of no 
confidence? 
10 Is the legislature’s term fixed even in the event of executive displeasure? 
11 Does the legislature have a monopoly on lawmaking authority? 
12 Can the legislature make laws without great concern for executive defiance? 
13 Are the legislature’s laws the final word? 
14 May the legislature make laws in any areas it wishes? 
15 Must the government spend the money the legislature appropriates? 
16 Does the legislature enjoy financial autonomy? 
17 Are legislators free from fear of punishment? 
18 Is the legislature free of executive appointees? 
19 Can the legislature by itself change the fundamental law? 
20 Is action by the legislature needed to declare war? 
21 Is action by the legislature needed to ratify treaties? 
22 May the legislature grant amnesty? 
23 May the legislature grant pardon? 
24 Does the legislature have a hand in the appointment of members of the judiciary? 
25 Does the legislature appoint the chief of the central bank? 
26 Does the legislature influence the state-owned media? 
27 Is the legislature regularly in session? 
28 Does each member of the legislature have a secretary? 
29 Does each member of the legislature have at least one staffer who helps with 
policy matters? 
30 Are legislators free from restrictions of term limits? 
31 Do legislators sincerely hope to keep their jobs? 
32 Does the legislature have a cohort of members who know the ropes? 
Source: Fish and Kroenig (2009) 
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5.0 Data 
As can be corroborated by Fish (2006) survey of democratization in post-Communists 
states, it is not so much the type of constitutional system (presidential, ‘semi-presidential’ or 
parliamentary) that determines the level and quality of a country’s democratization, but the 
power and effectiveness of its legislature. As his paper titled ‘Stronger Legislatures, Stronger 
Democracy’ concludes, stronger legislatures serve as a weightier check on executives, and 
also provides stronger stimulus to party building, whereas weaker legislatures need to make 
constitutional reforms a top priority to strengthen the legislature. In this chapter, data is 
collected for the Kenyan Parliament using two different constitutions as a means of 
measurement. The two constitutions under study vary in the type of constitutional system and 
in how they distribute power.  
In this chapter, data is gathered on the 32 items within four categories with regards to 
the Kenyan Parliament using two constitutions as benchmarks. However, to avoid double 
repetition, operationalization of data will be done concurrently while gathering data on each 
of the 32 survey items. The 32 items have been divided into four categories or indicators. 
These are: influence over executive; institutional autonomy; specified powers; and 
institutional capacity. In each indicator are the survey items that fall under it. The items are in 
form of statements and are written in italics. Questions for each item appear on Table 8 in the 
previous chapter. Operationalization of each of the items comes after the statements (also 
written in italics). Under each item is the data collected for the Kenyan Parliament. First to 
appear is the data for the Kenya Parliament under the former constitution followed by data for 
the Kenyan Parliament under the new constitution. For ease of reference, in the former 
constitution, “Section” is used to describe a particular law, while in the new constitution 
“Article” is used to describe the particular law etc. “Former” constitution refers to the 
constitution before the new one was promulgated on the 27
th
 of August 2010.  
 
5.1 Influence over Executive (Items 1-9) 
The first nine items, according to Fish and Kroenig (2009: 4), gauge the legislature’s 
influence over the executive. The items ask whether the legislature can oust the executive, 
have its own members serve in the government, question officials from the executive, oversee 
the agencies of coercion, appoint the prime minister, appoint or at least confirm ministers, 
elect the president, and express no confidence in government. 
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1. The legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, can impeach the 
president or replace the prime minister 
If the legislature has the power to impeach or remove the most powerful executive, be it the 
president, the prime minister or someone else, then I will assign a score mark 1. Should the 
legislature require the support of another institution or be part of the process of removing the 
executive, then I assign a score mark 0.5. If there is no provision for the removal of the 
executive in parliament or other institutions, then I assign a score mark 0. 
The former constitution has no provision for the removal of the President through 
impeachment. However, the closest there is to impeachment, is a provision that Parliament 
can pass a vote of no confidence against the Cabinet. Ironically, it is in the section 59 of 
summoning prorogation and dissolution of Parliament, which gives the President powers to 
either dissolve or prorogate Parliament. Subsection (3) provides that “if the National 
Assembly passes a resolution which is supported by the votes of majority of all members of 
the Assembly, declaring that it has no confidence in the government of Kenya, and the 
President does not within three days of passing of that resolution either resign from his office 
or dissolve Parliament, Parliament shall stand dissolved on the fourth day following the day 
on which that resolution was passed”. Now, because Parliament consists of the President and 
the national assembly, the removal of one affects the life of the other.  
However, in terms of section 12 (2), the President can be removed on the grounds of 
incapacity, i.e. being unable by reason of physical or mental infirmity to exercise the 
functions of the office of the President. In such a scenario, the national assembly’s term is not 
affected. But in the case of incapacity, the Chief Justice shall appoint a tribunal of medical 
practitioners to inquire into the matter and report back to him, and conveys the result to the 
Speaker of Parliament. If, within three months, the President is unable to discharge his duties, 
he shall cease to hold office. The Vice-President assumes presidency in acting capacity. Other 
than that, Section 14 stipulates that no criminal or civil proceedings whatsoever shall be 
instituted or continued against the President while he still holds office or against any person 
while he is exercising the functions of the office of the President. However, with the 
enactment of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act in 2008 and enacted as Section 
15A, provides that there shall be a Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers and 
Ministers of the Government of Kenya. Sub section (3) provides that “Parliament may, by an 
Act of Parliament and notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, provide for 
the appointment and termination of office of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and 
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Ministers
32
.” Having no provision for removal of the executive in Parliament, but one to 
appoint and terminate that of the Prime Minister, I assign a score mark 0.5 for the former 
constitution. 
One role of the National Assembly in the new constitution in chapter 8, Article 95 (5a) 
states that the National Assembly “reviews the conduct in office of the President, the Deputy 
President and other State officers and initiates the process of removing them from office.” 
Apart from the National Assembly, Article 96 (4) on the role of the senate provides that the 
“Senate participates in the oversight of State officers by considering any resolution to remove 
the President or Deputy President from office in accordance with Article 145.” Grounds for 
removal of the President are laid on Article 145 (1) (a) to (c). Article 145 (1) states that “a 
member of the National Assembly, supported by at least a third of all the members, may move 
a motion of impeachment of the President”; and if a motion under clause (1) is supported by 
at least two-thirds of all members of the National Assembly, the Speaker shall inform the 
Speaker of the Senate who shall convene a meeting of the senate to hear the charges against 
the President. The senate, by resolution, may appoint a special committee comprising eleven 
of its members to investigate the matter and report within seven days. If the charges are 
substantiated, then a vote of at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate will uphold any 
impeachment charge, the President shall cease to hold office. I assign a score mark 1 for the 
new constitution as the legislature has the power to impeach the President.  
2. Ministers may serve simultaneously as members of the legislature 
If ministers may serve simultaneously as members of legislature and member of the 
government, I assign a check mark 1. If a cabinet minister serves in the executive and still 
remain a member of legislature but forfeits his voting right, I assign a check mark 0.5. 
However, if a member of legislature cannot serve as a cabinet minister, I assign a check mark 
0. 
According to Chapter two in the former constitution, Section 16 provides that “there 
shall be such offices of Minister of the Government of Kenya as may be established by 
Parliament or, subject to any provisions made by Parliament, by the President,” while sub-
section Section 16 (2) provides that “the President shall, subject to the provisions of any 
written law, appoint the Ministers from among the members of the National Assembly.” 
Section 15 (1) and (2) provides that there shall be a Vice-President of Kenya, who shall be 
                                                          
32
 As this is a constitutional Amendment put in place in 2008, following the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Act, Section15A (5) provides that “the act made pursuant to subsection (3) immediately following the 
commencement of this section shall, while in force, be read as part of this constitution. 
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appointed by the President from among members of the National Assembly. Section 19 (1) 
also provides that, “the President may appoint Assistant Ministers in the performance of their 
duties.” On this item, I assign a score mark 1 as Ministers may serve simultaneously as 
members of legislature.  
According to the new constitution, Part 3 on the cabinet, Article 152(3) states that “a 
Cabinet Secretary shall not be a Member of Parliament”. I assign a score mark 0 as the new 
constitution is specific that a member of the legislature cannot serve as a cabinet minister. 
3. The legislature has powers of summons over executive branch officials and hearings 
with executive branch officials testifying before the legislature or its committees are 
regularly held. 
For the item to receive a check mark 1, the legislature must be capable in practice of calling 
or summoning officials from the executive to testify or explain matters regularly. The same 
marks will be awarded if the legislature can summon ministers to answer questions regularly 
in the floor of the House during “question time”. The item gets a check mark 0.5 if the 
legislature has the power to summon executive officials but it is not practiced. The check 
mark 0 is also awarded if the legislature has no power of summons over the executive 
officials.  
Items 3 and 5 (the legislature has effective power of oversight over the agencies of 
coercion) will be assessed together under the former constitution. Nowhere in the former 
constitution is there mention whether the legislature has the power to summon any executive 
branch officials. However, other than that, the Standing Orders Section 173 allows 
departmental committees to summon witnesses, receive evidence and the request for and 
receipt of papers and documents from the government and the public. Once a report has been 
compiled and reported in the floor of the House, the minister under whose portfolio the report 
touches on, according to Standing Orders 183, within 60 days report to the House. Section 
193 of the Standing Orders includes the mandate of the departmental Committees as to 
investigate, to inquire and to report on all matters related to the mandate, management, 
activities, administration, operations of the assigned ministries and departments. Subsection 
198 (e) gives departmental committees powers to investigate and inquire into all matters 
relating to the assigned ministries and departments as they deem necessary, and as they may 
be referred to them by the House or a Minister and to make reports and recommendations as 
often as possible. Taking this into account, I assign a score mark 1 for the former constitution. 
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Items 3, 4, and 5 under the new constitution will be assessed together. These three 
basically discuss the oversight or watchdog function of Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive. In 
the new constitution, Chapter 8 Article 125 (1) states that either House of Parliament and any 
of its committees, has power to summon any person to appear before it for the purpose of 
giving evidence or providing information. And (2), for the purpose of clause (1), a House of 
Parliament and any of its committees has the same powers as the High Court- to enforce the 
attendance of witnesses and examine them on oath, affirmation or otherwise; to compel the 
production of documents; and to issue a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad. 
Article 153 (3) of the new constitution states that “a Cabinet secretary shall attend 
before a committee of the National assembly, or the senate, when required by the committee, 
and answer any question concerning a matter for which the Cabinet Secretary is responsible.” 
The Standing Orders also covers the new constitution until after the next general elections. I 
assign a score mark 1 for the new constitution as it has powers to summon ministers regularly. 
4. The legislature can conduct independent investigations of the chief executive and the 
agencies of the executive 
 
If the legislature has the ability to conduct independent investigations of the chief executive 
and other agencies of the executive, then a checkmark 1 is awarded. A check mark 0.5 is 
awarded if the legislature only can conduct independent investigations to some agencies of 
the executive and not all. A checkmark 0 is awarded if the legislature cannot probe the 
executive or any of its agencies. 
In the former constitution protection of the President in respect to legal proceedings 
during office is guaranteed in Section 14 (1). It provides that “no criminal proceedings 
whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against the President while he holds office or 
against any person while he is exercising the functions of the office of President.” And 
subsection (2) provides that “no civil proceedings in which relief is claimed in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done shall be instituted or continued against the President 
while he holds office or against any person while he is exercising the functions of the office of 
President.” The President is protected from any investigations while in office. However, with 
the Standing Orders adopted in December 10, 2008, departmental committees can conduct 
independent investigations on agencies of the executive. On this, I assign a score mark 0.5 for 
the former constitution.  
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In the new constitution, the President is protected from legal proceedings under Article 
143 (1) and (2) which stipulate that civil and criminal proceedings shall not be instituted in 
any court against the President, clause (4) provides that “the immunity of the President under 
this article shall not extend to a crime for which the President may be prosecuted under any 
treaty to which Kenya is a party and which prohibits such immunity
33.” With reference to 
item 3 on the power of oversight by the legislature in Article 95 (5) (b), Article 95 (5) (a) 
provides that the National Assembly “reviews the conduct in office of the President, the 
Deputy President and other State officers and initiates the process of removing them from 
office.” I assign check mark 1 for the new constitution as it has the ability to conduct 
independent investigations of the executive and other agencies of the executive. Item 1 on 
impeachment under new constitution is also relevant here. 
5. The legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion (the 
military, organs of law enforcement, intelligent services, and the secret police). 
This question with the one above hangs together. However, if the legislature has effective 
powers over the agencies of coercion, that is, the power to oversee these agencies, 
investigate, regulate and fund for their activities, then I assign a checkmark 1. Should the 
legislature only regulate funds and can oversee but has no power to summon, question or 
investigate or lacks one of the functions, I assign a check mark 0.5. If the legislature has these 
powers, but rarely exercises them, then it gets also a checkmark 0.5. However, a check mark 
of 0 is awarded if the legislature cannot monitor the state’s coercive agencies.  
As discussed in item 3, the check mark 1 is given to the former constitution. With the 
adoption of new standing Orders on 10
th
 of December 2008, departmental Committees have 
the powers to summon agencies of coercion. This falls under ambit of the department of 
Administration and National Security in relations to Internal security and internal security, 
while the Defence and Foreign Relations Committee has mandate under all matters related to 
defence, East African Community matters, Pan-African Parliament, regional and international 
relations, agreements, treaties and conventions. 
In the new constitution, Chapter 8, Article 95 (5) (b) stipulates that the National 
Assembly exercises oversight of State organs, while Article 125 provides for either House of 
Parliament, and any of its committees has power to summon any person to appear before it for 
the purpose of giving evidence or providing information, and a House of Parliament and any 
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 This is for example the Rome Statute that constituted the International Criminal Court. Kenya is signatory to 
this Protocol, hence, the ICC Constitution is part of the Constitution of Kenya. Thus, the President can be 
charged for crimes against humanity the same way the President of Sudan has been charged. 
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of its committees has the same powers as the High Court. I assign a check mark 1 for the new 
constitution as it has the power to monitor agencies of coercion.  
6. The legislature appoints the prime minister. 
If head of state appoints a prime-minister who must seek approval from parliament, I assign a 
check mark 1. This is also assigned if the legislature elects the prime minister. However, 
legislature through one of its committees or sits in a panel that interviews, or check the 
integrity of the candidates for presidency or prime minister, then I assign a check mark 0.5. A 
check mark 0 is given if the legislature does not have the power to appoint the head of 
government or the prime minister. 
Section 4 of the former constitution stipulates that there shall be a President of Kenya, 
who shall be the head of State, and Section 23 vests executive authority on the President. 
There is, however, a provision for a Prime Minister enacted in the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act. See item 1 and also 2.7 on The National Accord and Reconciliation Act.  
Section 15A provides that “Parliament may, by an Act of Parliament and notwithstanding any 
other provision of the constitution, provide for the appointment and termination of office of 
the prime minister, deputy prime ministers and ministers.” Section 15A (3) stipulates that 
Parliament may provide for the function and powers of the prime minister and Deputy 
Ministers and the establishment of a coalition government. I therefore assign a check mark 1 
for the former constitution, that the legislature appoints the Prime Minister. Note that the 
Prime Minister and the President share power equally under this arrangement. 
 In the new constitution, there is no provision for the legislature to neither appoint the 
prime minister nor appoint the head of government. I assign a check mark 0 for the new 
constitution. The President is elected directly in a pure presidential system. 
7. The legislature’s approval is required to confirm the appointment of individual 
ministers; or legislature itself appoints ministers. 
If the legislature influence the composition of ministers or their approval is required to 
confirm the appointment of individual ministers, or the legislature itself appoints ministers, 
then I assign a check mark 1. If the legislature’s approval is only required under special 
circumstances then I assign a check mark 0.5. A check mark 0 is assigned if the executive 
appoints the ministers without the legislature’s approval. 
In the former constitution, and with reference to item 2, the President does not require 
the approval to confirm the appointment of individual ministers. The executive (read 
President) has the powers subject to Section 16(2), 15(2) and 19(1) to appoint ministers, the 
58 
 
Vice-President and assistant ministers. Section 18 is also specific. It stipulates that 
“responsibility for any business of the government of Kenya, including administration of any 
of the departments of Government, may be assigned to the Vice-President and the several 
Ministers as the President may, by directions in writing, determine.” And these offices shall 
become vacant if the President so determines. I would assign a score mark 0 that the 
legislature has no influence in the composition of ministers. However, and with reference to 
item 6 and Section 15A on the former constitution, courtesy of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act of 2008 that established the Coalition Government, Parliament has the 
power to appoint the Prime Minister, and the Deputy Ministers
34
. With this development, I 
assign a score mark 0.5 for the former constitution.  
In the new Constitution, on functions of the President, Chapter 9 Article 132 (2a) read 
together with Article 152 (2) on the cabinet, states that the President shall nominate and with 
the approval of the National Assembly, appoints, and may dismiss- Cabinet Secretaries. While 
Chapter 8 Article 124 (4a-c) states that when a House of Parliament considers any 
appointment for which its approval is required under this constitution or an Act of Parliament, 
the appointment shall be considered by a committee of the relevant House; the committee’s 
recommendation shall be tabled in the House for approval; and the proceedings of the 
committee and the House shall be open to the public. Not only are Cabinet Secretaries 
nominees to be vetted and confirmed by Parliament, Article 250(2) is clear on the role 
Parliament is to play in the appointment of Chairpersons, members of commissions and 
holders of independent offices.  I will therefore assign a check mark 1 for the new constitution 
as legislature’s approval is required to confirm the appointment of individual ministers. 
8. The country lacks a presidency entirely; or there is a presidency, but the president is 
elected by the legislature. 
I assign a check mark 1 if the presidency is elected by the legislature and 0 if he is directly 
elected by the people. 
In the former constitution, Section 5(1) provides that “the President shall be elected in 
accordance with this Chapter, subject thereto, with an act of Parliament regulating the election 
of a President.” Section 5 (3f) provides that “the candidate for President who is elected as a 
member of the national assembly and who receives a greater number of valid votes cast in the 
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 It should be noted though, that under the Accord, the respective Principals of the two parties would appoint 
equal number of ministers and assistant ministers and to appointments to other state departments would be 
shared on a fifty- fifty basis amongst the two parties. Hence parliament only appoints the PM and his deputies. 
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Presidential election than any other candidate for the President and who, in addition, receives 
a minimum of twenty-five percent of the valid votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces 
shall be declared to be elected as President.” Therefore, the country has a presidency and he is 
not elected by the legislature. I assign a check mark 0 for the former constitution. 
As per Transitional Clause in the new constitution, and considering the National 
Reconciliation and Peace Accord, the current President and the entire Cabinet are also 
members of Parliament. However, after the next general elections, Kenya will have a pure 
Presidential system of government where the President and all his Cabinet Ministers or 
Secretaries will not be MPs. Article 136 (1) stipulates that “the President shall be elected by 
registered voters in national elections conducted in accordance with this Constitution and any 
Act of Parliament regulating presidential elections.” On this item, I assign a check mark 0 for 
the new constitution as the President is not elected by the legislature.  
9. The legislature can vote no confidence in the government without jeopardizing its own 
term (that is without the threat of dissolution). 
If the legislature can pass a vote of no confidence or a motion of censure on the government 
without jeopardizing its own term, I assign a checkmark 1. A check mark 0.5 is assigned if the 
legislature can pass a motion of no confidence but threatens dissolution. This is because if 
that is the only way to remove a wayward president or executive and it risks its own “life” in 
the process, then it gets the marks. However, 0.5 check marks can be assigned if the 
legislature can pass a vote of no confidence in individual ministers. A 0 check mark is 
assigned if none of the powers is awarded to it.  
Section 59 (3) of the former constitution states that Parliament can pass a vote of no 
confidence against the Cabinet if: 
“the National Assembly passes a resolution which is supported by the votes of the majority of 
all members of the Assembly (excluding the ex officio members), and of which not less than 
seven days’ notice has been given in according with the standing orders of the Assembly, 
declaring that it has no confidence in the government of Kenya, and the President does not 
within three days of the passing of that resolution either resigns from his office or dissolve 
Parliament, Parliament shall stand dissolved on the fourth day following the day on which that 
resolution was passed.”  
This in effect means that the Parliament can jeopardize its own term as it will stand dissolved 
if this takes effect. I assign a score mark 0.5 for the former constitution as it risks its own 
“life”. 
In the new constitution, the life of the House is protected by Article 102(1) and only 
expires on the date of the next general election. I assign a score mark 1 for the new 
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constitution - read together with Item 1 on impeachment of the President - that the legislature 
can pass a vote of no confidence or a motion of censure without jeopardizing its own term. 
5.2 Institutional Autonomy (10-18) 
Items 10-18 according to Fish and Kroenig (2009: 4), evaluate the legislature’s institutional 
autonomy. They ask whether the legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive, 
vested with exclusive law making authority, free from the threat of an effective executive 
veto, free from threat of judicial review, able to legislate on any issue, in charge of 
government expenditures, in control of its own finances, composed of members immune from 
arrest, and free from executive appointees. 
10. The legislature is immune from dissolution from the executive. 
If the legislature is immune for the displeasure of the executive and has a fixed term, I assign 
a checkmark 1. By fixed term means that the legislature stands to dissolve itself at the end of 
their term. The legislature can still be assigned a check mark 1 if, on its own volition, decides 
to dissolve itself and still immune from dissolution by the executive. However, the legislature 
gets a checkmark 0.5 if it has a fixed term but the executive has the power to dissolve it only 
on special conditions. However, a check mark 0 is awarded if the legislature has no fixed 
term or it has but its survival is dependent on the whims of the executive. 
Section 59 (1) and (2) in the old constitution stipulate that the President may at any time 
prorogue or dissolve Parliament. On these two subsections, Parliament is not immune from 
the executive. I assign a check mark 0 for the former constitution.  
In the new Constitution, Article 102 (1) stipulate that the term of each House of 
Parliament expires on the date of the next general election, and clause (2), states that “when 
Kenya is at war, Parliament may, by a resolution supported in each House by at least two-
thirds of all members of the House, from time to time extend the term of Parliament by not 
more than six months at a time.” I assign a check mark 1 for the new constitution that the 
executive has no power to dissolve it whatsoever.  
11. Any executive initiative on legislation requires ratification or approval by the legislature 
before it takes effect; that is, the executive lack decree power. 
As one of the supreme functions of the legislature is law-making, then, if the legislature has 
the monopoly over the lawmaking, I assign a check mark of 1. Should the legislature be a 
rubber stamp of the executive, meaning they just ratify what the executive has made, I assign 
a check mark 0. However, in the situation the legislature gives temporary decree powers to 
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the executive on specified areas of authority and can rescind those powers, I assign a check 
mark 1. If the legislature cannot rescind those powers then I assign a checkmark 0.5. But, 
should the executive make laws without permission from the executive, a check mark of 0 is 
awarded. If the executive passes decrees that have the force of law without the legislature 
enjoying the right to annual the decrees, I assign a check mark 0; and 1 if it has the power to 
annul. 
Section 30 of the former constitution stipulates that the legislative power is vested in 
Parliament, which shall consist of the President and the National Assembly. Section 46, states 
that legislative powers are vested in Parliament through enacted bills. However, Section 48 
restricts Parliament from debating any financial matters that touches on taxation, imposition 
of a charge, payment, issue or withdrawal on the Consolidated Fund except upon the 
recommendation of the President signaled by a minister. I assign a check mark 0 for the 
former constitution as the President has authority on certain financial matters. This also refers 
to item 12. Presidential decrees were also equated for law even though they were illegal 
(Machuhi, 2012). 
Article 94 of the new constitution stipulates that the legislative authority is derived 
from the people and at the national level is exercised by Parliament, and no person or body, 
other than Parliament, has the power to make provision having the force of law in Kenya 
except under authority conferred by the constitution or by legislation. I assign a check mark 1 
as the legislature under the new constitution has the monopoly of making laws. 
12. Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or essentially veto-proof; that is, the 
executive lacks veto power, or has veto power but the veto power can be overridden by a 
simple majority in the legislature. 
If a bill automatically becomes law once passed without the executive having veto-proof, then 
I assign a check-mark 1. If the executive has veto power but can be overridden by a simple 
majority in the legislature, I assign a check mark 1.  Fish & Kroenig (2009: 8) argue that if a 
bill automatically becomes law once the legislature passes it, the executive lacks veto-power, 
and the answer is affirmative. A check mark 0.5 is assigned if a super majority is required to 
overturn a veto power from the executive. A simple majority here should be understood to 
mean the majority of the members present at the House at the time of voting. A super majority 
means more than three quarters of the total members of the house are present and vote to 
overrule. A check mark 0 is awarded if the executives veto power cannot be overturned by the 
house.  
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Items 11 and 14 concerning the former constitution is relevant here. Nevertheless, on 
legislation and procedure in the national assembly, and in exercising of legislative power of 
Parliament, Section 46 provides that Bills once passed in Parliament, should be presented to 
the President for his assent and the President has twenty-one days to signify to the Speaker 
that he assents to the Bill or refuses to assent to the Bill. Section 46 (4) provides that where 
the President refuses to assent to a Bill he shall, within fourteen days of the refusal, submit a 
memorandum to the speaker indicating the specific provisions of the Bill which in his opinion 
should be reconsidered by the National Assembly including his recommendation. Sub-section 
(5) provides that the National Assembly shall consider a Bill referred to it by the President 
and shall either approve the recommendations and resubmit it or refuse to accept the 
recommendations and approve the Bill in its original form by a resolution in that behalf 
supported by votes of no less than sixty-five per cent of all members of the national assembly 
in which case the President shall assent to the Bill within fourteen days of the passing of the 
resolution. I assign a check mark 0.5 for the former constitution as it requires a super majority 
to overturn a veto from the executive. 
Article 94 in the new constitution provides that Parliament’s authority is vested in and 
exercised by Parliament and Article 109 provides that Parliament shall exercise legislative 
power through Bills passed by Parliament and assented to by the President. The same 
procedure as in the former constitution is also the same here. The only difference is the 
shortened duration of time the President has to assent. I assign a check mark 0.5 as a super 
majority is required to overturn a veto power from the President.  
13. The legislature’s laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review. 
If the legislature’s law are supreme and cannot be rejected by the judiciary, then I assign a 
score mark 1.If the laws are rejected by the judiciary but the legislature can re-make the laws, 
I assign a score mark 0.5.  But if the legislature does not have the final word and the judiciary 
can overturn or reject the laws, the item is negative and receives a score mark 0.  
In the former constitution, Chapter 1 Section 3 provide that “this Constitution is the 
Constitution of the republic of Kenya and shall have the force of law throughout Kenya and, 
subject to section 47, if any law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall 
prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of inconsistency, be void”. And Section 67 (1) 
provides that “where a question as to the interpretation of this Constitution arises in 
proceedings in a subordinate court and the court is of the opinion that the question involves a 
substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if a party to the proceedings so requests, 
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refer the question to the high court.” However, Section 47 of the constitution empowers 
Parliament to amend the constitution. According to Dr. PLO Lumumba (2009: 149) 
Parliament is subject to jurisdictional factors and the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy, as 
obtains in England, can only apply to Kenya subject to modifications; the modification being 
that Parliament is only supreme in so far as it acts in accordance with the constitution. I assign 
a score mark 0.5 for the former constitution as Parliament can make and unmake laws. 
In the new constitution, Chapter 8, Article 94, provide that the legislative authority of 
the Republic is derived from the people and, at the national level, is vested in and exercised 
by Parliament. Article 94 (5) is clear that “no person or body, other than Parliament, has 
power to make provision having the force of law in Kenya except under authority conferred 
by the constitution or by legislation.” Article 165 stipulates, that among others, the high court 
shall have jurisdiction to hear any question respecting the interpretation of the constitution 
including determination of the question whether any law is inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this constitution. With clear distinct roles in the constitution, I assign a score 
mark 1 for the new constitution as its laws or not subject to judicial review. 
  
14. The legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions; the executive lack 
gatekeeping authority. 
If the legislature has the power to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions, I assign a score 
mark 1. If the only right reserved for the executive is to introduce budget, I assign a score 
mark 1. If the executive has gatekeeping authority whereby only the executive has the right to 
introduce legislation in some/most areas and the role of the legislature as a whole is limited 
in practice to rejecting or accepting such initiatives, I assign a score mark 0.  However, if the 
executive has authority to introduce legislation on some areas but the legislature alone has 
the powers to alter or introduce measures on the legislation, I assign a score mark 0.5. 
In the former constitution, Section 48(a) (b) puts restriction with regard to certain 
financial measures. It stipulates that except upon the recommendation of the President 
signified by a Minister, the National Assembly shall not proceed upon a Bill (including an 
amendment to a Bill) that makes provision for any of the following purposes: imposition of 
taxes or the alteration of taxation; imposition of a charge on the Consolidated Fund; the 
payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund; the composition or remission of a 
debt due to the Government of Kenya. This means that the National assembly has no 
jurisdictions on most money Bills. I assign a score mark 0 for the former constitution.  
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Chapter 8, Article 109 (1) in the new constitution states that “Parliament shall exercise 
its executive power through Bills passed by Parliament and assented to by the President”, and 
Article 109 (2) states that “any Bill may originate in the National Assembly”. However, 
Article 109 (5) provides that a Bill may be introduced by any member or committee of the 
relevant House of Parliament, but a money Bill may be introduced only in the National 
Assembly in accordance with Article 114. In Article 114 clause (1 to 4), explains and defines 
“a money Bill” and what it involves (for example, taxes, loans, appropriation). In departure 
from the former constitution, the President has no gatekeeping powers in any jurisdictions. I 
assign a check mark 1 that the Legislature has right to initiate Bills in all policy jurisdictions. 
15. Expenditure of funds appropriated by the legislature is mandatory; the executive lacks 
the power to impound funds appropriated by the legislature. 
I assign a score mark 1 if the executive spends appropriation specified by the legislature. 
However, if appropriations specified by the legislature can be blocked, redirected or 
manipulated by the executive, I assign a score mark 0. If the executive must use funds not 
allocated in the previous budget but must seek approval from the legislature, I assign a score 
mark 0.5. 
Refer to item 14 for the former constitution Section 48 (a) to (b). All “Money Bills” 
could be introduced only “upon the recommendation of the President. Hence, the Executive 
could unilaterally dictate fiscal policy and appropriate to itself any funds it required. I assign a 
check mark 0 for the former constitution.  
The new constitution in Article 95(4 a to c) confers to the National Assembly the role 
to appropriate funds for expenditure by the national government and other national State 
organs and also to exercise oversight over national revenue and its expenditure. However, it is 
Article 220 to 227 that have put a cap on the power of the Executive in relation to the national 
budget and other financial matters. Article 221 (1) which offers Parliament an opportunity in 
engaging in  budget preparation stipulates that “at least two months before the end of each 
financial year, the Cabinet Secretary responsible for finance shall submit to the National 
Assembly estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the national government for the next 
financial year to be tabled in the National Assembly.” (See appendix on highlights of the 
budget process). Thus, as mentioned, under the new constitution, Parliament has been 
transformed into a budget making organ as opposed to budget rubberstamping forum. I 
therefore assign a check mark 1 as the Funds appropriated are mandatory as specified by the 
legislature. 
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16. The legislature controls the resources that finances its own internal operations and 
provides for the perquisites of its own members. 
If the legislature enjoys financial autonomy from the executive and controls its own resources, 
I assign a score mark 1. If the executive controls the resources that fund the legislature’s 
operation, I assign a score mark 0. If the legislature must seek approval from the executive to 
finance some operations, I assign a score mark 0.   
Under the former constitution and the new Constitution, Parliament is accorded fiscal 
autonomy. The Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act of 1999 was passed by the National 
Assembly on November 17, 1999 and assented to by former President Moi two days later. 
The Parliamentary Service Act was enacted in 2002 and it facilitated the creation of a 
Parliamentary Service Commission, distinct from the Public Service of Kenya. These 
Amendments made Kenya’s National Assembly both financially and administratively 
independent of the executive as it created a Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) 
responsible for, among others, overseeing the National Assembly’s budget and administration, 
preparing Parliament’s budget – and providing for yearly audits. And in section 45B (6) of the 
former constitution, the autonomy of Parliament is guaranteed as it provides that “in the 
exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions, under this constitution, the 
Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.”  
In the new constitution, fiscal independence is acknowledged in Article 221 (1 to 7) 
that stipulates, inter alia, that the “National Assembly shall consider the estimates submitted 
by the Cabinet Secretary with estimates submitted by the Parliamentary Service Commission 
and the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary”. I assign a score mark 1 for both constitutions.  
17. Members of the legislature are immune from arrest and/or criminal prosecution. 
Are legislatures free from arrest or punishment in the course of their work, I assign a score 
mark 1. If the legislature as an institution has the power to lift immunity of legislators, then I 
will still assign a check mark 1. If the legislators are not free from fear in their work as 
legislators, I assign a check mark 0 and this also applies to situations where other agencies 
have the power to lift the immunity of legislators. If the legislators are only free in the 
precincts of Parliament or during sessions but can be arrested outside, then I assign score 
mark 0. This includes situations where the legislature is immune only on paper but members 
are frequently arrested. If the legislature is free from arrest in the course of their work but 
can be caught in criminal acts, I assign a check mark 0.5. 
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Powers, privileges and immunities of the National Assembly and its committees and 
members are provided in Section 57 of the former constitution for the purpose of orderly and 
effective discharge of its business and without prejudice to section 56. Section 56 provides for 
National Assembly to make standing orders regulating the procedure of the Assembly. While 
in the new constitution, Chapter 8, Article 117 (2) provides for that Parliament may for the 
purpose of the orderly and effective discharge of the business of Parliament, provide for the 
powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament, its committees, the leader of majority party, 
the leader of minority party, the chairpersons of committees and members. The National 
Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act (revised 1998) Part II on Privileges and Immunities, 
which is relevant to date, provide in Section 4 that “no civil or criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted against any member for words spoken before, or written in a report to, the Assembly 
or a committee, or by reason of any matter or thing brought by him therein by petition, Bill, 
resolution, motion or otherwise”. And Section 5 of the Act provides that “no member shall be 
liable to arrest for any civil debt except a debt the contraction of which constitutes a criminal 
offence, whilst going to, attending at or returning from a sitting of the Assembly or any 
committee.” Section 6 protects members from civil or criminal proceedings and provides that 
“no process issued by any court of Kenya in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction shall be 
served or executed within the precincts of the Assembly while it is sitting, nor shall any such 
process be served or executed through the Speaker or any officer of the Assembly unless it 
relates to a person employed within the precincts of the Assembly or to the attachment of a 
member’s salary”. But these privileges do not apply to a member during the period of 
suspension, since such member is deemed to be a stranger. I assign a score mark 0.5 for the 
former constitution as well as the new constitution as members are immune and only 
prosecuted if they are involved in criminal activities. 
 
18. All members of the legislature are elected; the executive lacks the power to appoint any 
member of the legislature. 
A check mark 1 is assigned if all the members of the legislature are elected and the executive 
lack the power to appoint any member of the legislature. A check mark of 1 is also assigned if 
the number appointed by the executive is less than 2 percent of the total members of the 
legislature. If the executive appoints members but they do not have voting rights, a check 
mark 1 is also awarded. If the executive appoints a substantial number of legislators who also 
have voting rights, I assign a check mark 0. However, if the legislature has two chambers and 
the members of the upper chamber are appointed by the legislature but do not appoint any in 
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the lower chamber, then I assign a check mark 1. This is because the upper chamber is 
largely ceremonial and possesses little or no real legislative powers. 
In the former constitution, Parliament consists of 210 elected members and 12 
nominated members to represent special interests and nominated by parties according to their 
parliamentary strength. The list of the nominated members is forwarded to the President by 
the electoral body to be according to President Section 33 (1) and taking into account the 
principle of gender equality. I therefore assign a check mark 1 for the former constitution as 
majority of the members are elected. 
In the new constitution, Chapter 8, Article 97 (1) (a to c) states that the National 
assembly consists of 290 members, each elected by registered voters of single member 
constituencies; 47 women, each elected by registered voters of the counties; 12 members 
nominated by Parliamentary political parties according to their proportion of members of the 
National Assembly in accordance with article 90, to represent special interests including the 
youth, persons with disabilities and workers. I assign a check mark 1 for the new constitution 
as most members of the National Assembly and the Senate are elected.   
5.3 Specified Powers (19-26) 
Items 19-26 focuses on specified powers. Items in this category, according to Fish and 
Kroenig (2009: 4), inquire about whether the legislature is vested with powers to change the 
constitution, authorize war, ratify treaties, grant amnesty, grant pardon, influence judicial 
appointments, appoint the head of the central bank, and influence the stat-owned media.  
19. The legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, can change the 
constitution. 
If the legislature alone has the power to change the constitution I assign a check mark 1. If 
the legislature has the power to change the constitution, but other actors too have the some 
powers, I assign a check mark 0.5. However, if other actors can change the constitution, but 
such changes must be approved by the legislature, I assign a check mark 0.5. If the legislature 
does not play any role in changing the constitution, I assign a check mark 0.  
In the former constitution, Section 47(1) and (2) provides that Parliament may alter the 
constitution by a majority of not less than 65 per cent of all the members of the Assembly. 
Here, references to the alteration, according to Section 46 (6b), are references to the 
amendment, modification or reenactment, with or without amendment or modification of any 
provision of the constitution, the suspension or repeal of that provision and the making of a 
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different provision in the place of that provision. For the former constitution, I assign a check 
mark 1 as it has the power to alter the constitution. 
In the new constitution, Article 94 (3) provides that Parliament may consider and pass 
amendments to and alter boundaries as provided in this constitution. Article 255(1) stipulates 
that a proposed amendment to this constitution shall be enacted in accordance with Article 
256 or 257, and approved in accordance with clause (2) by a referendum, if the amendments 
relates to any of the following matters: the supremacy of this constitution; the territory of 
Kenya; the sovereignty of the people; the national values and principles of governance; the 
Bill of Rights; the term of office of the President; the independence of the judiciary and the 
commissions and Independent offices
35
; the functions of Parliament; the objects, principles 
and structure of devolved government. Clause (3) on the other hand, provides that an 
amendment to this Constitution that does not relate to a matter mentioned in clause (1) shall 
be enacted either by Parliament, in accordance with Article 256 or by the people and 
Parliament, in accordance with Article 257. 
Now, should either House of Parliament fails to pass the Bill, or even to a Bill 
mentioned in Article 255(1) above, Article 257(10) stipulates that the proposed amendment 
shall be submitted to the people in a referendum. On this item, I assign a check mark 0.5 as 
the legislature on itself alone cannot change the constitution.  
20. The legislature’s approval is necessary for the declaration of war. 
If the legislature’s approval is necessary for declaration of war, a check mark of 1 is 
awarded. If the approval is not required, a check mark 0 is assigned.  
Nowhere in the former constitution is Parliaments’ approval necessary or required for 
the declaration of war. The only place war has been mentioned is concerning the life of 
Parliament. Section 59(5) provides that at any time Kenya is at war, Parliament may from 
time to time provide for the extension of the period of five years. I therefore assign a check 
mark 0 for the former constitution. 
In the new constitution, Article 95 (6) stipulates one of the roles of the National 
Assembly as to approve declarations of war and extensions of states of emergency. Article 
132 (4d) states that the President may “with the approval of Parliament, declare war.” 
However, Article 58 (1) states that “a state of emergency may be declared only under Article 
132 (4d) and only when the state is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, 
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 There are 11 Independent offices and among them are, Parliamentary Service Commission, Judicial service 
Commission, Auditor-General, among others.  
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disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and the declaration is necessary to meet 
the circumstances for which the emergency is declared”. Consequently, Article 58 (2) states 
that “ a declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken 
in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only prospectively; and for no longer that 
fourteen days from the date of declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend 
the declaration”. With this in mind, I assign a check mark 1 for the new constitution for the 
requirement of approval from the legislature before declaration of war. 
21. The legislature’s approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries. 
If the legislature’s approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries, a check 
mark 1 is assigned. A check mark 0 is assigned if ratification is not required from the 
legislature.   
Nowhere in the former constitution is the approval of the necessary for ratification of 
treaties with foreign countries. However, there is parliamentary departmental committee on 
Defence and Foreign Relations whose mandate is on matters of defence, East African 
Community matters, Pan-African Parliament, regional and international relations, agreements, 
treaties and conventions. Since, their mandate is not clearly defined and different from, say, 
the Parliamentary Budget Committee; I assume that its role is to play an oversight role and of 
ensuring the obligations by the executive are met. I assign a score mark 0 for the former 
constitution. 
In the new constitution, Article 2(5) states that the general rules of international law 
shall form part of the law of Kenya and Article 132(c iii) states that the President shall “once 
every year submit a report for debate to the National assembly on the progress made in 
fulfilling the international obligations of the republic”, while in Article 132(5) provides that 
the President shall ensure that the international obligations of the republic are fulfilled through 
the actions of the relevant cabinet secretaries. Article 153 (3) provides that a cabinet secretary 
shall attend before a committee of the National Assembly, or the Senate, when required by the 
Committee, and answer any question concerning a matter for which the cabinet secretary is 
responsible. Clause (4) provides that cabinet secretaries shall act in accordance with this 
constitution and provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under 
their control. Article 95 (5b) provides that the National Assembly exercises oversight of state 
organs and on this matter, any foreign affairs falls under the Defence and Foreign Relations 
Committee of Parliament as mentioned earlier. There is also a Private Members Bill pending 
debate in Parliament called the Ratification of Treaties Bill that requires Parliament’s 
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approval before ratification of any treaty with foreign countries. Since this is yet to be passed, 
I assign a score mark 0 for the new constitution. 
 
22. The legislature has the power to grant amnesty. 
Here amnesty refers to political offenses; and if the legislature has the power to grant 
amnesty, a check mark 1 is assigned. If not, a check mark 0 is given.   
Item 22 and item 23 will be considered together.  
In the former constitution, there is a Section on the Prerogative of Mercy, which can 
be translated to mean either amnesty or pardon. Section 27 (a to c) stipulates that “the 
President may grant to a person convicted of an offence a pardon, either free or subject to 
lawful conditions; grant to a person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the 
execution of a punishment imposed on that person for an offence; substitute a less severe form 
of punishment for punishment imposed on a person for an offence”. Subsection (e) grants the 
President power to “remove in whole or in part the non-disqualification or the disqualification 
of a person, arising out of or in consequence of the report of an election court under the 
provisions of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, from registration as an 
elector on a register of electors or from nomination for election as an elected member of the 
National Assembly”. The President as provided has powers to pardon even court decisions. 
There is also an Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy composed of the Attorney 
General (a Presidential appointee), and at maximum, five other members appointed by the 
President in the Committee. Under Section 28(2ii), a member of the Committee appointed 
shall hold the seat thereon for such a period “in any case, if the President in writing so 
directs.” However, where a person has been sentenced to death for an offence, the President 
under Section 29(1) after obtaining the advice of the Committee, he shall decide in his own 
judgment whether to exercise any of his functions under section 27. With Parliament having 
no powers whatsoever to grant amnesty to political offences, I assign a check mark 0 for the 
former constitution. 
In the new constitution, Article 133(2) states that “there shall be an Advisory 
Committee on the power of Mercy”, comprising the Attorney General, Cabinet Secretary 
responsible for correctional services and at least five other members as prescribed by the Act 
of Parliament, none of whom may be a State Officer or in public service. Parliament, 
according to Article 133(3) shall enact legislation to provide for the tenure, procedure of the 
members of the Advisory Committee and the criteria that shall be applied in formulating its 
advice. And Article 133(4) provides that “the Advisory Committee may take into account the 
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views of the victims of the offence in respect of which it is considering making 
recommendations to the President”. Article 133(1) provides that “on the petition of any 
person, the President may exercise a power of mercy in accordance with the advice of the 
Advisory Committee.” A check mark of 0 is awarded for the new constitution may not grant 
amnesty or pardon for any offence.  
23. The legislature has the power of pardon 
Pardon here refers to nonpolitical criminal offences and a check mark 1 is awarded if the 
legislature grants pardon and 0 if it cannot.  
See comments on the former and the new constitution on item 22. A check mark of 0 is 
assigned for both the former and the new constitution as the legislature has no power of 
pardon. 
24. The legislature reviews and has the right to reject appointments to the judiciary; or the 
legislature itself appoints members of the judiciary. 
According to Fish & Kroenig (2009: 11), the right to influence the composition of the 
judiciary carries the potential to affect the legal system and the administration of justice and 
where the legislature appoints members to the judiciary or has a role in the in judicial 
appointments. If the legislature reviews or has a hand in rejecting or appointment of members 
of the judiciary, both as single members and the judiciary as a whole, I assign a check mark 
1. If the legislature only appoints a single member of the judiciary and not the rest (national 
level courts, Supreme Court, or constitutional court), I assign a check mark 0.5. If the 
legislature is not involved in any way, I assign a check mark 0.  
In the former constitution, Section 61(1) provides that the Chief Justice shall be 
appointed by the President and sub section (2), the other (referred to as puisne judges) judges 
shall be appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission. Therefore, the legislature has no right to influence the composition of 
the judiciary as a whole and I assign a check mark 0.  
In the new constitution, Article 166 (1a) stipulates that the President shall appoint “the 
Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission and subject to the approval of the National Assembly.” In the 
establishment of the Judicial Service Commission, the constitution states that the commission 
shall consists of among others, the Chief Justice, the Attorney General and in Article 171 (h) 
“one woman and man to represent the public, not being lawyers, appointed by the President 
with the approval of the National Assembly”. The constitution provides that the other judges 
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will be vetted by the Judicial Service Commission and appointed by the Chief Justice. I assign 
a check mark 0 for the old and 0.5 for the new constitution. 
25. The chairman of the central bank is appointed by the legislature. 
If the legislature appoints the chairman of the central bank, or is included in the appointing, 
vetting the candidate for the position, or even has the power to dismiss the chairman, I assign 
a check mark 1. If the legislature has no role in the appointment of the central bank chairman 
but has the capacity to dismiss the central bank chairman, I assign a check mark 0.5. 
However, if the legislature has no role whatsoever in the appointment or dismissal of the chief 
of the central bank, I assign a check mark 0.   
In the Kenyan context, the head of the central bank is called the governor of the bank. 
The former constitution does not mention the central bank, the governor or its operations. 
This is mentioned instead in the Central Bank of Kenya Act. However, Section 24 stipulates 
that “Subject to this Constitution and any other law, powers of constituting and abolishing 
offices for the Republic of Kenya, of making appointments to any such office and terminating 
any such appointment, shall vest in the President”. Section 25(1) is more specific by 
providing that “Save in so far as may be otherwise provided by this Constitution or by any 
other law, every person who holds office in the service of the Republic of Kenya shall hold 
that office during the pleasure of the President”. The Central Bank of Kenya Act Chapter 491 
Part IV 11 (2) provide that “the Governor, Deputy Governor and the directors under 
paragraph (d) of subsection (1) shall be appointed by the President and shall hold office for 
terms of four years each but shall be eligible for re-appointment”. As the legislature has no 
role in the appointment or dismissal of the central bank chief, I assign a score mark 0 for the 
former constitution.  
Article 231 in the new constitution recognizes the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and 
gives it autonomy to carry out its functions under clause (3). Clause (5) stipulates that “an Act 
of Parliament shall provide for the composition, powers, functions and operations of the 
Central Bank of Kenya”. However, Amendment to the Section 11 of the Central Bank of 
Kenya Act (Hansard 19.04.2011: 83-85) that the directors of CBK shall be appointed by the 
President with the approval of Parliament and shall hold office for a period of four years but 
shall be eligible for re-appointment for one further term of four years (Thuku, 2011). A 
further amendment of the CBK Act, Section 13 (32) (c), provides that “there shall be a 
governor who shall be appointed by the President in a transparent and competitive process 
and with the approval of Parliament.” I assign check mark 1 for the new constitution. 
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26. The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media. 
To counterbalance the dominance of the executive in the state owned media, the legislature 
has to have a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media. If the legislature, 
governs, or appoints members that governs the state owned media and therefore has 
influence, on how the state-owned media is run, a check mark of 1 is assigned. If the 
legislature does not appoint members but has influence in the operation of the state-owned 
media, a score mark 0.5 is awarded. If the legislature has no substantial voice or influence on 
the state-owned media, a check mark 0 is assigned.  
There is nowhere in the former constitution where the national media is mentioned. 
However, being a state corporation, appointments are done by the respective ministry it falls 
under, or done by the President who has the powers under Section 24 of constituting and 
abolishing offices, of making appointments to any such office and terminating such 
appointment. I assign a score mark 0 for the former constitution. 
In the new constitution, Article 34 (5) provides that “Parliament shall enact legislation 
that provides for the establishment of a body, which shall be independent of control by 
government, political interests or commercial interests; reflect the interests of all sections of 
the society; and set media standards and regulate and monitor compliance with those 
standards.” Article 34 (4) stipulates  that “all state-owned media shall be free to determine 
independently the editorial content of their broadcasts or other communications; be impartial; 
and afford fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.” 
However, on the legislation of political parties, Article 92 provides that Parliament shall enact  
legislation to provide for  the reasonable and equitable allocation of airtime, by state-owned 
and other mentioned categories of broadcasting media, to political parties either generally or 
during election campaigns; the regulation of freedom to broadcast in order to ensure fair 
election campaigning. As the legislature has some influence in so far as legislation in the 
operationalization of the state-owned media, I assign a score mark 0.5 for the new 
constitution. 
5.4 Institutional Capacity (27-32) 
Items 27-32 measure the legislature’s institutional capacity. According to Fish and Kroenig 
(2009: 4), it assesses whether legislators meet regularly, have staff, are eligible for re-election, 
and number among their own a significant cohort of experienced colleagues. 
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27. The legislature is regularly in session. 
If the legislature holds regular session, at least not less than six months, I assign a score mark 
1. If the legislature is rarely in session, I assign a score mark 0. According to Fish & Kroenig 
(2009: 12) regular session gives a threshold of about six months per year as lengthy enough 
to enable it to handle the load of responsible, working assembly.  
In the former constitution, Section 58 (1) provides that each session
36
 of Parliament 
shall be held at such a place within Kenya and shall commence at such a time as the President 
may appoint. Clause (2) provides that there shall be a session of Parliament at least once in 
every year, so that a period of twelve months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the 
National Assembly in one session and one sitting thereof in the next session. Clause (3) 
provides that when Parliament is dissolved, the first session of the new Parliament shall 
commence within three months after that dissolution. Clause (4) provides that the sittings of 
the national assembly in a session of Parliament shall be held at such a time and on such days 
as may be determined in accordance with the standing orders of the Assembly. I assign a 
score mark 1 for the former constitution. 
In the new constitution, according to Article 126 (2) whenever a new House is elected, the 
first sitting of the new House shall not be more than thirty days after the election. According 
to the standing orders Part VII Section (1) to (3) provides that the House shall meet at 9.00 
a.m. on Wednesday and at, 2.30 p.m. on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, but more than 
one sitting may be directed during the same day. The House may also resolve to meet at any 
other time on a sitting day in order to transact business. Look at the Appendix for the 
legislative calendar of the fourth session of Parliament. I assign a score mark 1 for the new 
constitution. 
 
28. Each legislator has a personal secretary. 
The availability of a personal secretary may influence the legislator’s effectiveness which in 
might also affect the legislature’s capacity. A score mark 1 is given if each legislator has a 
personal secretary. A score mark 0 is given if the legislators do not have a secretary to assist 
him or her.  
A score mark 1 for both constitutions is awarded. Explanation is given in item 29 as both are 
covered with the same legislation. 
                                                          
36
 According to the standing orders, “session” means  a period in which the House is seating continuously 
without adjournment and includes any period during which the House is in Committee; but two or more period 
of sittings within the normal period of  one sitting, or within an equivalent period shall not rank as more than one 
sitting (Standing orders  2008: 5). 
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29. Each legislator has at least one non-secretarial staff member with policy expertise. 
According to Fish & Kroenig (2009: 12) use of at least one person with policy expertise 
irrespective of whether the person is employed by the member’s office, committee, or party, 
boosts legislators’ effectiveness and bolster the legislature’s capacity. If each legislator has 
such a resource at their disposal, a score mark 1 is given; if not, a score mark 0 is given. 
Section 45 of the former constitution, repealed in 1999, established in Section 45A and 
Section 45B, the Parliamentary Service and the Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) and 
made the National Assembly financially and administratively independent of the executive. 
The Parliamentary Service is composed of the Clerk of the National Assembly and other 
officers and staff as appointed by the PSC. The Parliamentary Service Commission consists of 
the Speaker as the chairman, a vice-chairman elected among members, the leader of 
Government business in the National Assembly (traditionally the highest ranking Minister in 
the government, which is the Vice-President), the leader of the opposition party with the 
highest number of seats in the National Assembly, seven members (not ministers) with four 
nominated by the parties forming the government, while three nominated by parties forming 
the opposition. Section 45B gave the PSC wide ranging powers among them, to appoint 
competent persons to assist effective and efficient carrying out its functions. 
With far ranging powers, the PSC has made changes in Parliament which included 
transforming the institution, staff, members, facilities, budget and committees. PSC has 
opened several Departments to offer professional services to MPs including Department of 
Information and Research, Health Club department, Legislative and Committees Services. 
The Fiscal Management Act 2009 created the Budget Office which among other duties 
sensitizes MPs on the budget process. There is also the Centre for Parliamentary Studies and 
Training whose main role is to enhance the capacity of MPs, staff of Parliaments and others, 
by offering learning and training opportunities/courses through suitable modules 
(Parliamentary Service Commission Annual Report 2011: 40). 
  Section 14 of the PSC Act 2000, according to Njuguna (2010: 16), defines the 
procedural function of the Clerk of the National Assembly, to include; rendering expert, non-
partisan and impartial advice to MPs on Parliamentary procedure and practice. On this item 
concerning non-secretarial staff with policy expertise, I assign both constitutions check mark 
1 each. 
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30. Legislators are eligible for reelection without any restriction. 
If legislators are eligible for reelection without any restriction and are free from term limits, a 
score mark 1 is given. If there are restrictions with term limits, a score mark 0 is assigned.  
In the former constitution, there was no provision barring legislators running for re-
election nor are there term limits. I assign a check mark 1 for the former constitution. 
There are no term limits for being a Member of Parliament in the new constitution. I 
assign a score mark 1 for the new constitution as legislators are eligible for reelection without 
restriction and are free from term limits.  
31. A seat in the legislature is an attractive enough position that legislators are generally 
interested in and seek reelection. 
According to Fish and Kroenig (2009: 13)), a seat in the legislature in most countries is a 
prestigious position that attracts qualified talent, where as it is seen as a mere stepping stone 
to another, more attractive position. Members too, may value their positions for perks rather 
than power. If legislators are normally interested in keeping their jobs, a score mark 1 is 
given, if not, a score mark 0 is given. 
A seat in the legislature is a prestigious position in Kenya. In the former constitution, 
having a seat in Parliament was the first step for Members of Parliament who wished to be 
appointed by the President in the Cabinet as Vice-President, Cabinet Ministers or Assistant 
Ministers and this opened up opportunities for the MPs to earn more and control resources in 
the ministry. Moreover, the passage of the National Assembly Remuneration (Amendment) 
Act of 2003 raised the basic salary for MPs to KSh200, 000 and the total package to KSh485, 
000, that is, US$7,460 a month and over US$89,000 per year
37
 (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009: 
57). By 2008, at the beginning of the Tenth Parliament, the total package had risen to a 
whopping US$ 13,090 per month or US$157,080 per year and according to Barkan and 
Matiangi (2009: 57), second only to Nigeria on the continent, and one of the highest in the 
world. This is in addition to other perks that MPs get. See Table 2.2 in the Appendix. MPs 
have since then increased their salaries and perks many times. I assign a check mark 1 for 
both constitutions as MPs value their positions for perks and also a stepping stone to other 
attractive positions.  
32. The reelection of the incumbent legislators is common enough that at any given time 
the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members. 
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 These are 2008 rate (to find the 2012 rate to the dollar). 
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If it is common enough that the legislature at any given time has a significant number of 
highly experienced members (in terms of policy matters, procedure, and ability to repel 
executive encroachment), a score mark 1 is given. If the legislature does not have a 
significant number of highly experienced members, a score mark 0 is given.   
All the previous elections in Kenya have resulted in a high turnover of MPs. However, 
there have always been some seasoned and experienced legislators who have always made it 
back to Parliament. The result for the Ninth Parliament (2003-2007), according to Barkan and 
Matiangi (2009: 53) shows that more than half of the Eighth Parliament (1998-2002) were not 
returned to the Ninth, and 53 percent of the incoming legislators were beginning their first 
term. See Table 9 below for composition of the Ninth and the Tenth Parliament. 
 
Table 9: Composition of the Ninth and the Tenth Parliament 
Term serving in Parliament Ninth (2003-2007 Tenth (2008-2012) 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth or more 
 
N = 
53.1 
23.2 
12.5 
5.4 
2.7 
3.0 
 
(224) 
64.3 
18.8 
8.9 
4.9 
1.3 
1.8 
 
(224) 
Composition of the Ninth and Tenth Parliament (in percentages) and is for 210 directly elected members, 12 
nominated members, and 2 ex officio members (the Speaker and the attorney general).
38
  
A little over a quarter were elected for their second term (23 percent) and 13 percent 
for a third term. There is a band of about 25 veterans who were elected for their fourth term or 
more and this include the President, Vice President, and a host of other MPs and together with 
some third termers who had not served consecutive terms, they were holdovers from the 
period of single-party rule who have also seen the House evolve since the return of multi-
party politics (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009: 54). On the Tenth Parliament, at least 35 percent 
were serving more than their first term and were therefore well versed with House Procedures 
and laws. I assign a score mark 1 for the both the former constitution and for the new 
constitution as the legislature has a significant number of highly experienced members (see 
the chapter coming now).  
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 This data is part of a larger data including gender, age and education of members of Parliament in Barkan and 
Matiangi (2009: 53). 
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Table 10: Results for the Former and the New Constitution 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF KENYA (BUNGE) 
Former  Constitution (1963 – July 2010) 
Score: 0.52 
Influence over  
executive (6/9) 
1. replace                        0.5 
2. serve as minister           1   
3. interpellate                    1       
4. investigate                  0.5 
5. oversee police               1 
6. appoint ministers          1 
7.Approve Ministers      0.5 
8. lack president               0 
9 no confidence             0.5 
Institutional 
autonomy (3.5/9) 
10. no dissolution             0 
11. no decree                     0 
12. no veto                      0.5 
13. no review                  0.5 
14. no gatekeeping             0 
15. no impoundment          0 
16. control resources          1     
17. immunity                   0.5 
18. all elected                     1 
Specified 
powers (1/8) 
19. amendments          1 
20. war                        0 
21. treaties                   0 
22. amnesty                 0 
23. pardon                   0 
24. judiciary                0 
25. central bank           0 
26. media                     0 
Institutional  
capacity (6/6)  
27. sessions                1 
28. secretary               1 
29. staff                      1 
30. no term limits       1 
31. seek re-election    1 
32. experience            1 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF KENYA (BUNGE) 
New Constitution (August 2010 – to date) 
Score: 0.75 
Influence over  
executive (6/9) 
1. replace                          1 
2. serve as minister           0 
3. interpellate                    1 
4. investigate                     1      
5. oversee police               1 
6. appoint ministers          0 
7.approve ministers          1 
8. lack president               0 
9 no confidence                1 
Institutional 
autonomy (8/9) 
10. no dissolution              1 
11. no decree                     1 
12. no veto                      0.5 
13. no review                    1 
14. no gatekeeping            1 
15. no impoundment         1 
16. control resources         1  
17. immunity                  0.5 
18. all elected                     1 
Specified 
powers (4/8) 
19. amendments         1 
20. war                       1 
21. treaties                  0 
22. amnesty                0 
23. pardon                  0 
24. judiciary             0.5 
25. central bank          1 
26. media                  0.5 
Institutional  
capacity (6 /6)  
27. sessions                 1     
28. secretary                1 
29. staff                       1 
30. no term limits        1 
31. seek re-election     1 
32. experience             1 
Table 5 
 
5.5 Summary of the Chapter 
In chapter five, the 32 two indicators by Fish and Kroenig were used as a benchmark for 
measuring the four different indicators that measures parliament’s strength. The four 
indicators measured the strength of the Kenyan Parliament vis-à-vis the former constitution 
and the new constitution. The overview of the results of the data is plotted on Table 9. This 
will form the basis of our analysis in the coming chapter. Using the Fish and Kroenig (2009) 
legislative Powers Survey (LPS) as the basis for generating a Parliamentary Powers Index PPI 
which ranges from zero (least powerful) to one (most powerful), the score reflects the 
legislature’s aggregate strength. A check mark next to each item would produce a score of 32, 
indicating an all-powerful parliament and a low score indicate a weak parliament.  
 
 
79 
 
6.0 Data Analysis 
In this chapter, I will analyze data collected in the previous chapter and the results as plotted 
in Table 9. The aim of the thesis is to examine how the constitutional revisions in Kenya 
affect Parliaments position in the political system. The data for measuring parliament’s 
position or strength is primarily collected from two different constitutions, among other 
sources. One of the constitutions, is the former constitution that served Kenya from 
independence in 1963 to 2010 and been repealed many times. The other is the new 
constitution promulgated in August 2010.  
6.0 General Observation of Data  
Table 9 provides results overview of the items and indicators including the aggregate 
results collected for the former constitution as well as for the new constitution and shows 
parliaments’ strength and weaknesses as per the different indicators or categories under 
observation. A combination of these indicators would help explain why some legislatures are 
more independent than others and why some play more significant roles in policymaking than 
others. Comparing the results of the former constitution on Table 10 with Table 7 (page 48) 
shows a marked improvement for the former constitution. Table 6 shows survey results 
conducted by Fish and Kroenig (2009). The overall score in comparison for the former 
constitution is 0.31 (very weak) for Fish-Kroenig against 0.52 (average) scores in my survey. 
The 5 year difference between two surveys of the same constitution, and the changes the 
country and parliament has witnessed, has shown the results of some items improve - my 
method of operationalization notwithstanding - and that parliament has not been static. The 
other key component under the former constitution is the role the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act of 2008 played in improving the survey results and strength of Parliament 
vis-à-vis the executive. This gradual improvement – part of the torturous path of Parliament 
according to Barkan and Matiangi (2009) – relates to Samuel Huntington’s  “snowballing” or 
“demonstration effect” as one of the reason for the expansion in the number of democracies in 
the Third Wave (Huntington, 1991). Such a similar demonstration effect helps explain the 
growth in independence of parliamentary legislation in Kenya over the years and by looking 
at the results of the Kenyan Parliament under the new constitution as show in Table nine. The 
results of the former constitution in Table 9 show Parliament’s strength crossed the half way 
mark, thanks to the Accord introduced in 2008 and other legislations.   
The comparison of the two constitutions shows Parliament under the new constitution 
has come out better (0.75 against 0.52 for the former constitution), doubling the power it had 
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when the Fish and Kroenig Survey was taken 5 years back (0.31 aggregate). This makes the 
current Kenyan Parliament into a powerful institution as it got score marks on 24 of the 32 
items in comparison to 16.5 score marks under the former constitution and a paltry 10 score 
marks during the Fish-Kroenig survey. The former constitution improved by 6.5 score marks 
from the Fish-Kroenig survey to the survey I performed. Looking at the results, the Kenyan 
Parliament has made relative strides or improvement in two of the four indicators in which the 
former constitution had performed dismally. These indicators are: institutional autonomy 
(which has doubled the score marks for the former constitution from 3.5 to 8) and specified 
powers (from 1 to 4). The results for Influence over executive and Institutional capacity are 
similar in both constitutions. However, whereas the results for the indicator institutional 
capacity is same for each item, the final results for indicator influence over executive though 
similar in the two constitutions, the score marks for some items are different. It is the 
indicator where the former constitution gained the most after the enactment of the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008. Another interesting observation is the indicator 
institutional capacity. It is the indicator where Parliament under both constitutions has full 
capacity and where provisions in the constitution have little or no effect on the results. The 
improvement of other indicators, especially institutional autonomy – which has items such as 
control of resources – occasions the improvement of indicator institutional capacity. Some 
items under this indicator take time to be actualized. An example is item 32 that touch on the 
experience of legislators. It requires the observation of the re-election and election of 
legislators over a long period before a score mark can be awarded (depending on the length of 
election cycle).  
Whereas, Parliament under the former constitution managed over half of the total 
marks per indicator in 3 of the 4 indicators, Parliament performed dismally on 1, that is, in 
specified powers. Parliament it managed 1 score mark on only 1 item in the 8 items that were 
under survey. It is the indicator where the “powers” of Parliament are seldom used. For 
example, item 20 (approval of war) – might never be exercised in most parliaments. The new 
constitution has clear foothold in three indicators and has close to average in one indicator 
(specified powers). This is a clear improvement on this indicator in relation to the former 
constitution. Having now looked at the general observations of the Kenya Parliament under 
the two constitutions, I will now analyze the four indicators and highlight some of the items 
that touch on the three generic roles of parliament, that is, legislating, oversight and 
representation. It is indeed clear that power, and how it is distributed has greatly changed 
under the new constitution.  
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6.1 Influence over Executive (Items 1-9)    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Former constitution 6/9: New constitution 6/9: Fish Kroenig survey 3/9 
In “influence over the Executive”, the nine items assesses how much influence the legislature 
has over the executive and other state agencies. Together, this indicator estimates the 
“watchdog” function of parliament. Of the nine items under review, the former constitution 
posted 6 score marks and the new constitution got 6 score marks. The data also shows that 
even though the score marks are equal, they are distributed differently in both constitutions. 
The National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 gave Parliament under the former 
constitution powers in three items; these are item 1, 5 and 7 which complemented the three 
that the former constitution gave in this indicator prior to the Accord, that is in item 2, 3 and 9 
(note, that the Fish-Kroenig survey gave Parliament under the former constitution the same 
score marks on the these items). Both constitutions posted full score marks in only two similar 
items. These are: “interpellate” or the powers to summon executive branch officials regularly 
(item 3) and to “oversee the agencies of coercion” (item 5). Both posted no score marks in 
one item, that is, president elected by the legislature
39
 (item 9). Due to reasons to be 
discussed, the two constitutions posted different score marks in different items. Where the 
former constitution posts 1 score mark in two items, the new constitution posts 0 score marks 
in the same two items. These are: MPs could serve as minister (item 2) and legislature 
appoints the prime minister (item 6). Other than that, the former constitution posts 0.5 score 
marks in 4 of the 9 items under this indicator: these are item 1, 4, 7, and 9, thanks to some 
provisions of the Accord. Apart from item 8, the former constitution has posted score marks 
whether a 1 or a 0.5 score mark in 8 of the 9 items. The new constitutions, on the other hand, 
posted six 1 score marks under this indicator and 0 scores in 3 items, that is, in item 2, 6 and 
8. Why is this so? This will be discussed below together with the other items. 
A paradigm shift in the new constitution is the establishment of a balance of power 
between the Legislature and the Executive which neither the Executive nor Parliament can 
disturb, contrary to the former constitution.  
Item 1 and 6 (impeachment of the president or prime minister, and; appoints the prime 
minister) gives score marks to Parliament under the former constitution (1.5 score marks). 
The enactment of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 integrated and created, in 
the former constitution, the post of Prime Minister and two deputies, and gave Parliament the 
powers to appoint and/ or dismiss them. However, these positions, created to solve a political 
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 This item posts negative on both constitution and is not relevant in Kenyan context and will not be discussed.  
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crisis in a power-sharing deal, were to last only for the life of the Tenth Parliament. It is the 
role awarded to the former constitution to appoint and dismiss the prime minister that has 
given the former constitution 0.5 score marks on item 1 and 1 score mark on item 6 (approve 
and appoint prime minister). The presidency under the former constitution could not be 
removed through impeachment and his or her removal was only possible under indirect and 
rare circumstance (that is, through a vote of no confidence
40
 in the whole cabinet, through 
death or incapacity). The new constitution, however, is clear on impeachment of the President 
(item 1). According to Sande (2011: 21), the impeachment proceedings as provided in the 
new constitution generates significant oversight and is considered the ultimate oversight 
power that gives strength to Parliaments’ lesser powers. Sande argues that Parliament for 
decades has refrained from applying the vote of confidence on government as was previously 
provided by various statutes for obvious reasons of its dissolution (see item 9 on chapter 5 
under former constitution). 
 In Item 2 (ministers may serve as members of legislature), Fish and Kroenig (2009: 6) 
argue that serving simultaneously as a member of the legislature and a member of cabinet is 
positive. They argue that the legislature may have more consistent influence over the 
governments operations where the ministers are themselves working Parliamentarians, and 
members of Parliament are ministers’ colleagues. In the Kenyan context, however, it is seen 
as negative as the President in power over the years misused this provision to appoint a huge 
number of legislators in the Cabinet for political expediency. The combination of 
parliamentary and ministerial duties appears to have been at the expense of parliamentary 
work as the new ministers’ neglect their parliamentary duties as they have to embark on a 
balancing act. It should also be noted that the former constitution gives no ceiling on the 
number of ministers to be appointed by the President to serve in government and every 
government often picks up the best material for ministerial appointment necessary for 
efficient running of state and in the process depletes Parliament of experienced 
Parliamentarians. There are examples of what the media variously refer to as “bloated 
cabinet” whereby some Assistant Ministers have protested that they have no job descriptions 
and are “just voting machines of the government” while having nothing to do (Kiberenge, 
2009). One distinguishing characteristic of it all is that with a huge cabinet, there existed 
comparatively more ministries than standing committees and this made it difficult for these 
committees to play their oversight role efficiently. Parliament is comprised of 14 standing 
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 It is a double edged sword as the Parliament in the event the president dissolves government, also stands 
dissolved or stands dissolved after 3 days if the president does not resign then. 
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committees while the cabinet is composed of 44 full cabinet ministers. However, this is set to 
change under the new constitution after the next general elections whereby the constitution 
has set a ceiling on ministries consummate with standing committees. 
 According to the report by Ikome, Zondi, Ajulu, and Krachai (2006: 16), the 
overbearing power of the executive, especially powers vested in the head of state, has a 
detrimental effect on the prudential separation of power required to ensure the independence 
of institutions. In a study by Ikome et al. on Kenya, Ghana and Senegal, the report found out 
that state power is concentrated in the office of the President and, by extension, the executive. 
And as the executive tends to be drawn directly from Parliament, this severely compromises 
the ability of the legislature to maintain its oversight and law-making function (Ikome et al., 
2006: 16). The report mentions further that the although enshrined in the constitution, the 
independence of Parliaments - in the case study of these three countries – is undermined by 
the influence of the executive, frequently exercised through financial incentives tied to neo-
patrimonial arrangements and rent-seeking activities, and this is especially evident in Kenya 
where the executive provides huge amounts of discretionary constituency development funds 
to Parliamentarians to underwrite local development projects of their choice
41
. The fact that 
legislatures are the recruiting grounds for cabinet posts reduces incentives for 
Parliamentarians to hold the executive to account (Ikome et al., 2006: 17), and for the growth 
of parties and party discipline (my observation). Another factor was that salaries for 
legislators were never high, with the results that MPs who were not appointed to positions in 
the cabinet or as deputy ministers, that is, “backbenchers”, had a very difficult time paying for 
their living expenses in the capital city while the legislature was in session (Barkan, 2009: 
14). The Kenyan context then, score mark zero (0) for this item can be regarded as “positive” 
and has more weight than a score mark one (1) when looking at the historical context of the 
Kenyan situation. 
Consequently, I agree with Chitere, Ludeki, Masya, Tostensen, and Waiganjo (2006: 
7) when they note that in the case of Kenya, the President weakens the formal provision for 
the removal of President by means of impeachment when he forms large cabinets with a 
sizable proportion of Parliamentarians as ministers and assistant ministers (of the 224 current 
Members of Parliament, 96 are in government: Party of National Unity has 48 members while 
the Orange democratic Movement and its affiliate parties have an equal number). This, 
Chitere et al. (2006: 7) argue is reasonable to deduce that it is a deliberate tactic on the part of 
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 Item 31 (As seat in the legislature is an attractive position) is also relevant concerning the former constitution 
regarding this issue. 
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the executive to engage in such practices to forestall a vote of no confidence. Given Kenya’s 
history in relation to the President appointing a huge cabinet, I assume this was what 
motivated Kenya’s constitutional drafters to remove in the new constitution the provision that 
cabinet ministers must be serving MPs. It must be the reason that under Article 152 (1) (d), 
the drafters put a ceiling on number of ministers that serve in Cabinet by stipulating that “not 
fewer than fourteen and not more than twenty-two cabinet secretaries.” The positions of 
Assistant Ministers were scrapped. In my view then and considering the Kenyan context, by 
delinking the Executive from Parliament in terms of item 1 and 2 and item 7 that gives 
Parliament the power to vet and approve presidential nominees gives Parliament significant 
power to affect governance. It also gives parliament a free rein to perform its mandated 
functions and promotes oversight and the nation becomes the winner as it gets the best from 
their elected representatives who use their experience to in bill-making and parliamentary 
debates 
The other significant role of Parliament in checks and balances is exercised in item 3 
(power to summon executive branch officials) and item 5 (oversight over agencies of 
coercion). The single most important achievement of the new constitution is the strengthening 
of Kenya’s Parliaments role of ‘checks and balances’ and redeeming it from the confinement 
of executive powers that had denied it the freedom of effective oversight. The passage of the 
new constitution has empowered the bicameral Parliament the responsibility as ‘watchdog’ 
institution and this could be exercised at the Committee level and plenary (chamber). As 
Parliament develops more, oversight work over the executive will shift to committees. The 
parliamentary committee system and party
42
 groups are often seen as the loci of power in 
legislatures (Strøm 1995 inWang, 2005: 184). Items 3, 4 and 5 are more relevant in the 
Committee level because at the plenary, it is only a gathering of MPs and only MPs are 
allowed to debate. As “strangers,” in parliamentary parlance or nomenclature, future cabinet 
secretaries will not be allowed in the plenary
43
. Committees, then, as practiced in other 
Commonwealth countries will be the key oversight tools used to conduct Parliamentary 
oversight and would wield lots of power. The changes to Parliament’s standing orders in 1997 
established departmental committees with the task of reviewing legislation within their areas 
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 According to Olson1980 and Shaw 1979 (in Wang 2005: 184), party and committees are strongly linked and a 
common assumption is that the more important the parties are, the less important the committees, and vice versa. 
With committee members chosen according to the strength of parties in parliament, parties tend to grow and 
become important players in parliament especially in policy matters.  
43
 Cabinet Secretaries will no longer be members of parliament and will have to engage Parliament through 
relevant Committees of Parliament. 
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of jurisdiction. The Kenyan Legislature at its current form consists of up to 14 active 
Committees.  
According to Gazemba (2011) committees will receive both oral and documentary 
evidence and where necessary make fact-finding tours to collect additional evidence. 
Committees, Sande (2011) points out, organize hearings as primary tools in obtaining 
information related to specific policies or issues under investigations or clarifications. Since 
public officials cannot be questioned on the floor of the House, they will then be summoned 
by the relevant committees. Hearings, Sande points out, may involve inviting a specific 
Cabinet Secretary, government official to appear before the Committee so as to provide 
evidence regarding an issue under scrutiny. Once the Committee is through with its 
investigations, Gazemba (2011: 45) points out, it compiles a report and tables it in the House 
for a resolution and in most cases the reports of the Committees are adopted and the executive 
is duty bound to implement the Committees recommendations. To further strengthen this 
oversight mechanism Parliament has established the Committee on Implementation as 
provided by article 124 (1) of the new constitution, to follow up on the implementation or 
resolutions of the House. With reference to item 15 (expenditure of funds appropriated is 
mandatory), public pre-eminence is guaranteed in Article 125 (5) in the new constitution 
which stipulates that “in discussing and reviewing estimates (Budget estimates and annual 
Appropriation Bill), the committee shall seek representations from the public and the 
recommendations shall be taken into account when the Committee makes its 
recommendations to the National Assembly.”  
What makes this committee system differ from the former constitution is that, in the 
new constitution, the committee has been given “teeth to bite”. Either House of Parliament, 
and any of its committees has power, through Article 125 (1), to summon any person to 
appear before it for the purpose of giving evidence or providing information. In clause (2); for 
the purpose of clause (1) a House of Parliament and any of its committees has the same 
powers as the High Court to enforce the attendance of witnesses and examine them on oath, 
affirmation or otherwise; to compel the production of documents; to issue a commission or 
request to examine witnesses abroad.  
Another item that deserves mention is item 7 (approval to confirm appointment of 
minister). The appointment to senior positions is another shift from what is provided for in the 
former constitution where the President had the power to appoint and dismiss ministers and 
other state officers as he pleases. According to Member of Parliament Namwamba (2011: 27), 
the new constitutional dispensation has scattered the one man rule where the President reigned 
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over Kenya like an absolute monarch. The entrenchment of parliamentary vetting as a basic 
requirement for all appointment to senior public office, Namwamba notes, has caused a 
seismic shift and ushered in a whole new governance paradigm in the country. 
The new constitution, therefore, hands Parliament a fundamental role in enforcing this 
new governance paradigm, through vetting of nominees picked by the executive arm of 
government. According to Namwamba (2011: 27), the route is quite simple: the executive 
(read President) nominates the candidate and submits the name to Parliament. The relevant 
committee of Parliament then vets the candidate against a set criterion, and makes 
recommendations to the whole House. Members in the House debate the recommendation and 
vote to either approve or reject the nomination. If approved, the President proceeds to appoint, 
and if rejected, the nominee is “returned to sender” and the process is repeated44. 
With regards to item 8 which is not relevant for Kenya, I perceive, item 2 with a 0 
(zero) score mark as a “positive” attribute in the Kenyan context. In item 6, the President is 
elected through direct elections. However item 1 gives parliament the power to impeach while 
item 9, gives Parliament power to pass a vote of no confidence in the executive without 
jeopardizing its life. In general then under this indicator, we can see that Parliament has been 
strengthened or given more powers under the new constitution. It has received the maximum 
score marks it could get in this indicator and there is “no room for improvement”. With 
regards to the former constitution, items 4, 7, 8 and 9 were the Achilles heel as the executive 
had the upper hand. Item 2 on MPs serving also as ministers is not “tangible” enough to give 
MPs an upper hand to influence the executive as the President in this case is also a Member of 
Parliament. 
6.2 Institutional Autonomy (10-18) 
Former constitution 3.5/9; new constitution 8/9 
One of the main roles of Parliament is to enact legislation, appropriate and exercise oversight 
over funds for national government and determine allocation of revenue between different 
levels of government. This oversight role of Parliament is exercised through budget scrutiny, 
departmental committees, parliamentary questions, legislation scrutiny, and debates amongst 
others. To play this basic role effectively, institutional independence of Parliament is 
paramount. The nine items together in this indicator measure the autonomy of Parliament. As 
                                                          
44
 The reality of this new dispensation was best illustrated in February 2011 when Parliament rejected as 
unconstitutional nominations made by the President to the four constitutional offices of Chief Justice, Attorney 
General, Director of Public Prosecutions and Comptroller of Budget. The High Court also found the action of the 
President unconstitutional. The President had to withdraw the nominees and the proper procedures were 
followed as stated in the Constitution with parliamentary vetting and approval. 
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can be seen in the Table 10, the new constitution has a check mark on all the items and it is 
the indicator where it has full capacity and has performed extremely well. The former 
constitution guarantees only four of the nine items and its effectiveness in this indicator is 
below average.  
The independence of the Parliament as an institution is guaranteed when the executive 
has no power or control in the items mentioned in this indicator. Item 10 gives Parliament 
immunity from dissolution under the new constitution and guarantees its full term of 5 years. 
The other items where the new constitution give full score marks are; item 11 - any executive 
initiative on any bill requires ratification by legislature; item 13 - legislatures laws are 
supreme and not subject to judicial review; item 14 - the legislature has right to initiate Bills 
in all policy areas; item 15 - funds appropriated by legislature are mandatory; item 16 - 
legislature controls the resources that finances its own operations; and, item 18 - all members 
are elected. The new constitution gets 0.5 check marks on item 11 - laws passed by legislature 
are veto-proof and item 17 - immunity from arrest. In the former constitution, only two items 
get full score marks. These are items 13 and 16, while items 12 and 17 get 0.5 score marks. I 
will highlight some items in this indicator that I think are “most important” in the institutional 
independence of Parliament. 
Another paradigm shift in the new constitution is in the “power of the purse” check. In 
the former constitution, the Executive had gatekeeping powers (item 14) and could impound 
appropriated funds (item 15). With the amendments to the former constitution in 1999, 
Parliament could eventually control its own resources. The new constitution has changed 
some of these “negative” items to guarantee Parliament its institutional autonomy. With 
regards to the changes that Parliament undertook under the former constitution, the new 
constitution has made radical changes to the budget process. It has opened the budget process 
to a wider array of actors by giving citizens and MPs a greater role and reduced the traditional 
nearly unlimited powers that the Executive held. It has put mechanisms to foster coordination 
and consultation between the Executive and Parliament. 
Under Section 48 of the former constitution, there were restrictions with regard to 
certain financial measures (item 14), what are referred to as “Money Bills” – such as the 
appropriation Bills (including an amendment to a Bill) that authorize spending and Bills 
introducing taxes. These could be introduced only “upon the recommendation of the President 
signified by a Minister”. This ensured that the President had firm control over the financial 
matters and if Parliament wished to change a Budget proposal or to allocate or relocate 
money, it had to seek the approval of the President. The only leverage Parliament had was to 
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reduce an existing item, or to refuse to pass the budget altogether, bringing government to a 
standstill (Murray & Wehner, 2012: 38). However, this was a tall order considering that 
nearly a half of the composition of MPs were in the cabinet (see item 2 and 31) and 
considering that through the patrimonial tendencies, the President had control over the MPs.  
However, the new constitution prescribes a special process for Money Bills in Article 
218 (1) with much of the power lying with a Parliamentary Committee and the National 
Assembly, not the Executive. It has given Parliament a more expanded role in the budget 
making process and changed the role of Parliament from budget approving legislature (or 
budget rubber stamping fora) to a budget making one. In strengthening separation of powers 
45
 and ensuring fiscal parity, three separate sets of “budget estimates” will be submitted to the 
national assembly to be considered on equal basis. There are those for the expenditure of the 
national government prepared by the national Treasury (Article 221 (1)); those for the 
Parliamentary Service (Article 127 (6) (c)); and those for the judiciary (Article 173 (3)). What 
is interesting here, and subject to various arguments
46
, and in departure from the position 
under the former constitution, and Section 12 of the Financial Management Act, 5 of 2008, is 
that the new constitution does not require estimates for the Parliamentary Service or the 
Judiciary to be considered by the National Treasury before they are submitted to Parliament
47
.  
The three sets of Budget estimates will be considered by a potentially very powerful 
committee
48
 of the National assembly which will exercise control over the budget process, 
and in a radical departure, amend the budget as provided in Article 221 (4) that the committee 
“shall discuss and review the estimates and make recommendations to the National 
Assembly”. And in clause (5), in discussing and reviewing the estimates, the committee shall 
seek representations from the public and this shall be taken into account when the final 
submissions are made to the National Assembly. Interestingly, this is a departure from Section 
48 of the former constitution as the National Assembly is not duty bound by the views of the 
Executive nor is it obliged to take them into account. However, this informs the need for early 
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 Financial independence for both the Judiciary and Parliament 
46
 According to Murray & Wehner (2012: 39), it would be wise and more efficient to have a process in which the 
separate Budget proposals are considered together in advance so that what is put in the National Assembly is 
realistic. 
47
 However, the draft Public Finance Management Bill 2011 proposes in Article 76 (2)  that “the Chief Registrar 
of the Judiciary and the Parliamentary Service Commission shall submit copies of the Budget Estimates under 
section 73 (1)(c) to the Treasury at the same date of submitting the estimates to the National Assembly”, and in 
Clause (3) ”the Cabinet secretary shall submit to the National Assembly no later than the 15th May the opinion of 
the Treasury on the budgets proposed by the Chief Registrar and the Parliamentary Service Commission”. 
48
 Article 114 (2) provides that any motion on a matter of “Money Bill”, the Assembly may proceed only in 
accordance with the recommendation  of the relevant Committee of the Assembly after taking into account the 
views of the Cabinet secretary responsible for finance. This makes the Committee powerful as the Assembly 
cannot amend the estimates the Committee adopts. 
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consultation and cooperation between the three branches to ensure that the Appropriated Bill 
is within realistic limits. As noted in this paradigm shift, much of the work of processing the 
budget has shifted entirely on Parliament’s Budget and Appropriations Committee which has 
the overwhelming task of giving strategic direction with regards to the allocation of 
Government resources. In undertaking this task, the PBAC will be required to liaise with 
other departmental committees
49
 as well as the public. This heralds a transformation on how 
Kenya’s public finance are managed and shared.  
With relevance to item 29 (each legislator has at least non-secretarial staff with policy 
expertise) Parliamentary Committee(s) will need considerable expertise and wisdom to 
understand what spending is essential and to manage the process properly through frequent 
consultation between the Executive and the National Assembly (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009; 
Murray & Wehner, 2012). In my view, it is only item 12 (the executive has veto power but 
can be overridden by a simple majority in the legislature- and in Kenyan context, by a super 
majority or two-thirds of members of the National Assembly) that gives the Executive 
(President) the only leeway (and only influence in this category) in influencing the process by 
refusing to sign the Appropriation Bill once approved by the National Assembly (Article 
115). Another safety net for the executive is given in Article 222 and 223 which allows 
expenditure before annual budget is passed but with a channel and limitations on how it can 
be done. However, when partisan control of the legislative and executive branches is divided, 
Parliamentary approval of interim spending can no longer be taken for granted (Murray & 
Wehner, 2012: 40) and the political and economic consequences of a failure to adopt a Budget 
and the resulting government “shutdown” are potentially highly damaging. And to avoid this, 
Murray and Wehner (2012: 40) argue, the National Assembly ought to take the Executive 
seriously, and the President’s power to veto the Appropriations Bill should influence the way 
in which the Standing Committee and the National Assembly deal with the estimates and the 
Bill.  
Item 13 (laws passed by legislature are supreme and not subject to judicial review) 
that the Speaker of the Kenya National Assembly argues that, “even if the Supreme Court 
pronounced itself on a matter, that could not stop Parliament from fulfilling its function of 
legislation. It does not matter which way the courts decide, it does not take the residual power 
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 In the new constitution, the Chairs of the various committees shall be the de-facto Ministers and hence they 
will be expected to verify and validate the issues raised by the Chair of the Budget and Appropriations 
Committee. The PBAC shall also seek views from other Departmental Committees, the public and other players 
on the key issues that they deem suitable for inclusion in the budget. See chart on the key highlights of the 
Budget process on Kenya Parliament (National Assembly Vol. 4 issue 1 April 2011 by Martin Masinde: 53) 
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of Parliament to legislate…Parliament can still enact a law that says something different” 
(Mugonyi, 2011: 11). However, the speaker argues that the courts still have power to interpret 
laws made by Parliament and even declare them unconstitutional (ibid).  
Item 17 on (immunity of legislators), both constitutions have been awarded 0.5 score 
marks. Whereas MPs under the Powers and Privileges Act and Standing Orders of Parliament 
are free from arrest, they can be arrested and prosecuted if they engage themselves in criminal 
activities. It is argued too, that if words said in Parliamentary proceedings are repeated 
elsewhere, the protection of Parliamentary privilege enjoyed does not apply. A case for 
precedence in the Kenya Parliament, according to Njoroge (2011: 39), occurred on July 10
th
, 
1997. Reacting to a question of privilege raised by the Member for Ugenya, where the then 
Member for Limuru was involved in an incidence with the police, Speaker Kaparo ruled that: 
“Freedom of speech is not conferred for the personal benefit of any individual-even a Member 
of Parliament. It is conferred for the benefit of the parliamentary system. On the other hand, 
criminal acts as opposed to speeches and Parliamentary actions committed within Parliament 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. The only privilege members enjoy in criminal 
matters is that words used by them in proceedings in Parliament cannot be made the subject of 
criminal proceedings or be used to support a prosecution. A member convicted of crime is in 
the same position as any other convicted person…I do not find either in written law or 
practice any authority for the proposition that a Member is immune from arrest from criminal 
offence committed either without or within Parliamentary Buildings except for what is either 
in the Chamber or in Committees of the House.”  
 
6.3 Specified Powers (19-26) 
Former constitution 1/8; new constitution 4/8 
Items in this indicator are rarely exercised by Parliament. It is the indicator where the former 
constitution has performed dismally. Of the 8 items under the indicator, the former 
constitution only managed one score mark, that is, in item 19 (legislature can amend the 
constitution). According to Salih (2005b: 14), the constitutional amendments that brought 
about competitive multiparty politics under the former constitution cannot be underestimated, 
because the amendments made it possible for people to exercise their democratic rights that 
were denied by one-party states. However, was also in exercising this right to amend the 
constitution that the legislature was used by the executive to pass oppressive laws. Thus, the 
clamor for change was rightfully directed towards Parliament and Parliamentarians. It is the 
change of section 2A of the former constitution that took Kenya from a single party state 
(from de jure to de facto single party state) into a multiparty state. The other seven items in 
this indicator were the prerogative of the President. Under the new constitution, however, the 
score marks are better than the former constitution but below average and there is only one 
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room for improvement
50
. Of the four indicators, according to the data collected, this is the 
only indicator under which the new constitution has room for improvement. As has been 
discussed earlier and relying on the data, the new constitution has received the maximum 
score marks it could in the three other indicators. Parliament has influence in four items: it can 
still amend the constitution (item 19), and in addition, it must approve war (item 20), approve 
or review appointment to the judiciary (item 23) and review and appoint the chairman of the 
central bank (item 25). On amnesty and on pardon (items 22 and 23 concurrently), the new 
constitution has established in Article 133(2) an Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy 
whereby Parliament shall enact legislation to provide for the tenure of the members, 
procedure and criteria that shall be applied by the Advisory Committee. This leaves 
Parliament with no jurisdiction or influence on this item. 
The last item on this category is item (26) influence on state owned media. Again, the 
constitution in Article 34 (4) stipulates that “all state-owned media shall be free to determine 
independently the editorial content of their broadcasts or other communications; be impartial; 
and afford fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.” 
The state-owned media, in my interpretation of this Article means that it should be 
independent or non-partisan as Article 34 (5) also provides - “Parliament shall enact 
legislation that provides for the establishment of a body, which shall be independent of 
control by government, political interests or commercial interests; reflect the interests of all 
sections of the society; and set media standards and regulate and monitor compliance with 
those standards.” However, the drafters of the constitution, cognizant of the power wielded by 
the executive during elections and in controlling the media, have given Parliament some 
semblance of power through legislation to influence the outcome.  
 Item 19 – legislature can alter the constitution. It is said that the former Kenya 
constitution was amended so many times that it was barely recognized from its original form 
(Mutua, 2009). Compare this to the American constitution which has been amended 25/26 
times in its existence. During the regimes of both Moi and Kenyatta, Parliament was used as a 
rubberstamp of the executive and during the first 25 years of independence, the constitution 
was amended more than 30 times, with most of the amendments made focused on 
strengthening the political power of the President. Another example is the Fifth Parliament 
(1983-1988) which amended the constitution five times, once every year (Kamau, 2011: 19) .  
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 Item 21 (legislature has to ratify treaties) “might” be a score mark 1 in the coming few months. There is 
legislation in parliament pending debate brought about by nominated MP Millie Odhiambo Mabona which seeks 
to compel the executive to seek ratification from parliament for any international treaty the government goes 
into. 
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The Kenya Parliament over these periods exercised less independence as Presidents 
Kenyatta and Moi increased their authority (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009; John K. Johnson, 
2009). Kenyatta required that the Kenyan legislators approve several amendments limiting 
their authority and that of their Parliament and simultaneously deepening and broadening the 
power of the President (John K. Johnson, 2009). An example, among many others, is the 
amendment of the constitution Act No 19 of 1966 that led to the abolishment of the Senate 
(Kamathi & Kiriinya, 2011: 29). The two Houses were amalgamated to form one. According 
to arguments by Fish and Kroenig (2009), parliament being able to alter the constitution is a 
positive attribute. However, these parliaments must be strong parliaments and not 
rubberstamping parliaments that amend the constitution at the whims of the Executive and in 
the process losing more of its powers. They must be parliaments that have power to perform 
all its generic functions. In the Kenyan context, this item is regarded as a negative under the 
former constitution if parliament on its own could amend the constitution. The Kenyan 
Parliament as discussed earlier was weak in the periods preceding the late 1990s (see also 2.5 
on this). 
6.4 Institutional Capacity (27-32)  
Former constitution 6/6: new constitution 6/6 
Parliament is not effective in serving the electorate if it does not confront the issue of capacity 
and a major means of increasing Parliamentary effectiveness has been through building the 
institutional capacity of the Parliament. The problem of institutional capacity is seen partly in 
terms of the availability of resources, lack of requisite expertise and staff and lack of facilities 
necessary for Parliamentary work. Such facilities would include office space for MPs, library 
or research areas, staff, etc. Infrastructure requirements are necessary if Parliaments are to 
expand their representation, oversight and lawmaking functions effectively. Even though most 
parliamentary strengthening activities focus on the technical aspects, institutional capacity 
here also includes issues such as: if Parliament is regularly in session; MPs have staff with 
policy expertise; no term limit for MPs; MP position is prestigious; re-election is common. As 
noted, the Parliament of Kenya in the former and the new constitution has relative capacity in 
these items and are similar in the score for each item. This is partly due to various changes in 
Parliament over the years leading Parliament to evolve to where it is today. The institutional 
capacity of Parliament was very much different and weak prior to the period preceding the 
second multiparty elections that created the Eighth Parliament (1998-2002). The 
establishment of the Parliamentary service Commission (PSC), with a broad mandate, became 
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the launch pad for some major developments in institutional matters and also in other key 
areas. I will briefly look at some of the items. 
Item 27, which seeks to find out whether Parliament is regularly in session, is 
affirmative in both constitutions. Even though Parliament has been meeting uninterrupted 
since independence, the President, in the former constitution, had powers to prorogue or 
dissolve Parliament at any time he so pleases. This would interrupt Parliamentary Business or 
Calendar. Announcing the date for elections was also a prerogative of the President and he 
used this power as “secret weapon” over his opponents. This ambiguity in the constitution that 
blurred the lines between the executive and the legislature has been removed in the new 
constitution, with Article 102 stipulating that the term of each House of Parliament expires on 
the date of the next election. Article 101(1) provides this date to be the second Tuesday in 
August in every fifth year. In general then, Parliament has been meeting regularly as per its 
legislative calendar.  
Item 28 & 29 seeks to find out whether each MP has a personal staff and also a one 
non-secretarial staff member with policy expertise. On this point, the PSC has ensured that all 
members of Parliament has one personal staff and in the Parliamentary Service, employed 
experts in all policy areas who are at the disposal of all MPS irrespective of party affiliation. 
Another area where the Kenyan Parliament has benefited is in capacity-building programmes 
and support staff. In respect to the limited capacity of the Kenya Parliament to perform its 
core functions, Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 43-45) point out that the Institute for Economic 
Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD) was the first to call the 
MPs to attention through workshops in the early years of the Eighth Parliament to explain the 
meaning and impact of the budget and the proposed changes in the tax code with the hope that 
such information would improve the annual budget debate. Other civil society organizations, 
including the Institute of Certified Public Accountants and several local think tanks, have 
since joined this exercise to raise the level of economic literacy among MPs. 
Item 31: A seat in Parliament is attractive. Apart from the extra advantage of an MP 
appointed into the Cabinet by the President and enjoying all the perks that come with it, as 
was the case in the former constitution, the Kenya MPs are also among the most well paid 
legislators in the world (see also table 2.2 in the appendix). Parliamentarians either were, or 
were anxious to become, government ministers and did not want to jeopardize their chances 
by questioning government action or policy (Ikome et al., 2006: 30-31), (Barkan & Matiangi, 
2009: 14). 
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And as MPs salaries and benefits have continued to rise, serving as an MP has become 
increasingly appealing, drawing many of Kenya’s brightest, most ambitious, and mostly 
highly educated citizens
51
 (John K. Johnson, 2009: 243) (Barkan & Matiangi, 2009: 53-54). 
Whereas the new constitution does not allow MPs to be cabinet ministers, the perks and 
salaries MPs enjoy are still sky high
52
. MPs earn a basic salary of KSh200, 000 and 
allowances totaling Sh651, 000 bringing their total monthly pay to Sh851, 000. While all this 
is paid for by taxes, Parliament has paid KSh2 billion to foot tax arrears for all the 224 MPs 
during 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 financial years. The legislators also made a second 
amendment to the bill by raising the severance allowance of all members of the National 
Assembly from KSh300, 000 per year to KSh744, 000 for the entire time they have served as 
MPs (Hansard, 2011: 83-90). Following the increases, MPs are also eligible for life-long 
pensions and other retirement benefits. The amount proposed as payment to outgoing MPs is a 
huge increment from the Sh1.5 million paid out to each member of the last Parliament. On the 
whole, paying MPs a decent salary may make them less amenable to executive manipulation. 
However, it is interesting to note that on this instance, regardless that MPs are handsomely 
paid, it was a case of the executive manipulating MPs to pass the Finance Bill
53
 by sneaking 
in the amendments to drop their quest for interest rate caps after offering them a gratuity of 
Sh3.72 million each payable at the end of their five-year term. The MPs passed the Bill into 
law in less than 5 minutes (Rugene & Shiundu, 2012) and considering that they were spoiling 
for a fight with the executive for several months in the hope of dismissing the bill and 
amending it (Anyanzwa, 2012). It then becomes a paradox that the MPs are a selfish lot and 
put their interests first before that of their constituents.  
Indeed as a reflection on this and among other factors, Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 
59) argue, the rate of reelection (33.8 percent) was the lowest in history, perhaps a backlash 
against the high salaries MPs provide for themselves during the Ninth Parliament. Already 
there is uproar over the recent law (Thuku, 2011) with a challenge to it lodged in court as 
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 Johnson gives example that most of the members of the Kenya’s Ninth Parliament’s Health, Housing, Labour 
and Social Welfare Committee were physicians. Barkan  and Matiangi (2009: 53-54) on table 2.1 shows that 
under the Tenth Parliament, 61.6 percent had university degree, 23.2 percent had post graduate degrees – nearly 
two-thirds of the House, and only 5 percent  had a secondary school education while average age of all members 
was 52.3 years (whereas half of the population is below 18 years of age). 
52
 According to Wanyande et al (2007: 3), elected representatives are the purveyors of public resources through 
corruption, appropriation of public land, self-arrogation of high salaries and high allowances relative to other 
public officials and through preferential access to opportunities that include tax exemption, trade licensing, credit 
facilities, and general precedence in public places. 
53
 The Finance Bill had been rejected several times by the MPs and it was unpopular. The treasury bribed MPs to 
pass the new budget and to be nice to the banks with a “gratuity” amounting to almost US$50,000. This is on top 
of their already obscene annual salaries which stand at US$ 161,000, excluding other shady allowances that are 
never included under official pay.  
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illegal given that the new constitution gives mandate of deciding pay and gratuity, and all 
emoluments, to the Salaries and Remuneration Commission
54
 (Juma, 2012). 
Item 32: Reelection of incumbents is common enough. As seen in the data section on the re-
election of incumbents, there has been a high turnover in the past elections of MPs, while at 
the same time there has been a group of MPs who have made it to Parliament for second, 
third, or even fourth terms. It is no wonder that when it comes to their perks and salaries, the 
members are easily swayed to increase their salaries and perks knowing that they probably 
would not see the inside of Parliament again. Whereas, reelection is common, the electorate, 
in the new constitution has been empowered in Article 104. The Article provides that the 
electorate have the right to recall the Member of Parliament before the end of the term of the 
relevant House of Parliament. This is premised on the belief that an election held once every 
few years is insufficient for representatives to be genuinely accountable to their electorates. 
There is a procedure and process for doing this. This is clear form of vertical accountability. 
Because parties have remained weak coalitions of local bosses that rarely distinguish 
themselves on the basis of policy or ideology, elections to Parliament have always been 
referendums on incumbents’ record at delivering goods back to the constituency (Barkan & 
Matiangi, 2009; Throup & Hornsby, 1998). Under the former constitution, there have been 10 
general elections since independence. Four of those have been held after the re-introduction of 
multipartism in 1992. According to Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 37), under Kenyatta, 
Parliamentary elections were intraparty contests within the ruling party KANU, but were 
largely free and fair contests with as many as ten candidates vying for each seat with voters 
encouraged to evaluate candidates, particularly incumbents on how they had serviced their 
constituencies. Under Moi though, Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 37) point out, voters were 
encouraged to vote for candidates considered “loyal” by the President and where they were 
not, the outcome was often manipulated. Later, leaders perceived not to toe the KANU party’s 
(read: government) line were either denied nomination to Parliament under the only party 
KANU(Badejo, 2006: 84; Throup & Hornsby, 1998) or disciplined by being disallowed to 
stand for elections, while others were banned from the then  party. In some areas, a handful of 
politicians were elected in unopposed as the ruling party found ways to bar would-be 
opponents to stand, while in others, there were outright rigging of election (Throup & 
Hornsby, 1998). All in all, statistics show that nearly sixty percent of incumbents or sitting 
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 The new constitution cognizant of the different salaries and perks from different state offices, set up the 
independent Salaries and Remuneration Commission in Article 230 to among other things, set and regularly 
review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers. 
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MPs fail to win back their seats even in free and fair polls. An example is the third General 
election held on November 8, 1979, the first election of the Moi era: nearly half of members 
lost their seats (Kamau & Songoro, 2011). 
According to the findings of the Infrotrak survey conducted between September 23rd 
and September 26th, 2011 in both rural and urban counties, only 63 per cent of the current 
legislators would be re-elected to Parliament in the next General Election (Obonyo, 2011). 
The poll found out that reasons for and against re-election of the current MPs are varied and 
range from poor service delivery, poor leadership qualities and inactivity in Parliament to 
arrogance of the legislators. Another survey conducted between December 16th and 17th, 
2011 by Infotrak shows 56 percent of Kenyans were of the view that they would not re-elect 
their MPs, 28 per cent said they would while 16 per cent were undecided (Obonyo, 2011). Of 
the 210 elected members, there are 55 constituencies in the country that has never returned the 
MP back to Parliament in the last three elections. According to Ongiri (2011), the re-election 
“jinx” in those constituencies is such that in the last three elections the incumbents have 
desperately fought to defend their positions, but faced a humiliating loss and to survive the 
trend, several MPs serving in those constituencies are chasing other positions in the newly 
created counties, hoping to benefit from the political shift. 
However, since the 1992 elections, there has been a cohort of members popular in 
their constituencies who have always been elected back to Parliament in whatever party they 
chose to run on. Others, like the President, have been in Parliament since independence. 
Kenya being a politically tribal society as it is, most of the parties have a regional following 
and hence, winning a nomination ticket in those parties is as good as being elected in the 
Parliament. In Kenya’s politics, and elsewhere for that matter, the party one chooses plays a 
big role in determining the aspirants’ fortunes. It is this factor that has made dead men wins 
elections and lacklustre ones make it to Parliament (Ongalo, 2012). An example is a comment 
about the 1992
55
 elections by former KANU secretary general Joseph Kamotho. He once 
famously said of the 1992 elections, that even if a dog had vied for a Parliamentary seat in 
Murang’a on a Ford-Asili ticket, it would have won with a landslide (Kwama, 2010). This, 
according to Kwama was Kamotho’s way of saying Murang’a residents were crazy about 
Ford-Asili then and would have voted in any dumb head on the party’s ticket.  
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 1992 was the year of the first multi-party elections and the country was deeply divided along ethnic lines. 
Central Province had two candidates, Mwai Kibaki (now President on DP party) and Kenneth Matiba (Ford-
Asili). 1992 elections also defined future electoral patterns, that in 1997, Luo’s voted overwhelmingly for Raila 
Odinga’s party (NDP then), the Bukusu for Michael Wamalwa (Ford Kenya) and the Kikuyu for Kibaki (then 
under DP).  
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6.5 Summary: Analysis on Kenyan Legislature and Democracy 
As can be seen from the results, the two constitutions varied greatly as to how they distributed 
power. The powers of the legislature in the former constitution have also not remained fixed. 
It has experienced gradual changes, the latest being the changes to solve the post-election 
conflict and the introduction of special offices.  
Having assessed the changes the Kenya Parliament has undergone with the new 
constitution, it is clear that it has become a more independent and powerful institution. It has 
acquired authority over its own management and resources, and more importantly, it now 
plays a major influential role in budgeting and law-making. As can be seen by the “above 
average” score-marks on legislative capacity that Parliament has acquired in the new 
constitution, its role of oversight seems to be expanding as well. Examining the four 
categories or indicators, shows that the Kenya’s Parliament is becoming more autonomous 
than it was under the former constitution through financial autonomy and the independent 
management of its staff and other requirements. The new constitution has also taken from the 
President, the exclusive power to convene, prorogue and dissolve Parliament. It has expanded 
the formal powers in several areas making it a powerful institution. This has happened at the 
cost of the executive which has seen its influence decline. 
As it takes over the role of budget allocation from the executive among other roles, the 
committee system of Parliament is strengthened and the power the committees hold will help 
constrain the executive. Under the former constitution, Parliament had unassertive influence 
as it had little say in the formation of the government and scant oversight authority although 
its resources and staff had improved considerably. The new constitution has strengthened 
Parliament which has been robust in playing its oversight role. The assertion then, that a 
strengthened Parliament with a functioning committee system holds the key to ensure 
governmental accountability, transparency, and in the process, drive democratic 
consolidation. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
With the change of the constitution in 2010, Kenya legislature has transformed from 
an emerging legislature to become a transformative legislature (this has been demonstrated in 
the data and analysis). However, even though the implementation of the new constitution has 
been promising, we cannot give a definite answer until the full operationalization of the whole 
constitution is accomplished. This will be done by the next elections in March 2013 when the 
former constitution will cease to function and the new becomes fully operational. However, 
with the timelines that has been put in place and with the accomplishments already done, 
including others not mentioned in this thesis, the future seems promising. In theory, and 
regarding the research question, the new constitution has indeed strengthened the powers of 
Parliament and made it into an assertive institution. Parliament has near full capacity in the 
four indicators that were used to gauge the strength of the legislature (as seen from the 
analysis, the Kenyan Parliament evolved from a rubberstamp legislature, to an emerging 
legislature). It is now in the transformative phase, owing to small gains through the years and 
given more impetus by the new constitution such as the power of the purse. In practice, too 
the legislature has become more eager to protect its independence from an executive that 
always tries to encroach on the powers on the other institutions. However, for checks and 
balances to be real, there should be real and effective accountability (horizontal) among the 
various institutions and respect for the constitution and its provisions. This also requires 
respect, bargaining and negotiation among the institutions as none can work without the other. 
The system of Parliamentary Committees is well developing and in the new 
dispensation of pure presidential system, Parliamentary Committees that shadows government 
ministries, departments and agencies is essential for the legislature to perform its key 
functions of legislating and oversight. This is seen in the budget-making process where there 
are a number of other portfolio committees that facilitate division of labor that is useful in that 
it creates specialization amongst MPs and other Parliamentary staff to understand policy and 
other issues in departments they are responsible for. A key added advantage in such 
committee system is that the Kenya’s Parliament has a rich pool of qualified MPs in nearly all 
fields (most have high levels of education) and most of these either head the various 
departments or are members. These committees are augmented by a competent staff. The 
presence of reformist MPs “who know the ropes” in the Kenyan legislature has enhanced the 
capacity of the legislature to perform the defining functions of the legislature. 
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 With time and through a combination of factors, the Kenyan legislature will continue 
to play a more significant role in governance through legislation and performing the other key 
roles. The new constitution gives a good framework for governance and has given new lease 
of life by reforming the justice system including the police. It has also changed the way 
political parties are formed and how they are run. This paper wishes further research in 
checking legislative assertiveness in the law making process by checking the source and type 
of legislative bills introduced and passed annually. Since the political parties system in Kenya 
is more fragmented than in other countries in Africa, the new constitution has come up with 
threshold for institutionalizing political parties. Thus, further research is needed to assess how 
the legislature - used to be more independent of party system - will perform its legislating 
functions in a system where parties will be stronger and stable and based on ideology.  
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Appendix 
Legislation to be enacted by Parliament  
Copied from the new constitution (2010) 
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Key Highlights of the Budget 
Process
 
Copied from Kenya National Assembly Publication: Kenya Parliament Vol.4 Issue 1 April 2011 (page 53) 
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Source: parliament.go.ke  
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History of MP Emoluments per Month, 1993-2008 (in Kenya shillings) 
 
Note: Notwithstanding the substantial increments in basic salary, most of the increases in the total package of 
compensation are in the form of increasing various allowances which account for 76 percent of all compensation.  
1In addition to the sitting allowance for attending plenary sessions of the house, members of committees receive 
an additional committee sitting allowance of KShs. 5,000 per month.  
2The rate of exchange during the period included by the table ranged from 62 to 80 Kenyan Shillings (KShs.) to 
the dollar. The rate at the end of July, 2008 was $1=KShs. 65.0. The dollar equivalents indicated in this table are 
calculated at that rate. 
Copied from Barkan and Matiangi (2009: 56) 
 
 
